On-line Dynamic Security Assessment in Power Systems. by Weckesser, Johannes Tilman Gabriel
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 20, 2017
On-line Dynamic Security
Assessment in Power Systems.
Weckesser, Johannes Tilman Gabriel; Jóhannsson, Hjörtur; Østergaard, Jacob
Publication date:
2014
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Weckesser, J. T. G., Jóhannsson, H., & Østergaard, J. (2014). On-line Dynamic Security
Assessment in Power Systems. Technical University of Denmark, Department of Electrical Engineering.
J. Tilman G. Weckesser
On-line Dynamic Security
Assessment in Power Systems
PhD thesis, October 2014

J. Tilman G. Weckesser
On-line Dynamic Security
Assessment in Power Systems
PhD thesis, October 2014

On-line Dynamic Security Assessment in Power Systems,
This report was prepared by
J. Tilman G. Weckesser
Supervisors
Hjörtur Jóhannsson
Jacob Østergaard
Release date: September 7, 2015
Category: 1 (public)
Edition: First
Comments: This report is part of the requirements to achieve the Doctor
of Philosophy (PhD) at the Technical University of Denmark.
This report represents 120 ECTS points.
Rights: ©J. Tilman G. Weckesser, 2014
Department of Electrical Engineering
Centre for Electric Power and Energy (CEE)
Technical University of Denmark
Elektrovej building 325
DK-2800 Kgs. Lyngby
Denmark
www.elektro.dtu.dk/cet
Tel: (+45) 45 25 35 00
Fax: (+45) 45 88 61 11
E-mail: cet@elektro.dtu.dk

Abstract
The thesis concerns the development of tools and methods for on-line dynamic
security assessment (DSA). In a future power system with low-dependence or even
independence of fossil fuels, generation will be based to a large extent on non-
controllable renewable energy sources (RES), such as wind and solar radiation.
Moreover, ongoing research suggests that demand response will be introduced to
maintain power balance between generation and consumption at all times. Due
to these changes, the operating point of the power system will be less predictable.
Consequently, today’s stability and security assessment tools, which are generally
dependent on extensive off-line studies, may no longer be feasible in their current
development state.
A core component of an efficient on-line dynamic security assessment is a fast and re-
liable contingency screening. As part of this thesis a contingency screening method
is developed and its performance is assessed utilizing a set of test cases. The de-
veloped method reliably assesses first-swing transient angular stability of a power
system in its current state with respect to a given set of contingencies. In order
to ensure fast performance of the screening method, first a review of existing tran-
sient stability assessment (TSA) methods was carried out and their computational
complexity was investigated. This allowed to identify the single machine equiva-
lent (SIME) method as the potentially fastest assessment method and, hence, well
suited for on-line DSA. Means for further performance improvement of the SIME
method are investigated such as the reduction of the degree of system model detail
used in time-domain simulation. This results in a recommendation for the required
model detail for synchronous generator. A challenging task when using the SIME
method is to early and reliably determine the critical machine cluster, which is
the group of generators likely to lose synchronism. Therefore, a novel approach to
identify the critical machine cluster is proposed in the thesis. This approach uses
a new coupling coefficient, which is a measure of the coupling strength of pairs
of generators, and a simple clustering algorithm to identify the critical group of
generators.
In order to determine a system to be transient secure, it is not sufficient to solely
assess if all synchronous generators remain in synchronism, it is also required that
the bus voltages remain within acceptable limits. A transient disturbance and the
following angular divergence of a group of generators can cause critical voltage
sags at certain buses in the system. In this thesis assessment of such voltage sags
is proposed using two types of sensitivities, which are derived from the algebraic
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network equations. These sensitivities are derived after an in-depth study of the
mechanism causing the voltage sags. The first sensitivity type is called load voltage
sensitivity and allows identifying which bus voltages are affected by a change in
rotor angle of a particular generator. The second proposed type is called generator
power sensitivity, which provides information on the effect of load variation on
the generator’s power injection. It is shown that the derived sensitivities can give
valuable information to identify critical generator-load pairs as well as locations for
applying preventive or remedial control measures. Furthermore, the development
of a method for early prediction of critical voltage sags is described. The method’s
performance is compared to other prediction approaches. The results show that the
proposed method succeeds in early, accurately and consistently predicting critically
low voltage sags.
An efficient on-line DSA not only identifies unstable or insecure operation, but also
proposes preventive or remedial control actions to restore stability and security
in the system. In this thesis a further development of a method for determining
real-time remedial action against aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability is de-
scribed. A real-time aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability assessment method
is employed to monitor the respective stability boundary and to compute the re-
spective stability margin of each generator in the system. In case that the stability
margin of a particular generator falls below a pre-defined security threshold, the
proposed method analytically determines power generation re-dispatch solutions,
which restore stable and secure operation in the system. The effectiveness of the
method is presented on two test cases in two different test systems.
Resumé
Denne afhandling omhandler udvikling af metoder for online dynamisk sikker-
hedsvurdering (DSA). I fremtidens elsystem med lav afhængighed eller sågar uaf-
hængighed af fossile brændstoffer vil en høj andel af elproduktion være baseret på
ikke-regulerbare energikilder (RES) såsom vind og sol. Desuden indikerer forskning
løbende at fleksibelt elforbrug vil indføres for at holde balancen mellem elproduk-
tion og elforbrug til alle tider. På grund af disse forandringer vil driftstilstanden
af elsystemet være mindre forudsigelig, og nuværende metoder til stabilitets- og
sikkerhedsvurdering, som generelt er baseret på omfattende oﬄine undersøgelser,
vil måske ikke længere være tilstrækkelige.
En central komponent i en effektiv online dynamisk sikkerhedsvurdering er en hur-
tig og pålidelig fejl-screening. Som del af denne afhandling er en metode til fejl-
screening udviklet, og dens resultater er vurderet på et sæt af testcases. Den ud-
viklede metode vurderer pålideligt første-svings rotorvinkel transient stabilitet af
et elsystems aktuelle driftstilstand med hensyn til et givent sæt af fejl. For at sikre
at screeningsmetoden kan udføres hurtigt, bliver en undersøgelse først udført af ek-
sisterende metoder til vurdering af transient stabilitet og deres beregningsmæssige
kompleksitet blev undersøgt. Dette gjorde det muligt at identificere single machine
equivalent (SIME) metoden som den potentielt hurtigste vurderingsmetode og er
dermed velegnet til online DSA. Muligheder for yderligere præstationsforbedring af
SIME metoden undersøges for eksempel reducering af modeldetaljen brugt i tids-
domæne simulation. Undersøgelsen resulterede i en anbefaling af den nødvendige
modeldetalje brugt i repræsentation af synkrongeneratorer. En udfordrende opgave.
når SIME-metoden er brugt, er at bestemme den kritiske maskingruppe tidligt og
pålideligt. Den gruppe vil sandsynligvis gå ud af synkronisme. Derfor er en ny
tilgang til at identificere den kritiske maskingruppe foreslået i afhandlingen. Denne
tilgang bruger en ny koblingskoefficient, som er et mål for koblingsstyrken mellem et
par generatorer og en simpel klyngealgoritme for at identificere den kritiske gruppe
af generatorer.
For at bestemme om et elsystem er transientsikkert er det ikke nok at vurdere, om
alle synkrongeneratorer forbliver i synkronisme. Det kræves også, at busspændinger
forbliver indenfor acceptable grænser. En transientforstyrrelse og den efterføl-
gende vinkeldivergens af en gruppe af generatorer kan medføre kritisk spænd-
ingssænkning på visse busser i elsystemet. I afhandlingen foreslås at to sensi-
tiviteter, som afledes fra algebraiske netværksligninger, bruges til vurdering af
disse spændingssænkninger. Disse sensitiviteter blev fundet efter dybdeborende
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undersøgelse af mekanismen, som forårsager spændingssænkninger. Den første sen-
sitivitet kaldes last-spændingssensitivitet (load voltage sensitivity). Den gør det
muligt at identificere, hvilke busspændinger der påvirkes af en forandring i ro-
torvinklen af en bestemt generator. Den anden sensitvitet kaldes generatoreffekt
sensitivitet (generator power sensitivity). Den giver informationer om virkningen
af en belastningsændring på generatorens effekt. Det vises, at de afledte sensi-
tiviteter kan give værdifulde informationer for at identificere kritiske generator-
belastningspar og steder for anvendelse af et præventiv eller afhjælpende reguler-
ing. Yderligere beskrives udviklingen af en metode til tidlig forudsigelse af kritiske
spændingssænkninger. Metodens ydeevne sammenlignes med andre forudsigelses-
metoder, og resultaterne viser, at den foreslåede metode succesfuldt forudsiger kri-
tiske spændingssænkninger tidligt, akkurat og konsistent.
En effektiv online DSA identificerer ikke kun ustabil eller usikker drift, men fores-
lår også en præventiv eller afhjælpende regulering for at genoprette stabilitet og
sikkerhed i systemet. I afhandlingen beskrives en videreudvikling af en metode
for at beregne afhjælpende regulering (remedial action) mod aperiodisk småsignal
rotorvinkel ustabilitet i realtid. En vurderingsmetode for aperiodisk småsignal ro-
torvinkel ustabilitet bruges i realtid til at overvåge den tilhørende stabilitetsgrænse
og at beregne den tilhørende stabilitetsmargin af hver generator i systemet. I til-
fælde af at en generators stabilitetsmargin er lavere end en fastlagt grænseværdi,
beregner metoden analytisk løsninger for genfordeling af effekten, der genopretter
stabil og sikker systemdrift. Brugbarheden af metoden vises på to testcases i to
forskellige testsystemer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Problem and motivation
Modern society is very dependent on the availability of energy and the consumption
is increasing. From 2004 to 2011 the per capita energy consumption increased
by almost 8 % worldwide and the electricity consumption per capita even grew
by approximately 18 % in the same period 1. This increase shows that society’s
dependency on a reliable and secure electric power supply is growing and it is not
expected to change in the future, in particularly with regards to the introduction
and the growing number of electric vehicles.
Due to the high dependency on the availability of electricity, a breakdown of the
supply, such as the 2003 blackout in the northeast of the United States of America
and in Ontario, Canada, has a large economic impact. The blackout, which affected
approximately 50 million people and lasted up to 4 days, is estimated to have caused
a loss of $4 billion to $10 billion (U.S. dollars) [1]. After the blackout a task force
was appointed to investigate the blackout, their findings were documented in [1].
They concluded that one of the principal causes of the blackout was the lack of
situational awareness, which was due to inadequate reliability tools. Therefore, it
was recommended to evaluate the real-time operating tools, which are required for
reliable and secure operation.
The growing size and complexity of the power systems on the one hand and on
the other hand the political induced paradigm shift in electric power generation
from conventional to renewable energy sources (RES) in several parts of the world,
e.g. documented in [2], pose great challenges with respect to secure and reliable
operation of the electric grid. The power generation based on RES, such as solar
radiation and wind, is dependent on forecasting accuracies. In order to account for
forecasting inaccuracies and to match power generation with consumption at all
times, research is carried out in the area of energy storage, demand response and
1http://data.worldbank.org
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other intelligent systems such as virtual power plants. Given that these projects
succeed and provide tools to balance consumption and generation at all times, the
generation and consumption pattern in the system will change frequently, which
may lead to a heavily fluctuating operating point of the power system.
Today’s tools and methods to determine and monitor stability as well as security
of the system are based on extensive off-line studies and are performed in advanced
e.g. day-ahead. This approach is feasible in a system, where power generation is
based on conventional energy sources and, therefore, can be planed ahead easily.
However, in a system with fluctuating energy sources and a consumption pattern
which is frequently adjusted to match the generation, these stability and security
assessment methods may no longer be sufficient. In [3] it is stated that in a future
smart transmission grid on-line stability assessment methods, e.g. for voltage and
transient angular stability, should be available, in order to ensure stable and secure
system operation. Furthermore, the authors suggest using measurements from pha-
sor measurement units (PMUs) for monitoring and visualization instead of system
snapshots from today’s state estimator, since state estimators require additional
runtime and are less robust. In fact, the phasor measurement technology [4, 5, 6] is
considered to be the enabling technology for the development of real-time wide-area
monitoring and control applications [7, 8].
Recent publications have presented methods which are utilizing synchronized wide-
area measurement to carry out on-line stability assessment. In [9] an entirely new
approach was developed for real-time aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability
assessment of power systems. The authors of [10] and [11] adopted an existing
off-line voltage stability method to real-time operation.
1.1.2 On-line dynamic security assessment
In order to improve situation awareness of the system operator, it is of great impor-
tance to know stability of the power system in its current condition with respect to
a number of credible contingencies. Dynamic security assessment (DSA) tools are
addressing this need. DSA is defined in [12] as follows:
“DSA refers to the analysis required to determine whether or not a
power system can meet specified reliability and security criteria in both
transient and steady-state time frames for all credible contingencies.”
In systems with conventional generation, power system operators depended heavily
on the security assessment results from off-line operation analysis to guarantee a
secure and reliable day-to-day operation. Today’s power systems are more com-
plex, due to open markets and integration of more renewable energies. Hence, the
predictability of power system operation is reduced and relying solely on off-line
DSA results is impractical or may even be infeasible. Therefore, the use of and the
demand for on-line DSA is growing worldwide [13].
In [14, Chap. 6] a structure for an on-line DSA was proposed as shown in Fig. 1.1.
In the following a short description of the different components of an on-line DSA
will be presented based on [14, Chap. 6].
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Figure 1.1: Components of an DSA and their interaction [14]
Measurement: Measurements can be obtained, e.g. from SCADA systems or
PMUs. The choice is depending on the measurement requirements such as accuracy,
sampling rate, and so on. The measurements are then used as input to a state
estimator or may directly be used in the security assessment tools.
Modeling: Accurate modeling of the power system and its components may be
the most important and critical part of an on-line DSA. Firstly, since the trend
is towards larger and larger interconnected systems, it is a challenge to determine
the required size of the used model and the adequate representation of external
systems. Secondly, another critical issue is to identify, the needed detail of the
model representation, e.g. model representation of distribution grids. Thirdly, in
order to carry out dynamic assessments and simulations, the system components
have to be represented by dynamic models suitable for the chosen time frame.
Finally, the models need to be validated with e.g. measurements, field tests or
comparison of simulations with recorded measurements of events.
Computation: In order to determine security of the system, a wide range of
methods has been developed, which may be split into two extreme groups.
• Deterministic evaluation using analytical solutions: Most complex; requires
detailed models; techniques such as detailed time-domain simulation
• Direct inference from measurements: Simplest approach; security inferred
directly from measurements (e.g. comparison of phasor angles)
Many of the currently used methods are somewhere in between the two extreme
groups or are even hybrid methods, which are combining detailed time-domain
simulation with for example a direct approach.
In order to operate the system securely, the assessment methods have to answer
the following questions at all times to the operator:
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1. How secure is the current state?
2. How secure is the operation in a different state?
3. What remedial actions can be performed to improve stability?
Consequently, the challenge of DSA is to determine the stability condition and
margin of the current state as well as the secure region. The security criteria
defining the secure region are as follows: thermal overloading, steady state voltage
and frequency excursion, transient voltage dip/rise, transient stability, small signal
stability, voltage stability frequency stability, etc. The assessment of these criteria
are carried out using either a full simulation approach (e.g. time-domain simulation,
Eigenvalue analysis and power-flow solution of P-V curves) or an approximated
approach (e.g. sensitivity based methods or direct energy methods).
Despite the considerable improvement of the processor speed of computers, DSA
and its computation still pose a great challenge. Consequently, the combination of
utilizing direct methods together with detailed simulation seems to be a promising
approach. Direct methods may be used to carry out a quick contingency screening
of the current system state and detailed time-domain simulation is only conducted
for critical contingencies and cases. Another approach to reduce the computation
time may be parallelization of the tasks.
Moreover, it is desirable that the DSA is highly automated with only little inter-
ference of the human operator. Consequently, it needs to be equipped with some
intelligence to determine the right remedial action, which considers all security mar-
gins. This automatized system needs to be very reliable and, therefore, redundancy
and self-healing may be important features of an on-line DSA.
Reporting and Visualization: In order to maneuver the system within the
secure region determined by the DSA, it is important that the results are displayed
simple as well as meaningful and that the key findings (e.g. critical contingencies,
potential criteria violations, security margins, etc.) are clearly displayed.
Control: In case that a contingency leading to insecure operation was identified,
the DSA should determine and present the required remedial action, which may be
preventive or corrective. Furthermore, the included intelligence should determine,
if the remedial action is automatically applied or if it is solely presented to the
operator.
1.1.3 Focus of the presented work
The aim of the PhD project was to contribute and advance the development of
as well as the research on on-line DSA systems. Since it is expected that the
generation and consumption pattern in the system become less predictable and
dependent on forecasting accuracies, it is expected that methods based on off-line
databases are going to be challenged by the vast amount of possible operating
conditions. Moreover, blackouts are occurring in extreme situations, which may
be extreme weather conditions or N − x contingency scenarios. It is likely that
these very unpredictable situations are not part of the database and may even
deviate significantly from the scenarios in the database. Hence, methods, which
are trained on them and provide a certain degree of generalization, may not always
be capable of correctly determining security and stability. For these reasons, the
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ambition of the PhD project was to develop on-line stability and security assessment
methods, which are independent of off-line case databases and simulations, and,
hence, approaches that are using data mining, decision trees or other machine
learning approaches were not considered to be an option. The chosen approach was
to develop or use methods, which are or were derived from in-depth studies of the
respective instability mechanism.
In this PhD project, it was investigated, how the availability of synchronized wide-
area measurements, e.g. provided by PMUs, can be used for on-line DSA. In
this work focus was on contingency screening, which was in [13] identified as a
main element of an efficient on-line DSA, and on-line transient stability assessment
(TSA) of the system. As defined in [15] TSA ...
“...is concerned with the ability of the power system to maintain syn-
chronism when subjected to a severe disturbance, such as a short circuit
on a transmission line. The resulting system response involves large ex-
cursions of generator rotor angles and is influenced by the nonlinear
power-angle relationship.”
As discussed in [16], TSA is not necessarily only concerned with loss of synchronism
of generators since in very stressed conditions other parameters may have a large
impact on the system dynamics, e.g. the transient voltage response. The angular
separation of generators caused by a large disturbance may lead to transient voltage
dips at certain buses in the system. Hence, in this work TSA is treated under
consideration of angular stability and transient voltage sags caused by rotor angle
swings.
Since DSA is not only concerned with transient stability, but also steady state sta-
bility, the PhD project investigated means to restore secure operation with respect
to aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability (ASSRAS), which is a quasi steady
state stability phenomena.
1.2 State-of-the-art
1.2.1 Installations of on-line dynamic security assessment
In 2007 Working Group Cigré C4.601 published an extensive review of on-line
dynamic security assessment tools and techniques [13]. The report covers state-of-
the-art on-line DSA and on-going research in the field. Table 1.1 shows a list of a
selected number of on-line DSA installations worldwide.
The table provides information on the assessment methods, which are part of the
DSA, where TSA stands for transient security assessment, VSA for voltage secu-
rity assessment, SSA for small signal security assessment and FSA for frequency
security assessment. Moreover, the last column informs on the current status of
the installation, where I/S refers to “in service”, O/S to “tested but out-of-service”
and U/D to “under development”.
Since the focus in this work is particular on transient stability/security assessment,
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Table 1.1: State-of-the-art dynamic security assessment installation [13]
Country Location/Company/Proj. SCOPE StatusTSA VSA SSSA FSA
Australia NEMMCO × × (MB) × I/S
Bosnia NOS × × I/S
Brazil ONS × × × × I/S
Canada BCTC × × U/D
Canada Hydro-Quebec × × I/S
China Beijing Elect. Power Corp × I/S
China CEPRI × I/S
China Guangxi Elect. Power Co. × × × I/S
Finland Fingrid × × (MB) I/S
Greece Hellenic Power System × I/S
Ireland ESB × × I/S
Italy & Greece Omases Project × × O/S
Japan TEPCO × × I/S
Malaysia Tenaga Nasional Berhad × × I/S
New Zealand Transpower × × × I/S
Panama ETESA × × I/S
Romania Transelectrica × × I/S
Russia Unif. Elect. Power System × × I/S
Saudi Arabia SEC × × U/D
South Africa ESKOM × × U/D
USA PJM × × × I/S
USA Southern Company × I/S
USA Northern States Power × I/S
USA MidWest ISO × I/S
USA Entergy × I/S
USA ERCOT × × I/S
USA FirstEnergy × U/D
USA BPA × I/S
USA PG&E × U/D
USA Southern Cal Edison × U/D
MB: Measurement based
Table 1.2 provides more information on the TSA systems employed in the DSA
installations listed in Tab. 1.1.
The table shows that in all installations time-domain simulations (TDS) are used
and often are extended with approaches using direct methods. The direct methods
are used to allow an early determination of stability and/or termination of the TDS
or estimation and computation of stability margins.
In the following, the on-line DSA with particular focus on transient security assess-
ment of three different approaches is briefly discussed on basis of three installations
described in [13].
1. Detailed time-domain simulation: Operating limits derived from extensive
time-domain simulation such as the one in Australia – NEMMCO.
2. Stability indicators derived from steady state data: The on-line DSA uses for
example a security margin for dynamic stability evaluation, which is deter-
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Table 1.2: State-of-the-art transient security assessment approaches used in the
installations described in [13]
Country – Company/Proj. Type Description
Australia – NEMMCO TDS Extensive off-line studies to determine operating limits
Bosnia – NOS SSSL Max. power transfer margin using Dimo’s methodTDS security margin: large enough to ensure TSA
Brazil – ONS TDS Simulation in combination with SIME methodDM
Canada – Hydro-Quebec TDS Power transfer limits are determined off-lineand are employed during on-line operation.
China – CEPRI TDS Extensive time-domain simulation utilizing parallelprocessing
China – Guangxi Elect. Power Co. TDS Simulation of a limited selection of contingencies.
Italy & Greece – Omases Project TDS Simulation in combination with SIME methodDM
Japan – TEPCO TDS Simulation in combination with TEPCO-BCU methodDM and BCU classifiers
Malaysia – Tenaga Nasional Berhad TDS Simulations of a set of contingencies
New Zealand – Transpower TDS Operating limits are determined from off-line studies
Panama – ETESA SSSL Dimo’s method to determine max. loadingTDS Off-line TDS to determine necessary security margin
Romania – Transelectrica SSSL Dimo’s method to determine max. loadingTDS Off-line TDS to determine necessary security margin
USA – PJM TDS TDS to compute non-linear system responseDM TSA margin determined using SIME based approach
USA – Southern Company TDS TDS to compute non-linear system responseDM TSA margin determined using SIME based approach
TDS: time-domain simulation; SSSL: steady state stability limit; DM: direct method; SIME: single machine
equivalent; BCU: boundary of stability region based controlling unstable equilibrium point;
mined from a steady state stability limit, e.g. in Bosnia and Herzegovina –
NOS
3. Combination of TDS with direct method: The on-line DSA combines both
approaches to speed up the assessment, e.g. in Brazil – ONS TDS is combined
with the SIME method
For a discussion of the remaining assessment methods, the reader is referred to the
full report of the Cigré working group [13].
Australia – NEMMCO: TSA is of particular interest in the system, due to its
network structure. The desired performance of the on-line DSA is 10− 15 minutes,
which is due to the requirement that the system needs to be maneuvered back into
a secure state within 30 minutes after it had entered an insecure post-contingency
state. The TSA heavily utilizes results from off-line studies, which provide system
operating limits. NEMMCO applies those as constraints in the power dispatch
process of the electricity market. The limits are determined by extensive time-
domain simulations using PSS/E. NEMMCO also developed and employs a real-
time security assessment tool. The tool receives the current system snapshot from
the state estimator and forwards it to a time-domain simulation engine, which
monitors transient security in real-time for a number of credible contingencies. The
current implementation usually considers 55 as credible classified contingencies.
The considered system model consists of approximately 2100 buses, 300 generators
and 700 dynamic models. The DSA server is capable of evaluating the stability of
all contingencies in less than ten minutes including five second PSS/E simulations
per contingency.
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In conclusion, the TSA of NEMMCO is based on detailed time-domain simula-
tion and the on-line assessment is enabled by choosing a small number of credible
contingencies.
Bosnia and Herzegovina – NOS: The installed on-line DSA consists of a state
estimator and a Fast Maximum Transfer Capability Analyzer (FMTCA). It works
seamlessly with the off-line power flow and transient stability program used in op-
erations planning. The on-line DSA is not using detailed time-domain simulation
but FMTCA, which employs a method developed by Paul Dimo to assess the max-
imum transfer capability of the power system [14, Chap. 2]. The method receives
a load-flow solution from the state estimator and it is claimed that it determines
the following in less than one second:
• Maximum loadability of each area including a user-defined security margin,
• The generators likely to cause instability as well as impact of machines and
tie-lines on system stability,
• And the stability indices for system buses.
Here, security margin is defined as a steady state stability reserve that is sufficient
large, in order that the system can withstand any set of credible contingency. It is
not described, how the security margin is determined. In [14, Chap. 2] it is stated
that the security margin may be chosen as a fixed percentage (e.g. 8 − 15%) of
the steady state stability limit, which corresponds to the maximum power transfer
limit. Moreover, the authors propose an algorithm to heuristically determine the
security margin in terms of steady state stability reserve. The approach utilizes
a load-flow solution at peak load conditions and runs extensive transient stability
simulation of a set of credible contingencies. The security margin corresponds to
the loading level or rather steady state stability reserve, where all contingencies
are stable and an increasing of the loading level leads to at least one contingency
becoming unstable.
The determination of a static heuristically computed security margin poses a large
computational burden and requires knowing generation as well as consumption
patterns well in advanced. Therefore, in a future system with large share of RES
the approach may be insufficient. Moreover, the usage of a static security margin
could be very conservative.
Brazil – ONS: The on-line DSA comprises six security assessment methods, which
are as follows: operating point steady state contingency analysis, operating point
dynamic contingency analysis, import-export steady state transfer limit between
two-generation areas, import-export dynamic transfer limit between two-generation
areas, steady state security region computation and dynamic security region com-
putation. Moreover, the DSA system can provide information on preventive or
remedial action, such as generation active power re-dispatch to avoid rotor angle
instability. For the assessment of dynamic security, ONS utilizes detailed time-
domain simulation as well as hybrid or direct methods based on the equal area
criterion or numerical energy functions, which are mainly used for stability margin
computation.
The approach and the implementation described by ONS seems to be promising
and it is stated that the performance targets, e.g. dynamic security assessment of
100 contingencies in a test system with 3000 buses and 700 generators in less than
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30 s, was achieved. However, the next steps are integration into the main control
center to evaluate real world performance.
1.2.2 Research on on-line dynamic security assessment
In the following, the results of on-going research efforts in the area of on-line dy-
namic security assessment are presented.
In [17, Chapter 6] the authors describe the further developed functions of the on-
line DSA system used in Brazil – ONS. As mentioned earlier the DSA system uses
a combination of detailed time-domain simulation and direct methods. The assess-
ment of stability using solely time-domain simulation requires visual inspection of
the results. The authors replace the need for inspection by employing numerical
energy functions and a modified version of the SIME method to compute stability
margins, detect instability and enable early termination of the simulations. The
further development of the DSA functions is mainly concerning the transient sta-
bility assessment approach, where the original SIME method was modified. The
modified version of SIME improves the speed and the accuracy of the computa-
tion of stability margins for stable cases. The central idea was to estimate the
Pe − δ characteristic of the single machine equivalent or rather the one machine
infinite bus system (OMIB) by the following equation.
Pe(δ) =
Em(δ)E∞
Xe
sin δ + P0 (1.1)
This equation expresses the electric power of the OMIB as a function of the equiva-
lent machine voltage behind the transient reactance Em , the voltage at the infinite
bus E∞, the equivalent machine rotor angle δ and a local power P0, which is de-
termined to fit a particular operating point. The authors suggest computing the
parameters Em(δ) and E∞ as the average of the generators’ voltages behind the
synchronous reactance in the critical and non-critical generator group. Moreover,
Xe is determined as the weighted average of the external impedance seen by each
generator in the critical group. The Pe− δ characteristic of the OMIB can then be
used to determine the stability margin of a case as soon as the maximum kinetic
energy is known.
The recent achievements in research on on-line DSA systems using the transient
energy function are presented in [18]. The authors present an update on the on-line
DSA system implemented at TEPCO in Japan. The presented DSA system exists
of two major blocks. The first block carries out a dynamic contingency screening
given a system state and a list of contingencies. The contingencies are classified and
the definitely stable cases are filtered out. The unstable and/or undecided cases are
forwarded to the second block, which carries out detailed time-domain analysis. In
order to efficiently filter and classify all given contingencies, the authors propose an
improved version of the BCU classifiers, which were proposed in [19]. Each of the
seven classifiers is designed to filter out contingencies with a certain characteristic,
e.g. contingencies causing islanding. The second block carries out BCU-guided time
domain simulation for each unstable and/or undecided case, which is described in
detail in [20]. In this approach detailed time-domain simulation is carried out and
the simulation output is used to determine stability as well as the stability margin
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with the BCU method. Depending on the case it may be necessary to run several
simulations with varying clearing time for one contingency.
The authors of [21] propose a new approach for on-line dynamic security assess-
ment, which uses phasor measurement units and off-line created decision trees. The
method receives on-line data for the next 24 hours consisting of a series of operating
conditions corresponding to load profile and unit commitment-based generation pat-
terns. These data are used for exhaustive detailed time-domain simulations of N−1
and credible N − k contingencies. The simulation results are stored in a database,
which is used to train a decision tree (DT). Critical attributes (CAs), which charac-
terize the system’s dynamic performance, are determined using the DT. Moreover,
thresholds for the CAs are identified on basis of the simulation database and the
DT. Contrary to the traditional terminal-node based DT method, the authors pro-
pose a path based DT method. In that approach, insecurity scores are computed
for each path of the DT and acceptability limits for this score are defined. During
on-line operation PMU measurements are used to measure or compute the critical
attributes and the values are used to identify related paths in the DT. If any in-
security score exceeds the pre-defined limit and the related contingency has a high
probability, then preventive measures can be determined and executed.
In [22] the authors propose another decision tree based approach for on-line DSA
and preventive control. For that purpose, two DTs are trained daily using a
database of power system simulations and prediction data for a 24-h horizon. One
DT uses measurable variables to monitor the system condition and identify po-
tential security issues, which is called the observation DT (ODT). The second DT
of controllable variables is used to provide on-line decision support for preventive
controls and is called the preventive DT (PDT). During on-line operation, real-time
measurements are utilized and compared to thresholds in the ODT. If a threshold
is violated, the data are forwarded to the PDT, where the most efficient preventive
control in terms of generation shift is determined. The security of the system is
determined with simple security indices such as transient security indices based on
the maximum angular separation of generators.
A third approach using decision trees was described in [23]. Here, particular focus
was on reducing the impact of missing PMU measurements. Multiple small DTs
are trained off-line and then re-checked with new cases in near real-time. In real-
time operation, the method utilizes wide-area PMU measurements, where some
measurements may be missing; a boosting algorithm is used to weight viable small
DTs before assembly.
The authors of [24] propose a linear approach for a risk based DSA. For that
purpose, an indicator representing the total system risk is proposed. The indicator
is computed as the sum of the risks of each considered contingency. The risk
associated to a certain contingency is computed as the product of the probability
of its occurrence, the probability of its stability margin and its severity. The severity
of a contingency is described by a linear function and dependent on the ratio of
the critical fault clearing time to the actual fault clearing time. The probability
of the stability margin originates from uncertainties for example introduced by
the prediction of power consumption. The presented results show that the linear
method is considerably faster than other risk assessment approaches, which for
example use the Monte Carlo method.
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1.2.3 Identified research challenges
The prior mentioned Cigré report presented an overview of on-line DSA installations
from all around the world and showed that a variety of techniques are used e.g.
detailed simulation, direct methods and simplified methods. This was followed by
an overview of on-going research in the field and will be concluded with a list of
identified research challenges for on-line DSA systems.
• Speed of analysis: Further performance improvements are required, which is
for example due to the increasing size of power system models.
• Robustness of analysis: The used stability/security assessment and screening
methods have to generate robust and reliable assessment results. Therefore,
a further development and improvement of the methods is needed.
• Solution robustness: State estimators have to be reliable also under stressed
system conditions, since their output is used and needs to be matched with
the dynamic system model. For that reason, system wide monitoring with
PMUs is very attractive.
• Load modeling: Need for methods which provide correct models of aggregated
loads, which correctly represent the important load characteristics.
• System modeling: Since SCADA only can cover a limited geographical area,
adequate model approximations of the external systems have to be made, and
development of wide-are state estimators needs to be promoted.
• Risk based security assessment: Development of risk-based DSA solutions,
which take into account the probability of the occurrence of a fault as well as
its severity.
• Optimal remedial measures: Development of highly robust and reliable closed-
loop preventive or remedial control methods.
In the thesis in each chapter more specific state-of-the-art sections can be found,
which address a particular part of dynamic security assessment.
1.3 Contributions
In the following, the main contributions of the presented work are listed:
• Investigation of the adaptability of transient stability assessment methods to
real-time operation: A review of the existing transient stability assessment
methods was carried out and their development was traced back. The com-
putational complexity of individual methods was then evaluated under con-
sideration of the respective assessment algorithms. This allowed investigating
the performance of the methods in large power systems and future power
systems, where the system composition may be changed. Finally, it allowed
identifying the method best suited for real-time transient stability assessment
in future power systems.
• Impact of model detail of synchronous machine on real-time transient stability
assessment: With an heuristic approach it was shown how detailed the model
of a synchronous machine needs to be to correctly display the instability
mechanism in power system simulations and to allow correct as well as early
stability assessment with a hybrid transient stability assessment method.
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• A method for fast contingency screening and on-line transient stability as-
sessment: The method carries out on-line transient stability assessment in
a power system with respect to a set of contingencies. The contingencies
are then corresponding to their severity divided in six different categories.
Furthermore, the run-time of the method was assessed to show the superior
performance in direct comparison to pure time-domain simulation, due to
an early simulation stop. The run-time assessment also allowed identifying
means for future improvements of the method.
• A method for early and reliable identification of the critical machine cluster:
The method aims at early and reliably identifying the critical group of ma-
chines. For that purpose, a novel coupling coefficient was derived, which is
a measure of the coupling strength between a pair of generators. After fault
clearance, these coupling coefficients are utilized to identify the group of gen-
erators, which is likely to lose synchronism. This information can then be
used to early and reliably determine transient stability of the system.
• Sensitivities were derived to investigate voltage sags caused by rotor swings:
Two types of sensitivities were derived from the algebraic network equations.
The first sensitivity allows identifying critical generator-load pairs, which
means that a change in the generator’s respective rotor angle greatly im-
pacts the voltage at a particular load. For example these sensitivities can
be used to determine the contributions of individual generators to observed
voltage sags. The second sensitivity reveals the impact of a change in load
consumption on the generators in the system. These sensitivities can provide
valuable insight, when designing special protection schemes such as under-
voltage load-shedding schemes.
• A method to predict transient voltage sags caused by rotor swings: The de-
veloped method uses post-fault measurements and a transient stability as-
sessment method, which is based on the single machine equivalent approach,
to predict crossing of a critical voltage level at the system buses as well as
the minimum of the voltage sag. The method may be part of a closed-loop
emergency control against voltage sags.
• Further development of a remedial action method: The method determines re-
medial action against aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability. It proposes
re-dispatch solutions of active power generation, which lead to a stabilization
of the imminent unstable generator and restores security in the system.
A list of the publications prepared throughout the project can be found on page xi.
1.4 Thesis structure
In this section the report structure is introduced to help the reader to easily find
his way through the thesis. The project’s main results are published in separate
scientific papers, which are attached to this report in the appendix as paper A to H.
Throughout the report there will be references to these papers, where it is needed.
However, the papers may also be read independently of the report.
In the prior section the background of the project was briefly discussed and the
state-of-the-art of on-line dynamic security assessment was presented. The intro-
duction chapter was then concluded by a listing of the contributions made by the
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PhD project and this description of the thesis structure. The following three chap-
ters are then summarizing the work in the three main topics, which have been
addressed in the PhD project.
The second chapter presents the results on contingency screening and transient
angular stability assessment, where the following questions were addressed.
1. Which transient stability assessment methods have been developed? And how
suitable are those for on-line stability assessment?
2. How can the computational performance of the methods be improved? And
what model simplifications can be assumed?
3. How can the contingency screening method be implemented in an on-line
environment? What is the performance and reliability of the method? How
can the performance be further improved?
The third chapter concludes on the results achieved in the area of transient voltage
sag assessment and prediction, where the following questions were investigated.
1. What mechanism causes transient voltage sags?
2. Which sensitivities can be used to assess voltage sags? And what can they
be used for?
3. How can voltage sags be predicted? And what is the best prediction method?
Finally, in the third chapter the results from preventive and remedial control are
summarized, which tried to answer the following question.
1. What can be done when aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability was
detected with a real-time assessment method?
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Chapter 2
Fast contingency screening and
on-line transient stability
assessment
This chapter describes the development of the contingency screening and on-line
transient stability assessment method as well as it summarizes the main results.
The chapter begins with a short description of the topic. Then an overview of the
existing transient stability assessment methods is presented and their potential to
be used as an on-line assessment tool is investigated. The details of the investigation
can be found in paper A in the Appendix. In the next section, the needed model
detail for generators is investigated and the detailed results are documented in paper
B. The findings of the two prior papers enabled the development of a method for
contingency screening and on-line transient stability assessment. The method itself
is proposed and results are presented, all the details can be found in paper C. The
last section of the chapter addresses the issue of identifying the critical cluster of
machines after the occurrence of a fault. A new approach for identifying the cluster
is presented. The detailed findings as well as the derivation of the approach can be
found in paper D.
2.1 Motivation
A very important part of an extensive on-line dynamic security assessment toolbox
is an efficient contingency screening method [13]. This method assesses periodically
the capability of the power system in its current state to sustain a set of credible
contingencies. Here, of particular interest is if the system can survive the dynamic
system response to a fault and its clearance, which is governed by the highly non-
linear differential and algebraic system equations.
One of the measures of surviving a contingency is that all synchronous machines in
the system remain in synchronism after the fault is cleared. This stability mech-
anism is called transient stability and has been studied intensely. Assessing tran-
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sient stability by numerically integrating the system of differential and algebraic
equations poses a large computational burden and, hence, already since the 1930’s
research efforts have been conducted to develop direct methods to replace the use
of extensive power system simulations e.g. the equal area criterion (EAC). The
origin of EAC is not precisely documented [25], but it was one of the first times
mentioned in [26]. Another widely studied direct method is based on Lyapunov’s
second method, where the power system and its dynamics are represented by the
transient energy function, which is a possible Lyapunov function describing the
dynamics of a power system [27].
However, neither of the aforementioned methods did succeed in replacing the use of
time-domain simulations completely, since the direct methods have limitations, e.g.
on how detailed the dynamic generator models can be represented. Hence, until
now contingency screening approaches are carried out off-line using time-consuming
power system simulations with detailed model representations of the power system
components.
Due to the paradigm shift in today’s power generation and, hence, in power system
structure, as described in Sec. 1.1, a need for on-line DSA emerges and, hence, also
for fast on-line contingency screening approaches.
2.2 State-of-the-art of contingency screening
A variety of methods for contingency screening have been developed. Generally
these methods use three different approaches and combinations of them:
1. Detailed time-domain simulation
2. Direct transient stability assessment methods based on e.g. Lyapunov’s sec-
ond method or equal area criterion
3. Severity and stability indicators
A method for contingency ranking using a combination of detailed time-domain
simulation and severity indices was described in [28]. A contingency is simulated
until approximately 500 ms after the fault clearance and the derived severity indices
are computed at the end of the simulation. For the purpose of measuring the
severity of a contingency, the authors propose several indices, which are based on:
1. Coherency: Maximum relative change of rotor angle of a machine after fault
clearance.
2. Transient energy conversion: Maximum deviation between kinetic and poten-
tial energy derived from the transient energy function (TEF) as described in
[29].
3. Dot products of certain system states: E.g. dot product of rotor acceleration
relative to the center of inertia (COI) and rotor speed with respect to COI.
Finally, the authors propose a composite index, which assigns different weights to
the prior defined indexes and sums up their contributions.
The proposed indexes are tested on several test systems and test cases. The results
show that to a certain extent the indexes may measure the severity of a contingency.
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However, in particular in the test case with 161 generators the majority of the
indexes do not obviously divide the contingencies into unstable and stable scenarios.
In [30] a screening method based on a direct method was proposed. The method
utilizes the transient energy function and aims at filtering out the non-severe distur-
bances. The TEF has received a lot of attention and assessment methods based on
it were continuously advanced. In [31, pp. 335], a recently developed on-line tran-
sient stability screening method based on TEF is presented. The approach uses
the TEPCO-BCU method to determine stability [32]. Furthermore, seven BCU
classifiers as discussed in [19] were improved and were employed to enable a fast
screening of a given set of contingencies. Each of the classifiers is designed to screen
out a particular category of contingencies, e.g. one classifier aims at filtering all
highly stable cases. The method was tested on a large system with 14,500 buses.
It was capable of capturing all unstable cases, 92− 99.5 % of the stable cases and
needed approximately 1.356 s per contingency.
A contingency screening method utilizing the extended equal area criterion (EEAC)
as described in [33] was presented in [34]. The EEAC is a further development of
the equal area criterion (EAC) to allow an application of the criterion to multi-
machine systems. The authors derived a set of rules to effectively filter out the
stable cases from a set of credible contingencies. In order to identify and filter
stable cases, just after fault clearance the stability margins determined from the
static EEAC (SEEAC) and dynamic EEAC (DEEAC, as described [35, 36]) are
computed. Then the aforementioned rules are employed to identify, if a case is
stable and should be filtered out. The authors suggest that the remaining cases are
then investigated using the integrating EEAC. The proposed method was tested on
seven test systems and in total 1106 cases, where 859 cases were actually stable and
247 were unstable. The results showed that the method filters between 70− 100 %
of the stable cases without any false positives.
In [25] the authors propose a contingency screening method, which is based on the
single machine equivalent (SIME) method. The method carries out a contingency
filtering, ranking and assessment. The method aims at first filtering out all the sta-
ble contingencies and then ranking of the remaining possible harmful contingencies.
The ranking is carried out based on their estimated critical clearing times (CCTs).
In order to filter and rank the contingencies, the method requires the results from
up to two time-domain simulations for each contingency. In order to filter out most
of the stable cases, a first relative long clearing time is chosen (CT1) and all cases,
which are assessed to be stable, are filtered out. The second simulation is carried
out with a clearing time slightly higher than the protection setting (CT2 < CT1).
If the case is assessed unstable, then the contingency is determined to be harmful
and a CCT may be estimated as an extrapolation of CT1, CT2 and the respec-
tive computed stability margins. If the case is stable, a CCT is estimated from
an interpolation of the two prior chosen clearing times and the respective stability
margins in the two cases. Finally, if the estimated CCT is above a third clearing
time threshold (CT2 < CT3 < CT1), then the contingency is discarded as harmless,
else it is classified as potentially harmful.
Another contingency screening method employing SIME was presented in [37]. A
new index for grouping of the generators was proposed by the authors as well
as a contingency classification based on the power-angle shape of the one machine
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Figure 2.1: Block diagram of the proposed screening and assessment method
integrated into a framework for online assessment
infinite bus system, which resulted from aggregation of the generators in the system.
One to three detailed time-domain simulations per contingency are required to
classify and rank the respective contingency.
2.3 Structure of the developed screening and assess-
ment method
In this section the structure of the proposed screening and assessment method is
briefly introduced and the assumptions are described. The method is described in
detail in Sec. 2.6 and paper C. However, the method was developed based on the
findings presented in Sec. 2.4 and 2.5.2 and, therefore, it is reasonable to introduce
the frame of the method at this point.
The method was developed under the assumption that a validated system snapshot,
e.g. from validated synchronized phasor measurements providing full system ob-
servability, is available and may be used to initialization a time-domain simulation.
Furthermore, a database with static and dynamic system parameter is accessible,
where each system component, e.g. synchronous generator, is represented with suf-
ficient model detail, which is further discussed in Sec. 2.5.2. The structure of the
developed method is shown in Fig. 2.1.
The method receives a validated system snapshot, which contains the complex bus
voltages and complex branch currents of the system, as well as model parameter
of the system components. These data are used to set-up and initialize a detailed
power system model. This dynamic power system model is then input for the fast
contingency screening and TSA method, whose derivation and development is the
focus of this chapter. Finally, the screening and assessment results are forwarded
to be available for other assessment, control and visualization methods, which may
be part of the dynamic security assessment toolbox.
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Figure 2.2: Available methods and their development steps (not intended to be
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2.4 Review and investigation of existing transient sta-
bility assessment methods
The core of an efficient contingency screening method is a fast and accurate tran-
sient stability assessment method (TSA). Since research has been addressing the
problem of TSA since the 1930s, a wide-range of assessment methods has already
been developed and tested.
For fast assessment the aforementioned direct methods are appealing and, hence, a
review of methods based on these was carried out. As part of the review, the per-
formance of some of the methods was evaluated by investigating the computational
complexity of the underlying algorithm.
2.4.1 Overview of existing methods
In Fig. 2.2 (adopted from paper A) the results of the investigation of existing
methods and their development steps are shown. It should be noted that in par-
ticular the Equal Area Criterion as well as methods based on the Transient Energy
Function have been developed extensively and show promising results. Therefore,
it was chosen to investigate the complexity of those methods in more detail.
2.4.2 Runtime analysis through assessment of computational com-
plexity
The computational complexity of a selection of methods was assessed through de-
tailed analysis of the respective algorithms and was expressed in big O-notation,
which is a common approach to evaluate the performance of algorithms in computer
sciences [60].
For each of the methods the required computations were analyzed and their com-
plexity was determined as a function of parameters of the power system such as
number of buses n, branches b or generators m. This allows evaluating and as-
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Table 2.1: Complexity estimation comparison, where b: number
of branches; d: bandwidth of banded matrix; m: number of
generators; n: number of buses
Method Dominant Operation Time
Closest UEP Determine V O(m4)
BCU Matrix Reduction O(dn2)
EEAC Matrix Reduction O(dn2)
Preventive SIME Time-domain Sim.† xO(d2n)
† : Explicit integration method (R-K method) with x
time steps after fault clearance
sessing of the performance of the various methods with respect to the system size,
e.g. number of generators or buses, and structure of the power system, e.g. ratio
between number of generators and buses.
In comparison to runtime assessment using a particular test power system, the
assessment of the algorithm has the great advantage that the results are valid for
different power system structures, such as a future power system with large number
of distributed energy generation.
As part of the investigation two methods based on the transient energy function and
two based on the equal area criterion (EAC) were assessed. The transient energy
function based methods are the closest unstable equilibrium point (UEP) method
and the boundary of stability region based controlling unstable equilibrium point
(BCU) method. The EAC based methods are the extended equal area criterion
(EEAC) method and the preventive single machine equivalent (SIME) method.
For each of these methods the complexity of each computational step was assessed
and the dominant (most complex) computation was identified. Table 2.1 presents
a comparison of the complexity of the prior mentioned methods.
The table shows the name of the respective method, a short description of the dom-
inant operation and the associated runtime in big O-notation. The results suggest
that the preventive SIME methods has the potential to be the fastest method, under
the assumption that the number of required time-steps x as well as the bandwidth
of the admittance matrix d are much less than the number of buses n in the system.
The SIME method is a so-called hybrid method, since it combines the advantages
of detailed time-domain simulation with the advantages of using a direct method
in this case the EAC [25]. This combination allows to early determine transient
stability of a case and, hence, an early stop of the time-domain simulation.
In this section only a short summary of the findings was presented and the reader
is encouraged to read paper A, where the different assessment methods as well as
the determination of the computational complexities are described in detail.
Update on runtime analysis: Further literature search and research has led to
updated complexities, which are explained in the following.
Highly efficient algorithms have been developed to carry out LU-factorization of
the very sparse admittance matrices in power systems a comparison can be found
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Table 2.2: Complexity estimation processes shared by the two scalar Lyapunov methods
Function Time Freq.
Y from PMU O(m+ n+ b) 1 O(m+ n+ b)
Reduce Matrices O(dn2) 1 O(dn2)
Time domain simulation† O(nα) x xO(nα)
Determine Vcl O(m3) 1 O(m3)
Determine Vcrit Paper A III-B1 & Tab. 2.3
Compare Vcl and Vcrit 1 1 1
TOTAL‡(one disturbance) O(dn2)
 : Matrix reduction by partitioning of the matrix, see [62, section 2.1]
† : Using an explicit integration method Runge-Kutta with x time steps with
α ≈ 1.2
‡ : Runtime evaluation without determination of the critical energy
Table 2.3: Complexity estimation BCU
Function Time Freq.
Lyapunov method frame O(dn2) 1 O(dn2)
Sim. until PEBS crossing † O(nα) y yO(nα)
Sim. reduced system ‡ O(nα) z zO(nα)
Find CUEP O(m3) 1 O(m3)
Determine Vcrit O(m2) 1 O(m2)
TOTAL(one disturbance) O(dn2)
 : see table 2.2
† : Time dom. sim. continued using R-K with y time
steps with α ≈ 1.2
‡ : Time dom. sim. of red. system using R-K with z
time steps with α ≈ 1.2
in [61]. The authors show experimentally that with very efficient factorization
algorithms, such as KLU, the complexity of the factorization can be estimated as
being quasi linear with complexity of O(nα) (where α ≈ 1.2). This is considerably
faster as the estimation of O(d2n).
Furthermore, closer investigation of the computation of the differential equations
of the generator rotor and stator as well as the associated algebraic equations has
led to the conclusion that the complexity of the calculations is more appropriately
estimated as being linear dependent on the number of generators. Hence, the
associated complexity in O-notation is O(m).
This leads to an alternation of the runtime assessment results. Therefore, the Tables
II, V and VI from paper A are repeated with the updated values, where the new
values are marked blue.
The updated complexity estimation results, which are affected by the update, are
shown in Tables 2.2-2.4. It should be noted that the result of the complexity
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Table 2.4: Complexity estimation SIME
Function Time Freq.
PMU data O(m+ n+ b) 1 O(m+ n+ b)
Time domain sim.† O(nα) x xO(nα)
Rotor angle (pred.) 1 m O(m)
Ident. critical mach. O(m logm) 1 O(m logm)
Aggregate & form OMIB O(m) 1 O(m)
P − δ approx. 1 1 1
Det. stability margin 1 1 1
TOTAL(one dist.) xO(nα)
† : Explicit integration method (R-K method) with x time steps
with α ≈ 1.2
Table 2.5: Updated complexity estimation comparison
Method Dominant Operation Time
Closest UEP Determine V O(m4)
BCU Matrix Reduction O(dn2)
EEAC Matrix Reduction O(dn2)
Preventive SIME Time-domain Sim.† xO(nα)
† : Explicit integration method (R-K method) with x
time steps after fault clearance
estimation of the Lyapunov method frame (see Table 2.2) and the BCU method
(see Table 2.3) were not altered, since in both cases the step corresponding to the
computation of the reduced matrix is dominant. In the estimation of the complexity
of the SIME method (see Table 2.4), in spite of the updated complexities, the time-
domain simulation remains to be dominant as long as the number of buses n is
considerably larger than the number of generators in the system, e.g. n > 2m.
This as a consequence also leads to an updated table of the complexity comparison,
which now shows the better performance of the preventive SIME method even
clearer (see Table 2.5).
2.5 Investigation of speed-up possibilities of transient
stability assessment
2.5.1 Motivation
The assessment of the existing transient stability assessment methods and their
algorithm complexity presented in the previous section led to the conclusion that
the hybrid method preventive SIME is potentially the fastest TSA method.
Since time-domain simulation was in the previous section identified as the operation
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posing the largest computational burden. An attempt to speed up the simulation
appears to be an efficient way to improve the overall performance of the method.
There are various ways to speed up time-domain simulation amongst others:
• Improve algorithms to handle admittance matrix, e.g. LU-factorization.
• Reduction of the number of differential equations, which need to be solved.
As described in the previous section very efficient algorithms were developed for
LU-factorization of the sparse admittance matrix. A simple reduction of the model
detail of the components in the system, e.g. synchronous generators, and, hence,
reducing the number of differential equations to be solved in each time step of the
simulation could be an efficient way to speed up the simulation. For that purpose,
it was investigated, how the model detail of synchronous generators impacts the
transient stability assessment with preventive SIME.
2.5.2 Impact of model detail of synchronous machines on transient
stability assessment
In this section the results are presented of the investigation on how detailed the
model of synchronous generator needs to be to assess transient stability with the
SIME method correctly. The method was prior identified as being a potentially fast
assessment method. The idea is that a further speed-up of the assessment method
can be achieved by reducing the detail of the models and, thereby, lowering the
number of differential equations to be solved in each simulation step.
Hence, the task was to investigate, if it is possible to reduce the order of the
synchronous machine model, while
• the instability mechanism is not altered
• and SIME correctly & early detects stability/instability
For that purpose, simulations and stability assessment results of two test systems,
with synchronous machine models of four different degrees of detail, were conducted
and compared. The considered synchronous machine models were the following:
Four Winding model (6th-order): Two damper windings in the q-axis;
one damper winding and the field winding in the d-axis; network and stator
transients are neglected. Recommended in [63] for round-rotor generators
with no dampers in the pole face region. Data supplied by manufacturer are
usually based on this model.
Two-axis model (4th-order): Damper winding dynamics ψ1d and ψ2q are
neglected; E′d and E′q dynamics are maintained.
One-axis model (3rd-order): Damper winding dynamics E′d are neglected
additionally.
Classical model (2nd-order): Voltage behind transient reactance assumed
to be constant.
The two test systems are listed below.
Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) system: 9 buses, 3
generators; no governor model, excitation system and PSS (adopted from
[64]).
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New England & New York system: 68 buses, 16 generators; thermal/turbine
governor, static exciters and PSS included (adopted from [65], see also Sec. I.1
in the Appendix).
For each of the test systems two test cases were set-up, a stable and an unstable
case. In order to determine if a case is stable or unstable, the simulation with
the highest order model (here: 6th-order) was considered as a reference and the
simulations with lower order models were compared against this reference.
Firstly, in order to assess if the instability mechanism is the same in the simulations
with lower order model, the rotor angle trajectories were compared to the trajectory
in the reference case. In the unstable case, the mechanism is considered to be
equivalent, if the same generator or group of generators loses synchronism as in
the reference case. In the stable case the critical generator or group of generators
should show a similar rotor angle response as the reference. Secondly, in order to
investigate if SIME correctly and early determines stability/instability, the stability
margin trajectories are computed in the different simulations and compared to the
respective stability margin of the reference simulation.
The study showed that SIME in all cases assessed stability correctly and in accor-
dance to the rotor angle response of the critical generators. However, it was found
that the stability/instability mechanism is only correctly exhibited, if the used syn-
chronous machine model is of 4th-order or higher. Figure 2.3 shows a result of the
comparison of the different generator models. The rotor angle responses depicted
in Fig. 2.3(a) reveal that only the simulations with 4th-order exhibit the same in-
stability mechanism as the reference case, which is the simulation with 6th-order
model. Hence, a representation of the generators with lower order models would not
be sufficient. Figure 2.3(b) displays the stability margin computed with the SIME
method over simulated time. It shows that the method in all cases determines the
stability margin correctly. Correspondingly, the stability margin converges to a
positive value for the simulations with 2nd- & 3rd-order and a negative value for
4th- order and higher.
In this section a short summary of the findings was presented and the reader is
referred to paper B in the Appendix to find the in-depth description of the inves-
tigation methodology as well as the detailed results.
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2.6 Fast contingency screening, ranking and on-line tran-
sient stability assessment
In order to ensure that the system is N − 1 secure, a fast and reliable contingency
screening method is essential. Moreover, to provide a more complete picture of the
system state a ranking of each contingency is very valuable.
For that purpose in this section a method is introduced, which carries out a fast con-
tingency screening, ranking and on-line transient stability assessment. The method
was developed based on the findings of the prior sections (Sec. 2.4 & 2.5.2). Hence,
the developed method uses the preventive SIME method to early and accurately
determine stability of a particular case. In the following a short summary of the
findings is described and the reader is encouraged to read paper C, where the
method and the results are described in detail.
2.6.1 Contingency screening and ranking method
The framework for integration of the contingency screening and assessment method
into an on-line assessment environment was briefly introduced in Sec. 2.3. In this
section, the actual screening and assessment method is introduced. Fig. 2.4 shows
the block diagram of the proposed method. As mentioned in Sec. 2.3 the input to
the method is the initialized power system model.
Fault parameter selection: In the first call of the function a list of contingencies
is set-up, then and in any subsequent call of the function the parameter (e.g. type
of fault, fault location, protection relay settings, etc.) of the next fault on the list
are extracted and used in the next simulation.
Prepare and execute simulation of scenario: The fault parameter and the
detailed power system model are then used to initialize the time-domain simulation,
which is then executed to determine the dynamic system response caused by the
contingency and its clearance.
Identify and assess islands: At the same time the power system model and fault
parameter are forwarded to a function, which checks if islands were created due to
the fault clearance and determines if loads or generators are in the island. In order
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Table 2.6: Classification of contingencies (where g: number of generators and
l: number of loads)
Classifier η dPadδ
∣∣
δr
ω
Number of Explanationgen. & loads
Definitely − − − − No intersection of P (δ)-curve and Pm.
Unstable (DU) − − − g ≥ 1; l = 0 Island contains generator, but no loads.
Unstable
< 0 − − − Preventive SIME returned a negative(U) stability margin.
Not Classi- − − − g = 1; l ≥ 1 Only one generator in island and nofiable (NC) synchronization reference available.
Marginal > 0 > 0 − g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1 Return angle at point where dPa/dδ > 0
Stable (MS) − > 0 < 0 g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1 and pos. margin or returning ω < 0.
Stable > 0 < 0 − g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1 Return angle at point where dPa/dδ < 0
(S) − < 0 < 0 g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1 and pos. margin or returning ω < 0.
Definitely − − < ωth g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1 Barely accelerated during fault and rel.Stable (DS) rotor speed less than a threshold ωth.
to use the efficient algorithms from graph theory, the function to identify islands
first converts the admittance matrix into an adjacency matrix and then uses an
algorithm based on depth-first search to check for islands.
First-swing TSA of simulation results: The system trajectories, which describe
the dynamic response of the system to the fault, and the island identification & as-
sessment results are forwarded to the transient stability block. Here, preventive
SIME is used to early determine stability or instability of the whole system or its
respective islands.
Fault classification: After stability of the system or the islands was determined,
some states and parameters of the computed single machine equivalent and island
are utilized to classify the fault. Table 2.6 shows the classification categories and
the characteristics used for categorization; namely the determined stability margin
η, the gradient of the Pa(δ)-curve dPa/dδ|δr at the return angle δr, the relative
rotor speed ω as well as the number of generator g and loads l in an island.
After fault classification the assessment results are stored and the next fault on the
contingency list is investigated. When the last contingency on the list was assessed,
the contingency screening and ranking results are forwarded to the publication block
(see Fig. 2.1).
2.6.2 Test results of the contingency screening and ranking method
The power system model used for test and evaluation of the method was the New
England & New York test system, which was adopted from [65] (see also Sec. I.1 in
the Appendix). The considered test cases were three-phase short circuits on either
end of transmission lines and transformers, which resulted in a total number of
172 test cases. These test cases were then used to assess the method with respect
to reliability and performance. Furthermore, the fault clearing time was varied
between 50 to 500 ms, which resulted in three sets of fault scenarios and a total of
516 test cases.
Method reliability: In order to assess reliability, the stability assessment re-
sults were tested against a reference stability assessment. The reference assessment
method solely considers the rotor angle trajectories extracted from detailed time-
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Table 2.7: Performed tests, assessment results from time-domain simulation and
reliability of proposed screening method
Test Clearing Number of Number of Identified Identified
time [ms] stable unstable stable cases unstable cases
Test I 50 168 40 94.64% 100.00%
Test II 200 137 71 93.43% 98.59%
Test III 500 55 153 90.91% 100.00%
domain simulation, where a case is determined to be unstable, if the rotor angles
of at least two generators are more than 120◦ apart at the end of the simulation.
This setting was chosen since it is a common setting for out-of-step protection of
generators [27, p. 924]. Table 2.7 shows the number of cases identified as being
stable and unstable in each set of contingencies.
Furthermore, the table shows how many of the unstable and stable cases the screen-
ing method correctly identifies. It should be noticed that the ratio of correctly iden-
tified stable cases is high with 90.91− 94.64 % and the share of correctly identified
unstable cases is even higher with 98.59− 100.00 %.
Discussion of a particular case: The lower success rate for unstable cases in
test II is due to the disagreement between the reference evaluation method and
the proposed method in a particular case. The rotor angles and rotor speeds of the
generators over time are shown in Fig. 2.5 for that case.
The graph shows that it is a marginal case. In the simulation the case is marginal
stable, since a group of generator loses synchronism after the first swing, but resyn-
chronizes after a pole slip. In reality, the protection system would detect loss of
synchronism and protection relays, such as out-of-step protection would disconnect
certain generators in the system, which would likely lead to a system collapse.
Corresponding, to the rotor angle deviation of two groups of generator, which is
larger than 120◦, the reference assessment method states that the case is unsta-
ble. The preventive SIME method predicts resynchronization of the generators, in
accordance with the simulation results, and, consequently determines the case to
be stable. This shows the importance of including and correctly modelling of the
protection system in transient stability studies.
Performance of the method: In order to assess performance, the run time of
the method and particular parts of the implementation were investigated. The ap-
plication of preventive SIME allows to early stop simulations, when the assessment
method has determined stability or instability. Therefore, the method needs to be
seamlessly integrated into the simulator.
The time-domain simulation software RAMSES [66], which was used in this work,
does not have a seamless integration of SIME. Hence, each case was simulated for a
fixed time period and the system trajectories were analyzed afterwards. However,
in order to show the effect of an integration of SIME into the simulation software,
a second test was performed with variable simulation times, which were sufficient
to determine stability with SIME and was extracted from the simulation with fixed
simulation time. Table 2.8 shows the runtime results of the screening method for
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Figure 2.5: Rotor angle and rotor speed of the generators over time in a partic-
ular fault scenario with clearing time of 200 ms
Table 2.8: Performance of fast screening method with variable simulation time
(and fixed simulation time in brackets)
Test Runtime with Runtime of
simulation [s] assessment [s]
per cont. total per cont. total
Test I 0.263 (0.449) 45.31 (77.30) 0.045 (0.057) 7.54 (9.78)
Test II 0.275 (0.536) 47.32 (92.17) 0.042 (0.055) 7.24 (9.53)
Test III 0.296 (0.636) 51.05 (109.36) 0.038 (0.051) 6.53 (8.85)
each set of contingencies with variable and fixed simulation time.
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It should be noted that in particular the runtime with included simulation is con-
siderable reduced due to the variable and, hence, shorter simulation time. Further-
more, it can be observed that the runtime without simulation and only assessment
is reduced. This originates from a lower amount of data, which needs to be read.
This is confirmed by the bar graph shown in Fig. 2.6, which shows the runtime of
different parts of the screening methods and compares the performance with fixed
and flexible simulation time.
Classification of contingencies: In order to assess the proposed classification
criteria, the critical clearing times (CCT) of the considered contingencies were deter-
mined and plotted against the assigned category of the respective fault. Figure 2.7
displays the result from all three tests.
The graph reveals that the CCT within a category vary greatly for stable cases.
However, when considering the average CCT in each category a trend for increasing
CCT can be observed from the category Definitely Unstable to Definitely Stable.
A more detailed discussion of the methodology and results can be found in paper
C.
2.7 Identification of critical machine cluster
When employing the SIME method or other methods based on the equal area
criterion for transient stability assessment, it is essential to correctly identify the
critical machine cluster, which is the group of generators likely to lose synchronism.
An early and accurate identification is the requirement to enable an early and
accurate transient stability assessment.
In this section the development of a new approach for identification of the crit-
ical machine cluster is described. The detailed development was documented in
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paper D. For the developed approach a new coupling coefficient for each pair of
generators was derived and computed. A clustering algorithm then identifies the
critical machine cluster in the system.
2.7.1 Coupling coefficient and coupling matrix
The coupling coefficient proposed in paper D is computed for each pair of generators
i & j. It corresponds to the stability margin computed for a one-machine infinite
bus system, when applying the equal area criterion. The stability margin is defined
as the difference between the available dissipation energy Edis,ij and the kinetic
energy Ekin,ij of the equivalent machine.
ηij = Edis,ij − Ekin,ij (2.1)
where
Edis,ij = −
∫ φu,ij
φc,ij
Pm,ij − Pe,ij(φij)dφij
Ekin,ij = 12
Mij
ω0
ω2ij
(2.2)
In these equations Mij corresponds to the inertia coefficient of the equivalent ma-
chine, ω0 corresponds to the synchronous speed, ωij to the rotor speed and φij to
the respective rotor angle, where φc,ij refers to the angle at fault clearance and φu,ij
to the angle at the unstable equilibrium point. Furthermore, Pm,ij is the equivalent
mechanical power and Pe,ij the electrical power.
In order to compute the coupling coefficient for each pair of generators, equations
for the computation of a one-machine equivalent were derived. The rotor angle
φij , speed ωij and inertia coefficient Mij of the equivalent machine were defined as
follows.
φij = δi − δj
ωij = ωi − ωj (2.3)
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and
Mij = MiMjMT with MT = Mi +Mj (2.4)
where δi/j is the rotor angle, ωi/j is the rotor speed andMi/j is the inertia coefficient
of the i-th and j-th machine, respectively. Based on that, an equation for the
equivalent mechanical power Pm,ij and electrical power Pe,ij was derived.
Pm,ij = 1MT (MjPm,i −MiPm,j)
Pe,ij = 1MT (MjPe,i −MiPe,j)
(2.5)
where Pm,i/j and Pe,i/j are the individual mechanical or electrical power. It is shown
in paper D that the electric power injection Pe,ij of the one-machine equivalent can
be reformulated as a function of φij .
Pe,ij = Pc,ij + Pmax,ij sin(φij − νij) (2.6)
where Pc,ij , Pmax,ij and νij are independent of φij , but functions of the reduced
admittance matrix and the complex e.m.f.s of the machines in the system. Finally,
the coupling coefficients determined for all pairs of machines can be assembled to
the coupling matrix H, which is an m×m matrix where m is equal to the number
of generators in the system.
H =
 η11 . . . η1m... . . . ...
ηm1 . . . ηmm
 (2.7)
2.7.2 Method to identify the critical machine cluster
In order to identify the cluster of critical machines, the impact of the fault and
its clearance on the coupling of the machines is important. For that purpose, the
matrix ∆H is proposed, which is defined as the difference of the coupling coefficients
in the initial steady state and after fault clearance.
∆H = H(t+c )−H◦ (2.8)
where H(t+c ) is the coupling matrix determined at the time just after fault clearance
t+c and H◦ is the coupling matrix determined before the fault occurs. H◦ provides
information on the initial coupling strength between individual generators and may
allow identifying structural weak connected machines. By assessing the change in
coupling for the individual pairs of machines, it allows to investigate the impact of
the fault and its clearance on the coupling coefficients. These changes may be due
to the dynamical response of the machines or structural changes in the system.
The method for identifying the critical cluster of machines was developed under
the assumption that the coupling of the critical group of generators is considerably
weakened because of the fault. The weakening may originate from an increase in
kinetic energy during the fault or a degradation of the connectivity due to the fault
clearance. Hence, the changes of the coupling coefficients may provide valuable
information for identifying the critical machine cluster.
In the following a simple clustering algorithm to identify the critical machine cluster
is described. A block diagram of the algorithm, which was proposed in paper D,
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Figure 2.8: Block diagram of the critical machine cluster identification algorithm
is shown in Fig. 2.8. The diagram shows the sequence of operations carried out to
identify the cluster. The different blocks are below described in more detail.
Receive system snapshots: The method receives a system snapshot of the pre-
and post-fault condition. It is assumed, that these snapshots provide full observ-
ability of the system and contain the complex bus voltages as well as the trans-
mission line and injection currents. Furthermore, it is assumed that the given data
are sufficient to determine the system’s admittance matrix in pre- and post-fault
condition.
Compute pre- and post-fault cluster matrix: In this block the coupling matrix
for the two conditions are computed. For that purpose and as described in detail
in paper D, the Thévenin equivalent of the generators, the extended admittance
matrix and, subsequently, the reduced admittance matrix are computed. These
data are then utilized to determine the one-machine equivalent for each pair of
machines and, finally, their coupling coefficients can be computed with (2.1).
Determine impact of fault on coupling coefficients ∆H: Corresponding
to the assumption that the coupling coefficients of the critical group are strongly
affected by the fault, the impact of the fault is computed as the difference of pre-
and post-fault coupling with (2.8).
Set-up ascending list of changes in coupling coefficients ∆h: In this block
a list ∆h is created, which contains the sorted entries from ∆H. The entries
are sorted ascending beginning with the lowest or rather most negative change in
coupling. Moreover, two vectors r and c are built up which have the same size as
∆h and contain the row and column numbers of the respective entries in ∆H.
Set-up adjacency matrix Adj: In order to use the efficient algorithms from
graph theory to identify the critical machine cluster, a graph G is initialized corre-
sponding to the matrix ∆H. The resulting graph G is a complete graph with m
vertexes and with an adjacency matrix Adj.
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Remove entry with lowest change in coupling: There are several algorithms
in graph theory to identify clusters, e.g. minimum cut, which determines the cut set
with the smallest sum of weights possible to split the graph into two disjoint subsets,
or hierarchical clustering, which determines clusters according to the “distance” of
the individual vertexes to each other. However, in this work individual connections
one after another are removed according to the list in ∆h and beginning with the
lowest or rather most negative change in coupling. Therefore, the corresponding
entries in ∆h, r and c are removed and the respective entry in Adj is set equal to
zero.
Check if the graph is still connected: After a connection in the graph was
removed, a depth-first search is executed to identify, if the resulting graph is still
connected. If the graph is still connected, the next entry in ∆h, which corresponds
to the next lowest change in coupling, is removed and the corresponding entry in
Adj is set to zero. Then it is again checked, if the graph is still connected. This
process is continued until the graph is split in two.
Identify created clusters: When the graph was split into two disjoint subsets,
then the created clusters need to be identified. For this purpose, the graph is
explored with multiple depth-first searches until all vertexes are associated with a
cluster. The results are the identified clusters as well as the nodes belonging to
each cluster.
New England & New York example case: In paper D two test cases were
presented and the capability of the method to determine the critical machine cluster
was demonstrated. The used test system was the New England & New York system,
which is described in detail in Sec. I.1 in the Appendix. In both test cases a short
circuit on a transmission line was applied and was cleared after 250 ms by opening
of the breakers at both ends of the line.
Figure 2.9 shows the simulation results of the second case, where the disturbance
led to the loss of synchronism of the generators GEN 2 and 3. Figure 2.9(a) shows
the rotor angle response of a selection of generators, where time of fault clearance
is indicated by t+c . At fault clearance, it may be difficult to identify the critical
machine cluster solely based on the observed rotor angles, since at that time the
selected generators in the range of GEN 4 − 9 are relatively close to the unstable
generators GEN 2 and 3. However, shortly after the rotor angles of the selected
generators in the range of GEN 4− 9 split from the unstable generators.
In Fig. 2.9(b) the fault induced changes of the coupling coefficients is displayed,
when ∆H is computed at t+c . Visual inspection of the graph indicates three groups:
• Group I: GEN 2 and 3
• Group II: GEN 1 and 4− 9
• Group III: GEN 10− 16
This is in good agreement with the groups identified in Fig. 2.9(a). When the
algorithm, which was shown in Fig. 2.8, is employed to identify the critical machine
cluster, GEN 2 and 3 are determined to be the most critical ones, which is in good
agreement with the prior discussed observations.
In conclusion, in the presented test case the proposed coupling coefficients or rather
the change of the coefficients due to the fault indicated correctly which generators
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Figure 2.9: Case II: Critical machine identification in a stable test scenario,
where a short-circuit on the line connecting bus 4 and bus 5 was applied.
are forming clusters. Moreover, the proposed clustering algorithm correctly identi-
fied the most critical group of generators. However, further tests and investigations
are needed to confirm and verify the approach.
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Chapter 3
Sensitivity based assessment and
prediction of transient voltage
sags
In this chapter the derivation of sensitivities to assess transient voltage sags caused
by rotor angle swings and the development of a method for early prediction of these
voltage sags is described. The detailed derivation and the results of the sensitivities
as well as the prediction method can be found in the Appendix in the papers E, F
and G, respectively.
3.1 Voltage sags caused by rotor angle swings
Voltage sags, also known as voltage dips, are depressions of the measured voltage
magnitude lasting for a short period of time. The first international definition and
measurement method for voltage dips was described in the standard IEC Standard
IEC 61000-4-30 [67].
“Voltage dip: Temporary reduction of the voltage at a point in the
electrical system below a threshold.”
In literature on power quality, the topic is frequently addressed and discussed [68].
A primary cause of voltage sags are faults in the power system and the observed
voltage sags are dependent on the types of loads, e.g. induction machine, which are
connected to the buses in the region of the fault. However, a less recognized origin
of voltage sags is rotor angle swings or, rather, the angular separation of groups of
generators. This kind of voltage sags is less dependent on the type of load present
in the power system, since the dominating mechanism is the angular separation.
New England & New York example case: In this chapter, the simulation
results are obtained using the New England & New York system, which consists of
68 buses and 16 generators, and was adopted from [65]. Detailed information and
37/159
3.1. Voltage sags Assessment and prediction of transient voltage sags
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 180
 200
 220
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
(deg)
Time t (s)
GEN-1
GEN-4
GEN-5
GEN-6
GEN-7
GEN-13
GEN-14
GEN-15
GEN-16
(a) Rotor angles over time
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
(pu)
Time t (s)
Bus 15
Bus 16
Bus 20
Bus 21
Bus 23
Bus 24
Bus 50
Bus 51
Bus 52
(b) Voltages over time
Figure 3.1: Example of a voltage sag caused by rotor angle swings
a one-line diagram can be found in Appendix I.1. The initial conditions of the test
scenario were as well adopted from [65]. In this case, the considered contingency
is a three-phase short-circuit on the transmission line connecting buses 16 and 21.
The short-circuit occurs one second after the simulation begins and is assumed to
be very close to bus 21. It is cleared after 150 ms by opening the breakers at
both ends of the faulted transmission line. Figure 3.1 shows a selection of the bus
voltages and the rotor angles of a selection of generators over time. The fault leads
to acceleration and, subsequently, angular separation of certain generators as seen
in Fig. 3.1(a).
In Fig. 3.1(b), it can be observed that the short circuit leads to a depression of the
voltage magnitudes at the system buses. However, the voltages begin to recover
immediately after fault clearance. Following, at a selection of buses voltage sags
can be observed which coincides with the rotor angle swings depicted in Fig. 3.1(a).
Since the voltage sags may lead to further disturbances in the system for example
disconnection of loads and, hence, to deterioration of the system condition, it is
crucial to study the mechanism behind these voltage sags.
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Figure 3.2: IEC-61000-4-34: Voltage Dip envelopes defined by the IEC for
class 2 and class 3 loads with input current more than 16 A per phase
3.1.1 IEC standard on voltage sags
In IEC-61000-4-34 requirements for different load types with input currents of more
than 16 A per phase are defined with respect to voltage dips.
• Class 1: Highly sensitive loads, usually equipped with protection such as
uninterrupted power supply, filters, etc.
• Class 2: Points of common coupling for consumer systems (PCC) and points
of common coupling for industrial systems (IPC)
• Class 3: Only IPC’s with higher compatibility level as class 2
• Class X: User defined class
For the classes 2 and 3 the standard defined voltage envelops to determine regions
of unaffected and misoperation (see Fig. 3.2).
The norm required that Class 2 devices stay connected to the power grid, if the
voltage recovers to a value above 0.7 pu after fault clearance, else the devices may
disconnect. For Class 3 the requirements are more stringent, the loads need to
remain connected in the first 200 ms after fault clearance, if the voltage recovers
to a value above 0.4 pu. In the period of 200 − 500 ms, the loads need to stay
connected, if the voltage is higher than 0.7 pu. Afterwards, the voltage needs to
have recovered to a value above 0.8 pu to guarantee that the Class 3 loads operate
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normally. If the voltage magnitude at a bus is not recovering fast enough and the
“Misoperation Region” is entered, the connected loads may malfunction, e.g. an
induction machine may stall, and eventually trip.
3.1.2 Investigation of the mechanism behind voltage sags
The mechanism behind voltage sags caused by rotor swings can be discussed and
illustrated graphically under consideration of a simple example power system as
the one shown in Fig. 3.3.
G1
1
3
G3
4
G4
2
G2
5
L1
6
L2
∆P1
∆P3
∆P2
∆P4
Figure 3.3: One-line diagram of a simple example test system with 6 buses.
The generators are represented by the so-called “classical” transient stability model,
where each generator is represented by an e.m.f. E¯′ of constant voltage magnitude
behind the transient reactanceX ′d (see Fig. 3.4(a)). The angle of the e.m.f. can then
be used to represent the rotor angle of the generator [27, Sec. 5.3, p. 187]. In this
example, for sake of simplicity the generators’ mechanical power input is assumed
constant and the loads are modelled as constant impedances. When representing
each generator by its Norton equivalent, as shown in Fig. 3.4(b), then the following
linear algebraic equation can be used to describe the relation of the complex bus
voltages V¯ and the complex current injections I¯, where Y is the “augmented”
admittance matrix.
I¯ = YV¯ (3.1)
Assuming a system with n buses and m generators (n > m), the equations in (3.1)
can be sorted, in order that the buses where generators are connected are numbered
from n−m+ 1 to n. 
0
...
0
E¯′1/(jX ′d,1)
...
E¯′m/(jX ′d,m)

= Y

V¯1
...
V¯n−m
V¯n−m+1
...
V¯n

(3.2)
Equation (3.2) reveals that the complex voltage at a bus is a result of the sum of the
contributions of the generators in the system. The contribution of a generator is
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Figure 3.4: Thévenin and Norton equivalents of generator
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Figure 3.5: Example of complex voltage at bus 6 as sum of generator contribu-
tions
determined by its e.m.f., which is scaled and rotated corresponding to the entry in
the inverse of the admittance matrix divided by the respective transient reactance.
Figure 3.5(a) shows the complex voltage at bus 6 (from the simple example system)
and the contribution of the individual generators, which amount to the voltage
measured at the respective bus. Under the aforementioned assumptions, the effect
of an increase in rotor angle, e.g. due to a transient disturbance, on a particular
bus voltage can be assessed under consideration of the linear algebraic equation
(3.2).
In the example shown in Fig. 3.3, a short-circuit occurs on the transmission line
connecting bus 4 and 5. The fault alters the admittance matrix and leads to changes
of the electric power injections of the generators in the system. Since the mechanical
power is assumed to be constant, the change will result in a power mismatch ∆P in
the system’s generators and, consequently, cause a relative acceleration or deceler-
ation of the generators’ rotors. In the example, it is assumed that the fault mainly
affects generator G4 causing an acceleration of the machine and an advancing of
the rotor angle relative to the remaining generators.
The effect on the voltage at bus 6 is shown in Fig. 3.5(b) and it can be observed
that the relative increase in rotor angle depressed the voltage magnitude at the
bus. This observation gave the impulse for the investigation of transient voltage
sags using sensitivities derived from the linear algebraic network equations.
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3.2 State-of-the-art assessment of transient voltage sags
Similar to the assessment of transient stability, the voltage sags caused by rotor
swings can be assessed by using detailed time-domain simulation, simplified/direct
methods or combinations of the prior two.
In 1990 the authors of [69] presented a method based on the TEF, which can be
used to determine the depth of the voltage sag. The authors suggest computing
the maximum rotor angle during the swing through an approximation of the post-
fault angle trajectory and utilizing that the total system energy described by TEF
is constant after fault clearance. Under the assumption that the generators are
represented by their Norton Equivalent, the generators’ current injections can be
determined at the maximum rotor angle excursion and, subsequently, utilizing (3.1)
the voltages in the grid can be computed. Finally, voltage sag prediction results
are presented from three different test systems, which look promising. However, it
should be mentioned that the computational complexity associated with the TEF
approach and in particular the identification of the controlling unstable equilibrium
point is high as discusses in Sec. 2.4 and paper A. In [70] the authors used the same
TEF based approach to compute the voltage sag and derive sensitivities, which
allow relating the depth of the observed voltage sag to certain pre-fault parameters
such as terminal voltages and power generation.
A voltage sag/dip assessment method, which uses detailed time-domain simulation
and a simple two-dimensional look-up table, where the critical voltage level and
critical voltage dip duration are specified, was proposed in [71]. Furthermore, the
authors investigate the transient voltage stability of dynamic loads such as induction
machines.
A contingency filtering and ranking method with respect to voltage sags was pre-
sented in [72]. The method carries out detailed time-domain simulation for the in-
dividual contingencies and classifies them according to the depth of the voltage sag
in satisfactory, harmless, potentially dangerous and dangerous. The voltage magni-
tude thresholds for the classification are adopted from NERC stability performance
criteria, which can be found in e.g. [73], where a survey of current practices for
transient voltage sag criteria related to power system stability was presented.
3.3 Sensitivity based assessment of transient voltage
sags
This section solely presents a short summary of the derivation and findings concern-
ing the transient voltage sag assessment using sensitivities. The detailed derivation
and results can be found in paper E in the appendix of this thesis.
In the paper two sensitivities were proposed. In the following, the derivation of
the sensitivities will be briefly discussed and their application potential will be
presented by means of the example shown in Fig 3.1.
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3.3.1 Load voltage sensitivity
This sensitivity provides a measure of the impact of a generator on the voltage
magnitude at a particular bus. The sensitivity of the voltage magnitude at the l-th
bus with respect to the k-th generator is defined as:
(sV,Gk)` =
|V¯ †` | − |V¯`|
 · pi/180 ` = 1, . . . ,m− n (3.3)
where  corresponds to a small change of the rotor angle of generator k, which is
simulated through a shift of the phase angle of E¯′k, and V¯
†
l is the complex voltage
at bus ` after altering the rotor angle, which can be computed as follows.

0
...
0
E¯′1/(jX ′d,1)
...
E¯′k e
j/(jX ′d,k)
...
E¯′m/(jX ′d,m)

= Y

V¯ †1
...
V¯ †n−m
V¯ †n−m+1
...
...
...
V¯ †n

(3.4)
New England & New York example case: Figure 3.6 shows the load voltage
sensitivities in the test case at a selection of load buses and for a subset of genera-
tors computed just after fault clearance. The sensitivities allow identifying critical
generator-load pairs in the system, such as generators GEN-6 & GEN-7 and the
load buses 21, 23 and 24. These findings are confirmed by the time-domain sim-
ulation results, which were presented in Fig. 3.6 and showed a large rotor angle
excursion of GEN-6 & GEN-7 causing voltage sags at the mentioned buses. The
results of a possible application are presented in Fig. 3.7. Here, these sensitivities
are used to determine the contribution of the individual generators to the observed
voltage sags. In this case, it allows identifying generator GEN-6 and GEN-7 as
being the origin of the voltage sags, where the contributions from GEN-6 are gen-
erally greater. This information can be very useful e.g. when determining effective
locations for preventive controls, which aim at reducing the voltage sags, and is
discussed in more detail in paper E.
3.3.2 Generator power sensitivity
The second sensitivity assesses the impact of a change in load consumption on the
electric power injection of the generators in the power system. The derivation of
this sensitivity was motivated due to the fact that certain loads may disconnect,
when the voltage dip is deeper than a certain threshold and its duration longer
than a certain time limit.
The derivation of the generator power sensitivity is described in detail in paper E in
the appendix, a short summary is presented here. In order to estimate the impact
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Figure 3.6: Selection of load voltage sensitivities showing the estimated change
in voltage magnitude to a 1◦ increase of rotor angle of a particular generator
(colour code) for a selection of load buses (x-axis)
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Figure 3.7: Contribution of individual generators to voltage depressions
of a load variation ∆y at the k-th bus, first the complex bus voltages after the
change V are estimated in the whole power system using the following equation,
which was derived from (3.2).
V = V◦ − V
◦
k
[Y−1]kk + 1∆y
Y−1ek (3.5)
where ek is the unit vector with the k-th entry equal to one and Y−1 corresponds to
the inverse of the admittance matrix. The index k and the superscript ◦ represent
values at the k-th bus and values before the load change respectively.
Under the assumption that the generators are represented by their Norton equiva-
lent, then the variation in current injection can be determined for the i-th generator
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Figure 3.8: Selection of generator load sensitivities displaying the estimated
change in active power injection of each generator (y-axis) to a 1 pu increase of
load admittance at particular system buses (x-axis). The results correspond to
the case shown in Fig. 3.1
connected to the k-th bus as follows.
Ii =
E
′
i − V k
jX ′d,i
(3.6)
The resulting change in active power injection can then be computed.
∆Pi = Re
(
V kI
∗
i − V 0k
(
I
0
i
)∗)
(3.7)
In this manner the effects of changes in load consumption on each generator can
be estimated.
New England & New York example case: Figure 3.8 depicts the generator
power sensitivities of a selection of generators and at a subset of load buses in the
test case. The sensitivities reveal that a change of load consumption at the buses
21 and 23 will mainly affect the critical generators GEN-6 and GEN-7. Hence, it is
expected that an increase in load consumption increases the electric power injection
of the generators and vice versa.
Figure 3.9 shows a comparison of three cases: a base case, a second case, where
load tripping leads to further deterioration of the system conditions and loss of syn-
chronism of generator GEN-7, and a third case, where load tripping is leading to
faster system recovery. Figure 3.9(a) shows the electric power injection of generator
GEN-7 and Fig. 3.9(b) displays the voltage magnitude at bus 23 over time in the
three cases. In the second case, load is tripped at bus 23, which was identified as
a location where changes in load consumption mainly impact the power injection
of GEN-6 and GEN-7. Figure 3.9(a) reveals that the load tripping leads to slight
reduction of the power injection of the generator, which is enough to cause insta-
bility in this marginal case. In the third case load tripping occurs at a bus, which
has a dominant effect on generators in the vicinity of GEN-6 & GEN-7 (GEN-4 &
GEN-5) and not on the two generators themselves. In this case the load tripping
causes a slight acceleration of the generators GEN-4 and GEN-5, which decreases
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Figure 3.9: Example of the application of generator power sensitivities. Com-
parison of a base case with two cases, where different load tripping events were
applied.
the relative rotor angle difference between the two groups of generators and enables
a faster resynchronization. Figure 3.9(b) shows that this load tripping has a pos-
itive effect and leads to a faster recovery of the voltage at bus 23. These findings
show, that the generator power sensitivities can be very useful, when e.g. designing
under-voltage load shedding schemes. A more detailed discussion of the results can
be found in paper E.
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3.4 Early prediction of transient voltage sags
The prior described sensitivities allow assessment of voltage dips after they were
observed, but also enable determination of efficient locations for preventive or re-
medial control. This information is very valuable, if dangerous voltage sags are
identified early with appropriate prediction methods. For that purpose, three dif-
ferent voltage sag prediction methods were developed and compared in paper G.
The methods were assessed with respect to their ability to early, accurately and
consistently predict the crossing of a critical voltage threshold.
3.4.1 Voltage sag prediction methods
The three methods are using different approaches to solve the task of early predict-
ing the voltage sag and are described in more detail in the following.
Utilizing PMU measurements: The first approach assumes that measurements
of the bus voltages are available at high sampling rates from phasor measurement
units (PMUs). A recursive least square (RLS) estimator is used to predict the evo-
lution of the voltage magnitudes at the respective buses with a quadratic function.
The extreme values of the function can then be utilized to determine the depth of
the respective voltage sag.
Using the phase angle of the e.m.f: The second approach addresses the problem
of voltage sag prediction under consideration of the underlying mechanism, which
was described in Sec. 3.1.2. Here the assumption is that the relative angular
deviation of certain generators causes the depression of the voltage magnitude.
When representing a generator by its classical model, the phase angle of the e.m.f.
E
′ corresponds to the angle of the generator’s rotor. Hence, in this approach the
evolution of the rotor angles of the individual generators are predicted using a RLS
estimator and corresponding estimations of the complex bus voltage trajectories
are computed by solving the following equation.
0
...
0
E¯′1 ej∆δ1/(jX ′d,1)
...
E¯′m ej∆δm/(jX ′d,m)

= Y

V¯ †1
...
V¯ †n−m
V¯ †n−m+1
...
V¯ †n

(3.8)
where ∆δi is the deviation of the rotor angle of the i-th generator to its initial value.
Using E-SIME: The third method combines the knowledge on the identified mech-
anism causing the voltage sag with a sophisticated transient stability assessment
(TSA) method. The used TSA method is called Emergency SIngle Machine Equiv-
alent (E-SIME) method, which is described in detail in [25] and the recent achieve-
ments were published in [74]. E-SIME uses on-line measurements to identify the
critical group of generators, meaning the group of generators likely to lose synchro-
nism, and determines a single machine equivalent for the dynamic interaction of
the critical generator group and the remaining generators. For this equivalent the
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Figure 3.10: Early and consistent detection of load bus voltages falling below the critical
value of 0.7 pu: The x-axis shows the simulation time and the y-axis the loads in the
system. A marker indicates that at the time instance in the simulation the respective
method predicted the voltage to fall below 0.7 pu. The red squares indicate when the
voltage actually crossed 0.7 pu. The results correspond to the case shown in Fig. 3.1
equal area criterion can be applied to determine stability. In this approach E-SIME
is slightly modified to predict for a stable case the return angle of the critical group
of generators. Under the assumption that the voltage sag reaches its minimum at
the maximum angular separation of the critical generators and, hence, at the re-
turn angle, the bus voltages at that point can be computed by advancing the rotor
angles of the critical machines and employing (3.8). In this case ∆δ is zero for the
non-critical generators and for the critical generators their angular distance to the
return angle.
3.4.2 Comparison of the prediction method
The three methods were evaluated with respect to their ability to correctly predict
voltage sags. The criteria to measure the performance of the different methods
were the following.
• Earliness: How early can the method identify critically low voltage sags?
• Consistency: How consistent is the prediction? Are only the actual critical
buses flagged as critical?
• Accuracy: Is the voltage sag minimum predicted with satisfactory accuracy?
The assessment results are documented in detail in the Appendix in paper G and
show that each of the approaches predicts the voltage sags to a certain extent.
New England & New York example case: Figure 3.10 shows a comparison of
the earliness and consistency of the assessment results. The findings indicate that,
in contrast to the other prediction methods, the method based on E-SIME allows
an early and consistent prediction of critical load buses. The method does not flag
non-critical buses as critical and allows identification of critical buses approximately
200− 500 ms before the critical voltage level is underrun. These findings together
with the results on the accuracy of the voltage minimum prediction, which can be
found in paper G, suggest that the method using E-SIME is promising to early,
accurately and consistently predict voltage sags.
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Chapter 4
Remedial action using wide-area
measurements
The work described in this chapter is building up on [75], where a method was de-
veloped to prevent blackouts. As part of the PhD project the method was extended
and tested on a different system. Moreover, it was further developed to allow the
filing of a patent [76]. In the following, the addressed instability mechanism and
the remedial action method are briefly introduced with the help of an example case.
The detailed documentation of the method can be found in paper H.
4.1 State-of-the-art of wide-area remedial actions
In order to operate a system reliable, efficient remedial action schemes (RAS) or
special protection schemes (SPS) are required as mentioned in [77]. Several utilities
tried to implement RAS, which are to a certain extend centralized and automated.
Moreover, the authors of [77] describe a real-world implementation of a Centralized
Remedial Action Scheme (CRAS) implemented in the grid from Southern California
Edison. Contrary, to other systems in the CRAS the measurements of monitoring
relays are transferred to a central location, where they are evaluated. In case of re-
quired remedial action, control signal are send to mitigation relays from the center.
In this manner, the system executes corrective actions such as load or generation
reduction to ensure reliable and safe system operation after fault occurrence.
Another real-world implementation of an automatic and system-wide RAS arming
system was described in [78]. In the system, a transient stability analysis tool is
used periodically to determine the RAS arming patterns. In order to achieve real-
time performance of the system, a large case database is used. The database is
generated from extensive off-line system studies.
A new methodology for determining the security region of transmission systems
with respect to its current operating point was proposed in [79]. The actual cal-
culation of the security region is carried out off-line, but the result can be used to
monitor the operating point and condition of the system. Furthermore, the authors
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suggest that the off-line calculated stability boundaries, which make up the security
region, may be used to identify efficient remedial actions. When the operating point
of the system approaches the boundary of the security region, then pre-determined
remedial actions can be executed to bring the system back into a secure state.
The remedial action methods, which were described so far, apply actions such as
load tripping and generation shedding to secure system operation. Another type
of remedial action may be automated adaptation of controller parameters, e.g.
based on wide-area measurements and in correspondence to the current system
condition. In [80] an adaptive damping control scheme was proposed, which uses
wide-area measurements to adapt the controller parameters to fit to the current
system conditions. The initial controller parameters are determined off-line and
are derived using a large database of common system operation conditions.
In [81] two different approaches for damping of inter-area oscillations are compared.
The conclusion of the paper suggests that wide-area control methods are more
effective than local controls.
The method described in [82] addresses the same instability mechanism, namely
aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability, as the one proposed later in this chap-
ter. The authors developed a method, which applies changes to the consumption
pattern with the goal to restore stability and security of the system with respect to
the stability boundary. In order to achieve this goal, the method proposes changes
to a number of loads, which were identified to be the most effective locations for
applying countermeasures.
4.2 From voltage instability to a collapse in voltage
In some of the cases where aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability causes a
collapse in voltage, the power system had earlier entered a state of voltage unstable
operation. The topic was discussed in [83], where a method for early warning against
aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability was developed. In the following a short
summary of the discussion will be presented. The explanations are supported by a
state diagram shown in Fig. 4.1.
When after a fault a power system enters the state of voltage instability, the point
of maximum deliverable power has been reached at certain system nodes. This
state is shown in the upper right corner of Fig 4.1. If the condition subsequently
evolves into a blackout depends on a variety of system characteristics such as long
term voltage dependency of system loads and voltage control equipment.
In the following a degradation mechanism is described, which may eventually lead
from voltage unstable operation to a collapse in voltage. A ULTC-Transformer
connected to a voltage unstable bus will attempt to boost the depressed voltage
by adjusting the transformer ratio. However, in such a condition each tap action
will further deteriorate the system condition by decreasing the system voltage and
increasing the line currents. The lower system voltages suppress the voltage at
neighboring buses, which may lead to spreading of the voltage instability to other
buses.
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2.2 The Anatomy of a Blackout
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Figure 2.5: State diagram illustrating how the occurrence of voltage instability can
evolve into a system blackout. Various mechanisms (ULTC-transformer control ac-
tions, line tripping or activation of OXLs) cause gradual deterioration of the system
conditions. In the figure, the deterioration continues until a) the point of maximum
injectable power from a given generator is reached resulting in a loss of synchro-
nism of the generator, which can gradually evolve into a loss of synchronism be-
tween subgroups of generators and a subsequent blackout, or until b) when trip of
a critical line results in partitioning of the system into uncontrollable islands with
large imbalance between load and generation resulting in blackout.
21
Figure 4.1: From voltage instability to a collapse in voltage (adopted from [83])
Furthermor , the de ressed system voltage a d the increased line currents lead to
higher reactive power demand, which needs to be provided by the generators in the
system. This may result in the activation of overexcitation current limiters (OEL)
at individual generators. Then the generator is no longer capable of keeping the
voltage magnitude at the respective remote bus constant and its share of reactive
power generation needs to be transfered to other generators. This may lead to
overloading of other generators and cascading activation of OELs (see Fig. 4.1).
Due to the increasing line currents, transmission lines may experience overload-
ing, which may lead to further line tripping, system deterioration and eventually
split the system into uncontrollable islands. Another possibility is that individual
generators reach the point of maximum injectable power into the system and lose
synchronism with the remaining generators in the system, which eventually may
lead to a blackout.
As described in [83], voltage instability describes the operating condition where the
point of maximum deliverable power is reached at certain nodes. While aperiodic
small signal rotor angle stability is associated with the capability of a generator
to inject power into a system node or rather the condition that a generator has
reached the maximum injectable power.
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4.3 Aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability
The proposed remedial action method determines countermeasures with respect to
the boundary of a particular instability mechanism, which is called aperiodic small
signal rotor angle stability (ASSRAS) and, according to [9], refers to...
“...the capability of each generator to generate sufficient synchroniz-
ing torque so that operation at stable equilibrium point can be main-
tained. The lack of sufficient steady-state synchronizing torque causes
aperiodic increase in rotor angle and a loss of synchronism.”
By focusing on a particular mechanism, the power system can be represented by a
simplified model, which allowed the development of the real-time stability assess-
ment method described in [9].
Nordic32 example case: The Nordic32 system as described in [84] is in the
following employed to support the description of the instability mechanism, the
assessment method and the remedial action method. A one-line diagram as well as
a description of the modification applied to the system can be found in Appendix I.2.
In order to trigger aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability in the case of the
Nordic32 system, the transmission line connecting bus 4021 and 4042 was tripped
at t = 5 s. The system response can be seen in Fig. 4.2.
Figure 4.2(a) shows the voltage magnitudes at a selection of system buses over time.
The loss of the transmission line at t = 5 s causes oscillation in the system, which
damp out, but lead to the activation of several over excitation limiters (OELs)
between t = 18.3 s and t = 47.1 s (for details see paper H). After the last activation
of an OEL, the voltages appear to stabilize again before a collapse in voltage occurs.
Figure 4.2(b) depicts the change in rotor speed relative to nominal speed of a
selection of generators. It can be observed that the speed of the generators varies
due to the loss of the transmission line and the activation of the OELs. Moreover,
the magnified detail in the graph reveals that generator G7 experiences a speed
up and, subsequently, a loss of synchronism, at the same time as the collapse in
voltage occurs.
The observed collapse in voltage and the simultaneous loss of synchronism of a
generator confirm that the observed instability is aperiodic small signal rotor angle
instability.
4.4 Aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability assess-
ment method
The method carries out an element-wise assessment (see Fig. 4.3), which allows to
monitor the ASSRAS of each individual generator in the power system in real-time.
In the figure the stability boundary is represented by a red curve, which divides the
graph into an area of stable and unstable operation. The current operating points
(OPs) of the individual generator are depicted by the “×” and their respective
distance to the boundary corresponds to their stability margin.
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Figure 4.2: Nordic32: System response to the tripping of the line connecting
bus 4021 and 4042 resulting in a collapse of voltage
In order to display the stability of each generator in such way, the authors of [9]
simplified the considered power system model by introducing the following assump-
tions:
1. Power injection occurs at nodes with constant voltage magnitude.
• Hence, the generators are represented by voltage sources with constant
magnitude. Dependent on the excitation system of the generator this
source is either directly connected to the terminal or to an internal node
behind the saturated direct axis reactance.
2. Power consumption in the system can be represented by impedance loads.
• The method relies on the availability of real-time measurements, which
allow determining the load impedance in the current system state.
These assumptions are sufficient in the case that system snapshots of the current
system condition are received at a high sampling rate, e.g. from PMUs which
provide full system observability. The snapshots are used to determine the complex
voltages at the nodes of power injection, the impedances corresponding to the
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Figure 4.3: Element-wise assessment of stability, monitoring the aperiodic small
signal rotor angle stability of each individual system generator.
V ∠δ
Zth∠φth
Eth∠0◦
Figure 4.4: Two bus equivalent: Node of constant voltage magnitude and
Thévenin equivalent
current load consumption and to update the admittance matrix to the current
system condition.
Under these assumptions seen from each node of constant voltage magnitude the
rest of the system can be represented by a Thévenin equivalent as shown in Fig. 4.4.
In [85] the authors mapped critical and characteristic curves of the PQV-surface
of a two-bus system into the injection impedance plane, which corresponds to the
load impedance plane, but the resistance can be both positive and negative.
Critical curves:
• ∂P∂V =
∂Q
∂V = 0. Maximum injectable active power when Eth and φth are fixed
• ∂Q∂P =
∂V
∂P = 0. Maximum or minimum injectable reactive power when V and
Eth are constant
• ∂P∂Q =
∂V
∂Q = 0. Maximum injectable active power when V and Eth are fixed
Characteristic curves:
• Constant active power injection P
• Constant reactive power injection Q
• Constant voltage magnitude V
• Constant voltage angle δ
It was shown and analytically derived that these critical and characteristic curves
appear as circles in the injection impedance plane.
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The critical curve, which corresponds to the maximum injectable active power,
when the voltage magnitudes at both ends are fixed, is identical to the circle, which
is the characteristic curve of constant voltage angle, when δ = 180◦ − φth. This
is due to the fact that the active power injection of a two bus system, such as in
Fig. 4.4, becomes solely a function of the voltage phase angle δ, when the voltage
magnitudes at both ends and the impedance Z¯th are assumed to be fixed. Then
the power injection may be computed as follows.
Pinj =
EthV
Zth
cos(δ + φth)− V
2
Zth
cos(φth) (4.1)
Consequently, the maximum power injection Pˆinj at δ = 180◦ − φth is equal to:
Pˆinj = −EthV
Zth
− V
2
Zth
cos(φth) (4.2)
This critical curve represents the ASSRAS boundary and in the injection impedance
plane the boundary for a particular generator can be expressed in polar coordinates
as:
Zinj,i = −Zth,i sin θsinφth,i (4.3)
When representing the operating point of a generator by its injection impedance
Z¯inj , it was shown in [9] that an operation outside the corresponding circle repre-
sents a stable operation, while an operation inside is unstable and leads to a loss of
synchronism of the respective machine. This allows determining a stability criterion
for each machine, which is described by the following set of inequalities.
∣∣∣∣∣ Z¯inj,i(2 sinφth,i) + jZth,iZth,i
∣∣∣∣∣

> 1 Stable
= 1 On the boundary
< 1 Unstable
(4.4)
Moreover, in [9] the authors derived an equation to determine the stability margin
of each generator to its stability boundary in terms of active power, which is very
useful when developing a remedial action method.
When the remaining system is represented by a Thévenin equivalent, the active
power injection of a generator can be computed utilizing (4.1) and the maximum
power using (4.2). Knowing the maximum and the current power injection allows
computing the current active power margin as follows.
∆Pinj = Pˆinj − Pinj = EthV
Zth
(cos(δ + φth) + 1) (4.5)
This margin can also be expressed in percentage of the maximum power injection
as follows:
%∆Pinj =
cos(δ + φth) + 1
1 + VEth cosφth
· 100% (4.6)
The developed stability criterion (4.4) together with the derivation of a useful sta-
bility margin allowed the authors to develop an assessment algorithm, which is
shown in Fig. 4.5.
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determine
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[9] and stability
margin (4.6) for
each generator
Publish
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ment
results
Figure 4.5: Function blocks of the ASSRAS assessment method [9]
The algorithm receives a snapshot of the system, which contains the complex bus
voltages and complex transmission line currents, and may be obtained from syn-
chronized PMU measurements or a fast state estimator. This snapshot is then used
to evaluate ASSRAS and to determine the stability margin of each generator in the
system. These assessment results together with some of the mapped characteristic
curves, e.g. curves of constant voltage magnitude and curves of constant phase
angle, enabled the development of the remedial action method (RAM) described in
the next section.
N− 1 operating points: Due to the assumption that active power is injected
at nodes of constant voltage magnitude, the generator is either represented by
a voltage source with constant magnitude directly connected to the terminal of
the machine or connected to an internal node of the generator, which is situated
behind the synchronous reactance. This is depending on the excitation system
of the generator and its state. For generators equipped with an AVR and OEL,
this allows to monitor the actual operating (OP) as well as the N − 1 OP, which
corresponds to the condition of an activated OEL and, consequently, the generator
lost its capability to keep the voltage magnitude at the terminal constant.
Table 4.1: Location of the node of constant voltage magnitude in different gen-
erator configuration and operation conditions during computation of stability
criteria and margin
Excitation system OEL Actual OP N − 1 OP
Manually – at internal node –
AVR with OEL inactive at terminal at internal nodeactive at internal node –
Table 4.1 shows for the different configurations and conditions, where the voltage
magnitude is assumed to be constant, when computing stability criteria and margin
of the generators.
Nordic32 example case: In the following the assessment results when applying
the prior described method to the test case, which was introduced in Sec. 4.3, will be
discussed. The results will be shown in the normalized injection impedance plane.
The normalization as described in [9] corresponds to mapping of the operating
point of each generator and allows displaying them with respect to one normalized
ASSRAS boundary, while maintaining the characteristic that the distance of an OP
to the boundary reflects its stability margin.
Figure 4.6(b) shows the operating points of the generators in the system at a
selection of time instances (numbered from I − IV ) in the normalized injection
impedance plane. Figure 4.6(a) shows again the voltages over time for a selection
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Figure 4.6: Nordic32: Stability assessment results of the test case
of buses and the time instances I − IV are indicated by vertical dashed grey lines.
The red area, in Fig. 4.6(b), corresponds to the unstable region and its boundary is
the section of the circle, which corresponds to the normalized ASSRAS boundary.
The N − 1 OPs are displayed by blue filled squares and the actual OPs by blue
circles. The numbers inside the OPs correspond to the respective generator, e.g. 1
corresponds to G1.
The graph shows that, due to the disturbance and the subsequent activations of
the OELs, the OPs of the generators are moving in the injection impedance plane.
It can also be observed that for those generators, which experience an activation of
the OEL, the N − 1 OPs turn into actual OPs, e.g. G10 and G11.
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Finally, it should be noticed that the OP of generator G7 gets closer and closer
to the stability boundary until it crosses it at t = 45.89 s. Hence, the assessment
method could detect the imminent instability approximately 28 s before the collapse
in voltage occurred (see Fig. 4.6(a)). It should be mentioned that Fig. 4.2(b) showed
that it was also G7, which was identified from the time-domain simulation results
as the generator that first lost synchronism.
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4.5 Remedial action method
Figure 4.7 shows the block diagram of the proposed remedial action method (RAM).
The method proposes an active power re-dispatch solution, which aims at moving
the critical generator away from the stability boundary by reducing its active power
injection. The reduction is counterbalanced by an increase of power generation of
the remaining (supporting) generator.
Imminent insta-
bility detected
with ASS-
RAS method
Check if
system in quasi
steady state
Determine
new stable
operating point
Determine
available
power reserves
Generate redis-
patch solutions
and identify
preferable solution
Figure 4.7: Function blocks of the proposed remedial action method
4.5.1 Imminent instability detection
The ASSRAS assessment method is used to monitor the stability of the system
and to determine the stability margin of each generator. Since it is preferable that
RAM is executed before the stability boundary is crossed, a trigger margin and a
security margin as percentage of the maximum power injection are introduced. If
the stability margin of an operating point of a generator crosses the trigger margin
RAM is executed. In order to avoid a crossing of the trigger margin by supporting
generators and to provide a target margin for the critical generator a second margin
called security margin was introduced.
It is suggested that the trigger/security margins for actual OPs and N − 1 OPs
differ, since a crossing of the stability boundary of an N − 1 OP solely represents
an insecure system state, while the crossing of an actual OP corresponds to an
unstable system state.
In paper H the trigger and security margins were chosen as shown in Tab. 4.2.
Table 4.2: Trigger and security margins for the different operating point types
Type of OP Trigger margin Security margin
Actual OP 1 % 2 %
N − 1 OP 0.1 % 0.5 %
Under the assumption that the ratio between the voltage magnitude at the node of
power injection and the voltage magnitude of the Thévenin equivalent is constant
(V/Eth = const.), then the trigger and security margin correspond to certain curves
of constant δ in the injection impedance plane.
4.5.2 Quasi steady state
Aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability occurs in a quasi steady state, since
it occurs when a generator can no longer produce sufficient steady state electrome-
chanical torque. During system dynamics OPs of generators may enter the region
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of unstable operation. Therefore, it is necessary to determine a criterion to assess,
if a new quasi steady state was reached.
Due to the assumption of constant voltage magnitude at nodes of power injection
when computing the stability boundary and margin, it is reasonable to determine
quasi steadiness of the system based on the error introduced by variations of the
voltage magnitude. If the voltage magnitude fluctuates, then the computed max-
imum power injection will vary. Therefore, the system is considered to be in a
quasi steady state, when the variation of the maximum power injection is within
acceptable limits, which was chosen to be 0.5 %.
4.5.3 Determine new stable operating point & available power re-
serves
When the system is in quasi steady state and the critical generator has been iden-
tified, then the new stable operating of the critical generator has to be determined
and the available power reserves of the remaining generators have to be computed.
In order to utilize the characteristic curves, which were described in [85] and men-
tioned in Sec. 4.4, it is assumed that throughout the remedial action the voltage
magnitudes at the nodes of power injection remain constant. Table 4.3 shows for
the different operating point types and depending on the generator’s excitation
system in which node the voltage is assumed to be constant during the remedial
action.
Table 4.3: Location of node of constant voltage magnitude during remedial ac-
tion in different generator configuration and operation conditions
Excitation system OEL Actual OP N − 1 OP
Manually – behind Xd –
AVR with OEL inactive at terminal at terminalactive behind Xd -
Due to the assumption of constant voltage magnitude, the power injection of the
generator is again solely a function of the voltage angle. Therefore, in the injection
impedance plane the OP of each generator where their margin is equal to the trigger
or security margin corresponds to the intersection of the curve of constant V and
the respective curve of constant δ. This observation is the basis for the computation
of the new stable operating point and the available power reserves.
As priorly mentioned, if the assumption of constant V is extended to the assumption
of constant ratio V/Eth, then the trigger and security margin correspond to curves
of constant δ.
In the following, the determination of a new stable and secure operating point is
exemplified on the instability scenario in the Nordic32 system from the previous
sections.
Nordic32 example case: In Sec. 4.4 generator G7 was identified as the critical
generator that first crosses the stability boundary. However, the remedial action
method is already executed when the stability margin of the respective machine fell
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below the trigger margin (see Tab. 4.2) and the system is in quasi steady state (as
described in Sec. 4.5.2). In the test case the actual OP of generator G7 crosses the
first time the trigger margin boundary in quasi steady state at t = 21.89 s, which
corresponds to time instance III in Fig. 4.6.
Below the computation of a new stable and secure OP for an actual operating
point will be described. The computation of a new stable OP for a crossing of the
stability boundary by an N − 1 OP as well as the determination of the available
power reserves follow a similar approach and the reader is encouraged to find the
detailed derivations in paper H.
Figure 4.8 graphically explains, how the new stable and secure OP is determined for
an actual OP that caused the insecure situation. The OP of generator G7 is here
displayed by its injection impedance Zinj and has just crossed the trigger margin
represented by the red dotted circle.
Re(Zinj)
Im(Zinj)
ZinjZ
∗
inj
Stability boundary
Trigger margin
Security boundary
Line of
const.
V
Figure 4.8: Graphical representation of the computation of a new secure op-
erating point for the case of imminent instability due to an actual operating
point
The desired margin after the remedial action is defined by the security margin msec
(see Tab. 4.2) and is known as a percentage of the maximum power injection.
Under the assumption that the voltage magnitude ratio V/Eth remains constant
throughout the remedial action, (4.6) can be used to compute the voltage angle δ∗
at the new stable and secure OP.
δ∗ = arccos
[
msec
100%
(
1 + V
Eth
cos(φth)
)
− 1
]
− φth (4.7)
Then the power injection at δ∗ can be computed employing (4.1). The power
reduction needed to bring the generator back into a stable and secure state can
then be determined as the difference in power injection.
∆Pinj = Pinj(δ)− Pinj(δ∗) (4.8)
In this case the remedial action method determines that a reduction of the power
generation of G7 by 8.25 MW is sufficient to bring it back to a secure operating
point. In a similar way, the power reserves of the remaining generators with respect
to their security boundary can be computed.
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4.5.4 Identify re-dispatch solution
After the required power reduction for the critical generator and the power re-
serves of the remaining generators are determined, then re-dispatch solutions can
be developed. Depending on the available power reserves and the amount of re-
quired power reduction, the adjustment of the OP of the critical generator can be
counterbalanced by one or several of the remaining generators.
Nordic32 example case: In the discussed case, the required power reduction is
relatively small and the power reserves of the remaining generators are sufficiently
large. It was chosen that generator G11 is used to counterbalance, due to the short
electrical distance between the two generators. The sequence of OEL activations at
certain generators in the system caused three times a crossing of the trigger margin
by generator G7, each time the remedial action method was triggered and an active
power re-dispatch was conducted. Table 4.4 shows the three re-dispatch solutions,
which includes time of trigger margin violation, the critical generator, stability
margin before the re-dispatch, required power reduction, supporting generator and
stability margin of the critical generator after the remedial action.
Table 4.4: Nordic32: Active power re-dispatch
Time Critical Margin Necessary Supp. Margin
s Gen. %∆Pinj ∆P Gen. after red.
21.89 G7 0.98% 8.25 MW G11 1.53%
27.05 G7 0.81% 9.44 MW G11 1.05%
49.46 G7 0.83% 9.09 MW G11 2.14%
The table shows that the method only with the last remedial action achieves to
bring the generator’s OP back to the secure region. The deviations after the first
two remedial actions may be explained by the dynamics induced by the activation of
the OELs. Figure 4.9 shows with solid lines the bus voltages when remedial actions
are applied and dashed when no countermeasures are taken. The graph confirms
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Figure 4.9: Nordic32: Scenario with applied remedial actions voltages at a se-
lection of buses
that the proposed method succeeds in stabilizing the system and in avoiding the
imminent blackout.
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Conclusion
The PhD project concerned the development of tools and methods suitable for a
future on-line dynamic security assessment system. For that purpose, the assump-
tions were the availability of a database, which contains detailed models of the
system components, and system snapshots, which provide full observability at a
high sampling rate, e.g. provided from a fast state estimator or PMUs. Further-
more, it was assumed that due to the paradigm shift in power system operation
and the reduced predictability of generation and load patterns, approaches based
on large case and simulation databases, which are periodically generated off-line,
are unfavorable. The ambition of the PhD project was to develop on-line stability
and security assessment methods, which are independent of such case databases.
Therefore, approaches, which solely utilize on-line measurements and parameters,
were chosen or developed. The results of the PhD project are methods and tools,
which origin from in-depth studies of the underlying instability mechanisms.
The PhD project resulted in the development of the following methods:
• Fast Contingency Screening and On-line TSA: An efficient and reliable con-
tingency screening method is a central part of an on-line DSA. The screening
method developed in this thesis aims at quickly assessing and classifying the
credible contingencies in the system. The focus was on first-swing transient
stability.
• Critical machine cluster identification: In order to further improve the perfor-
mance of the contingency screening and on-line TSA method, a new approach
for early and accurately identifying the critical machine cluster was developed.
For that purpose, a coupling coefficient was developed, which is a measure of
the coupling strength between two generators.
• Transient Voltage sag assessment and prediction: A case can only be deter-
mined as being transient stable when all generators remain in synchronism
and the bus voltages remain within acceptable limits. This is due to the fact
that voltages below a certain threshold may cause subsequent events in the
system, which may further deteriorate the system condition and may cause
instability. In order to address this issue, sensitivities were derived to assess
voltage sags and a method for early prediction of voltage sags was developed.
63/159
5.1. Fast contingency screening and on-line TSA
• Remedial Actions: When assessment methods are available, which are capable
of monitoring stability in real-time, and an insecure state has been detected,
then the next logical step is to determine and apply remedial actions to restore
security. The developed method aims at restoring stability through an active
power generation re-dispatch with respect to aperiodic small signal rotor angle
instability.
5.1 Fast contingency screening and on-line transient
stability assessment
The aim was to develop a contingency screening method, which assesses the security
of the system in terms of its capability of surviving the transient response to any
credible contingency. Moreover, the ambition was to develop a method, which could
perform this task in a time frame suitable for on-line application.
In order to develop such a method, first the available transient stability assessment
methods were reviewed and their adaptability to real-time operation was assessed.
For that purpose, the computational complexities of the respective assessment al-
gorithms were analyzed. The results showed that a hybrid method called SIME,
which combines the advantages of detailed time-domain simulation and a direct
method, was promising.
In the next step, it was investigated, if the used power system model can be simpli-
fied to speed up the stability assessment, while preserving the instability mechanism
correctly and allowing accurate as well as early stability assessment with the SIME
method. The results showed that, in order to display the true instability mecha-
nism, it is of crucial importance to represent the components in the power system
with sufficiently detailed models and in case of the synchronous generator with
models of 4th-order or higher.
The prior findings were utilized to develop a fast contingency screening and on-
line transient stability assessment method. Moreover, the method employs a new
approach to fast identify created islands in the power system utilizing the efficient
algorithms from graph theory. The presented results showed that the proposed
screening method determines stability with high reliability, where the success rate
for identification of unstable cases was higher than for stable cases. Furthermore,
the performance assessment showed that most of the computation time is spend
on the detailed time-domain simulations and that the computation related to the
actual stability assessment calculations is negligible. Finally, it was shown that the
proposed contingency categorization criterion is promising and may provide better
system awareness. However, a reliable and early identification of the critical group
of generator, which are those likely to lose synchronism, may lead to improved
classification results, a higher success rate for identification of stable cases and
lower the required simulation time in certain cases. Hence, in order to improve the
contingency screening and assessment results, a new approach for identifying the
critical machine cluster was proposed. For that purpose, a cluster coefficient was
derived, which utilizes the equal area criterion. These cluster coefficients were then
used to identify the critical machine cluster after fault clearance. The proposed
approach was tested on two scenarios, where the method succeeded in identifying
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the critical group of machines.
5.2 Assessment and prediction of transient voltage sags
The ambition was to develop methods and indices to assess transient voltage sags,
which are caused by large rotor angle swings of generators in the system. For that
purpose, first the mechanism behind them was investigated thoroughly and related
to known theory. This enabled the derivation of two sensitivities, which provide
valuable information on the voltage sags.
The first sensitivity identifies which bus voltages are affected by changes in rotor
angle of a certain generator. It was shown that this sensitivity can be used to
determine the contribution of a generator to observed voltage sags and it allows
identifying favorable locations for preventive control. The second sensitivity reveals
which generators are impacted by a change in load consumption. It was shown that
this sensitivity can be used to assess if load tripping has a detrimental or beneficial
impact on the voltage sag as well as the power system’s dynamic performance.
In conclusion, the derived sensitivities can provide valuable information on location
and type of preventive or remedial control. However, in order to apply counter
measures an early detection of critical voltage sags is crucial. For that purpose,
three different voltage sag prediction methods were derived and their performances
were assessed with respect to earliness, consistency and accuracy of the prediction.
The results showed that a modified version of the transient stability assessment
method SIME performed best.
5.3 Remedial control against aperiodic small signal ro-
tor angle instability
A further developed version of the remedial action method described in [75] was pre-
sented and its performance was demonstrated on basis of an example case. In order
to develop the remedial control action method, the instability mechanism causing
aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability as well as the real-time stability as-
sessment method were studied in detail. Characteristic curves of the PQV -surface
of a two-bus system mapped into the injection impedance plane turned out to
be very useful, when determining remedial control actions in terms of generation
re-dispatch. These curves allow to analytically determine generation re-dispatch
solutions, which restore stability and security in the system with respect to aperi-
odic small signal rotor angle stability. The results showed that the method succeeds
in stabilizing the system, even if a series of disturbances such as the activations of
over excitation limiter cause repetitive crossing of the security boundary.
65/159
5.4. Future work
5.4 Future work
In the following an outlook on future work and research challenges is presented.
5.4.1 Contingency screening and on-line transient stability assess-
ment
• Further speed up of the contingency screening method: A possible
way to further speed up the assessment could be parallelization, for example
by only initializing the simulation once and parallel computation of several
contingencies at the same time. Moreover, a seamless implementation of
SIME into a time-domain simulation tool could enable further performance
improvements.
• Investigation of transient stability of other generator types: The
number of generators, which are not synchronously connected, is growing,
e.g. due to the increasing installation of wind turbine generators. Conse-
quently, investigation of the transient stability of these types of generators
could be useful and, following, an adaptation of the developed transient sta-
bility assessment methods may be needed.
• Reliability of the proposed screening method: In order to further assess
the reliability, tests on other and larger power systems may be performed.
• Extension of the contingency screening method: In order to ensure
security of the system, it is not sufficient to solely assess the systems stability
with respect to rotor angle stability. Hence, the screening method should
be extended to include security assessment with respect to other instability
mechanisms, e.g. transient voltage sags.
• Critical machine cluster identification: The proposed method performed
well in the presented test cases. However, the approach should be further
investigated and the results should be compared to other approaches.
• Application possibilities in other approaches: A major challenge in
transient stability assessment with methods based on the Lyapunov approach
is to fast determine the controlling unstable equilibrium point. An early
identification of the critical machine cluster with the proposed algorithm could
speed up the process of finding the CUEP and improve the existing methods.
• Implementation into test environment: In order to validate the proposed
methods, an implementation into the real-time simulation environment in
PowerLabDK could be realized.
5.4.2 Voltage sags caused by rotor swings
In order to develop an efficient defense mechanism against critical voltage sags, e.g.
a closed-loop emergency control, a plurality of methods and indicators need to be
developed.
• Firstly, a method to early predict voltage sags and to determine their severity.
• Secondly, indicators to identify preferable locations for applying remedial con-
trols and efficient means for controls.
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• Lastly, methods to determine the required size and, possibly, duration of the
control.
In this work the first two points were addressed and methods/criteria were proposed.
Below a list of future work is presented:
• Severity of voltage sags: A measures for assessing the severity of observed
voltage sags could be another important indicator for a closed-loop emergency
control.
• Implementation into test environment: In order to test the proposed
sensitivities and the prediction method in a real-time environment, the meth-
ods could be implemented in the real-time simulation environment in Power-
LabDK.
• Benefits for other approaches: It will be investigated, how other ap-
proaches could benefit from the proposed sensitivities. Application possibili-
ties are anticipated in the area of machine learning in particular decision trees,
where the computed sensitivities could be attributes in a decision tree, which
is used to assess system security. Moreover, the sensitivities could support
the selection of appropriate test scenarios when building up learning sets.
5.4.3 Remedial action method using wide-area measurements
• Implementation into real-time test environment: In order to validate
the proposed method, an implementation into the real-time simulation envi-
ronment in PowerLabDK could be realized.
• Consideration of other stability and security boundaries: The pro-
posed method determines remedial action with the aim to improve the system
condition with respect to aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability. An ex-
tension of the method to determine remedial action under consideration of
other instability mechanisms could be one of the next development steps.
• Transient stability: It will be further investigated, how the assessment
results from the developed contingency screening approach can be used to
determine remedial control actions to bring the system back in a secure state.
• Transient voltage sags: To realize a closed-loop emergency control against
transient voltage sags it will be necessary to develop means to determine the
required size of remedial control.
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Abstract—In this paper, an investigation of the adaptability
of available transient stability assessment methods to real-time
operation and their real-time performance is carried out. Two
approaches based on Lyapunov’s method and the equal area
criterion are analyzed. The results allow to determine the
runtime of each method with respect to the number of inputs.
Furthermore, it allows to identify, which method is preferable in
case of changes in the power system such as the integration
of distributed power resources (DER). A comparison of the
performance of the analyzed methods leads to the suggestion
that matrix reduction and time domain simulation are the most
critical operations.
Index Terms—Power system stability, Stability analysis, Lya-
punov method, Wide area measurements, Phasor measurement
units
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of the fundamental requirements of a modern societyis a stable and secure operation of the electric power
system and this is not expected to change in the future. In
many countries a shift from fossil energy sources to renewable
energy sources is taking place. In order to reach the future
vision of a danish society with minimal dependency on fossil
fuels [1], the power system faces a great challenge. It has
to evolve into a system with minimal environmental impact,
while continuing to provide its service satisfactory and at
a competitive price. Therefore, a big share of the power
production will use non-controllable sources, such as wind
and solar radiation [1].
This will lead to increased fluctuations of the power sys-
tem’s operating point, which will make the planning of a stable
and secure operation a challenging task, and a planning hours
ahead may no longer be feasible. Hence, the state-of-the-art
stability assessment methods, which are based on computa-
tionally demanding off-line calculations, will no longer be
sufficient. A need for real-time assessment tools will arise.
Smart grid solutions are often suggested for coping with the
fluctuating nature of wind and photo-voltaic power generation,
where control of distributed energy resources is used for power
balancing purpose. It is of paramount importance, that the
smart grid control actions do not cause other stability problems
in the system, while solving the power balancing problem. The
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need for real-time stability information in a future smart grid
power system was accentuated e.g. in [2].
The phasor measurement technology [3]–[5] is seen as the
enabling technology for the development of real-time wide
area monitoring and control applications [6], [7].
Recent publications focus on the task of on-line security and
stability assessment by utilizing synchronized phasor measure-
ments. In [8], [9] an entirely new approach was developed for
real-time assessment of the power system. However, in [10],
[11] an existing method, used for off-line stability assessment,
was adapted to real-time operation.
The potentials of adapting existing off-line assessment
methods are further explored in this paper, where the focus is
on methods for transient stability assessment. The computa-
tional complexity of several methods is investigated to identify
the approaches that are well suited for real-time operation.
This complexity investigation as well applies to future systems
with changed topology. In contrast, an analysis based on
simulations would only be representative for a current system.
II. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING METHODS
Figure 1 shows a mind-map of available transient stability
assessment methods and depicts as well how research gradu-
ally developed towards more specific assessment methods. In
the following, two approaches for transient stability assess-
ment are discussed.
A. Lyapunov’s Direct Method
Direct methods for transient stability assessment using
Lyapunov functions have been developed since the 1960s
(e.g. [12], [13]). The challenges are to determine a Lyapunov
function, which represents the system with satisfactory accu-
racy, and, furthermore, to determine the most suitable critical
energy, which allows the evaluation of the transient stability.
1) Transient Energy Function: A widely used energy func-
tion was derived in [14], which is nowadays most often
referred to as transient energy function (TEF) (e.g. [16], [37]).
This function is used in scalar Lyapunov approaches to assess
transient stability in the power system.
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Fig. 1. Available methods and their development steps (not intended to be exhaustive)
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[Cij(cos θij − cos θsij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
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−
∫ θi+θj
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i
+θs
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Dij cos θij d(θi + θj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Edis
] (1)
E Constant voltage behind the transient reactance
Gii Driving point conductance
Pmi Mechanical power input of the ith machine
V Transient Energy
The terms in eq. (1) can be interpreted as:
• Ekin: Total change in rotor kinetic energy with respect
to the center of inertia (COI) (Mi and ω˜i are the inertia
constant and angular velocity relative to COI respectively)
• Epot,r: The change in potential energy of the rotor with
respect to COI (Pi = Pmi − E2iGii and θi represents
the rotor angle relative to the COI, the index s denotes
conditions at the stable equilibrium point (SEP))
• Emag: Change in stored magnetic energy in the branch
connecting machine i and j (Cij is the product of the
voltages Ei, Ej and the transfer susceptance Bij)
• Edis: Change in dissipated energy of the branch connect-
ing machine i and j (Dij is the product of the respective
voltages Ei, Ej and the transfer conductance Gij)
The term Edis causes that the total energy for a system with
transfer conductances cannot be expressed in a closed form
expression. One way to circumvent the problem is to neglect
those when determining the reduced admittance matrix. The
admittance matrix includes the transmission line impedances
and loads, which are modeled as constant impedances. Ne-
glecting the resistances is generally not acceptable [14].
2) Lyapunov Function: In order to use Lyapunov’s method
and the transient energy function, it has to be shown that
eq. (1) exhibits the properties of a Lyapunov function.
Moreover, the power system has to have an asymptotic
stability characteristic to be transient stable. In order to prove
asymptotic stability with the Lyapunov method, the corre-
sponding function V (x) has to be a strong Lyapunov function
(V (x) > 0; V˙ (x) < 0) [38]. This can be relaxed to V˙ (x) ≤ 0,
if LaSalle’s invariance principle is invoked and the stability of
V (x) is only analyzed around the origin [37], [38].
The transient energy function (1) exhibits these characteris-
tics, when using the classical model and assuming certain con-
straints such as neglecting the transfer conductances Gij = 0,
[16], [39]. The Lyapunov function is then.
V =
n∑
i=1
(Ekin(ω˜i)− Epot,r(θi))−
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
Emag(θij)(2)
3) Accounting for transfer conductances: Several ap-
proaches were developed to account for or to approximate
the effects of the transfer conductances and only a few will be
mentioned in the following. For a more complete discussion
of the different approaches the reader is referred to [16].
a) Numerical integration: Some approaches utilize nu-
merical integration to approximate the effects of transfer
conductances. This additional term may cause the loss of the
Lyapunov properties of the function. Furthermore, different
integration paths may lead to different assessment results.
In [14] and [37] a linear approach is assumed and the
additional term is integrated using the trapezoidal rule.
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
∫ θi+θj
θs
i
+θs
j
Dij cos θijd(θi + θj) ≡
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
Iij (3)
where
Iij = Dij
θi + θj − θsi − θsj
θij − θijs
(
sin θij − sin θsij
)
(4)
Another approach was chosen by the authors of [15],
here the sustained fault trajectory in the relative angle space
determines the integration path [16].
3b) Structure Preserving Model: A third approach was
described by Bergen and Hill in [20], where the loads are
preserved in the reduced admittance matrix, instead of being
absorbed by it. Contrary to neglecting the transfer conduc-
tances of the transmission lines, neglecting the real part of the
load impedances may not be a valid assumption [16].
In this approach the authors are considering a frequency
dependent load (FDL) model, which load variations are linear
about nominal frequency. This leads to a modification of the
swing equation considered for the derivation of the TEF (eq.
(1)) and, eventually, to a modified Lyapunov function [40].
The structure preserving model was further developed by
other research groups (see also [16], [40]).
4) Critical Energy: In order to determine the stability
of the system, the critical energy has to be computed. A
straightforward theoretical approach to identify the critical
energy is described in [16]: Step 1: Find all the unstable
equilibrium points (UEPs) surrounding the new SEP of the
post-fault system; Step 2: Define the critical energy Vcrit as the
value corresponding to the UEP ’closest’ to the SEP (lowest
value). This theoretical approach is not feasible and several
practical attempts were made to identify the critical energy.
a) Closest UEP approach: In [16] only all type-1 UEPs
are considered to determine the closest unstable equilibrium
and the corresponding critical energy. These are the operating
points, where one of the machines looses synchronism. In
order to identify the type-1 UEPs, an operating point of the
following structure can be chosen as a starting point.
θsj = [θs1,n, θ
s
2,n, . . . , pi − θsj,n, . . . , θsn−1,n] (5)
The critical energy can be approximated by:
Vcrit = min
j=1,...,n−1
V (θsj , 0) (6)
This approach reduces the computational time, but does not
have an effect on the conservativeness of the method.
b) Controlling Unstable Equilibrium Point (CUEP): The
method of the controlling UEP was first considered by Fouad
et al. [41]. The controlling UEP is the unstable equilibrium,
which is closest to the particular trajectory of the disturbed
system. At the UEP, in order to satisfy the swing equation (see
e.g. [42]), the angular speed is equal to zero and, consequently,
the critical energy in that point is determined by eq. (1) and
(3) as follows.
Vcrit = −
n∑
i=1
Epot,r(θ
u
i )−
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
[
Emag(θ
u
ij) + I
u
ij
]
(7)
In order to identify the controlling UEP Fouad et al. propose
in [18] a criterion as follows: "The post-disturbance trajectory
approaches (if the disturbance is large enough) the controlling
u.e.p. This is the u.e.p. with lowest normalized potential
energy margin at the instant the disturbance is removed." This
criterion can be computed using the following:
∆VPE,norm = ∆VPE/VKE,corr (8)
where the energy absorbing capacity of the post-disturbance
system ∆VPE can be determined as the difference between
potential energy at the UEP and at fault clearance. The equa-
tions for determining the corrected kinetic energy VKE,corr are
provided in [18]. The correction is necessary due to the finding
that not all the kinetic energy contributes to the separation of
the critical generators [37], [41], [43].
In order to determine the minimum normalized potential
energy margin ∆VPE,norm, the actual values of θu for the
possible UEPs have to be known. In [18] it is proposed, that
approximate values of θu are used, which can be obtained from
the knowledge of the post-disturbance stable equilibrium point.
After identification of the candidate CUEP the corresponding
θu is calculated accurately and, eventually the critical energy
corresponding to the CUEP can be calculated utilizing eq. (7).
The critical energy computed can then be compared to the
value of the energy function at the time of fault clearance and
the stability of the system can be determined.
A more detailed description of the approach is provided in
[18] or [39]. This approach clearly reduces the conservative-
ness of the method compared to the closest UEP method.
c) Potential Energy Boundary Surface (PEBS): Kaki-
moto et al. [15] as well as Athay et al. [14] proposed to deter-
mine the transient stability region by analyzing the potential
energy function (Vp). According to [14] the Vp has within a
periodic frame of rotor angles at most one relative minimum
(new SEP). The rest of the extreme values correspond to
relative maxima and saddle-points (UEPs). The authors of
[15] propose a stability boundary, where the saddle-points
surrounding the SEP are connected through curves (Ox),
which are orthogonal to equipotential curves (Vp(θ,E) = Ci).
The authors argue that, due to the fact that the direction of
the total torque applied to the system is orthogonal to the
equipotential curves, the system will loose synchronism after
crossing a curve Ox. In [15] it is suggested that the fault-on
trajectory is simulated until it crosses a curve Ox. The point of
crossing the boundary can be detected by analyzing the time
derivative of the kinetic energy.
A theoretical foundation of the PEBS method was later
presented by Chiang et al. in [17]. The authors define the
PEBS as the stability boundary of the gradient system
θ˙ = −∂Vp/∂θ (9)
and conclude that it is a local approximation of the stability
boundary of a power system described by the swing equation.
d) Boundary of stability region based controlling un-
stable equilibrium point method (BCU method): The BCU
method, described in [19], is based on the relationship of
the stability boundary of the original and the reduced system
determined by eq. (9) [17]. Where the reduced system is
described by:
θ˙in = (Pi − Pei)− (Mi/Mn)(Pn − Pen) (10)
Pei Injected electrical power of the ith machine
Roughly speaking, the BCU method analyzes the fault-on
trajectory and detects when the boundary of the reduced-
state model is crossed. This point is called exit point and is
4used as the initial condition when integrating the post-fault
reduced system. The integration yields a new approximation
of θ corresponding to the controlling UEP and is used as
an initial guess to find the actual CUEP by solving eq. (9)
equal to zero. The transient stability of the system can then be
determined utilizing the CUEP, provided by the BCU method,
and applying the CUEP method described in section II-A4b.
B. Methods based on the Equal Area Criterion (EAC)
The equal area criterion was developed in the late 1930’s,
though the origin is not really clear [30].
1) Equal Area Criterion (EAC): The method allows the
determination of transient stability of an one-machine infinite
bus system (OMIB) without computing the swing curves.
Therefore, the following simplifications and assumptions were
considered. The synchronous machine (SM) is represented
by a constant voltage magnitude behind the synchronous
reactance and the mechanical power input is assumed to be
constant. Furthermore, the damping of the machine is ne-
glected and the loads are represented by constant impedances.
It was later shown that the simplifications can be relaxed [30].
When the damping is neglected and after manipulation, the
swing equation can be written for an OMIB as follows [44]:
[dδ/dt]
2
=
∫
(2/M)(Pm − Pe) dδ (11)
Pe/m Electric power injection / mechanical power input
δ Relative rotor angle
Initially, the derivative of the angle is zero and changes after
the disturbance. For a stable case the angle reaches a maximum
at δm and changes the direction thereafter. From this the
following stability criteria can be formulated [44].∫ δm
δ0
(2/M)(Pm − Pe) dδ = 0 (12)
The integral can be split up into two areas, which can be
calculated as follows (indices D and P denote conditions
during and after fault clearance respectively).
Aacc =
∫ δc
δ0
(PmD − PeD) dδ =
∫ δc
δ0
Pa dδ (13)
Adec = −
∫ δm
δc
(PmP − PeP ) dδ = −
∫ δm
δc
Pa dδ (14)
Pa Accelerating power
A stability margin η can then be determined as follows, where
δu is the rotor angle at the UEP.
η = −∫ δu
δ0
Padδ = Adec(δm = δu)−Aacc (15)
A positive margin represents a stable case, a negative an
unstable and in the case that η = 0 it is a critical case.
2) Extended Equal Area Criterion (EEAC): In order to
determine the stability of the power system as a response to a
certain disturbance, the method described in [26] decomposes
the multi-machine system into a set of critical machine(s)
and a set of the ’remaining’ generators. The machines in
the two groups are aggregated and then transformed into two
equivalent machines to form an OMIB system. Furthermore, in
order to achieve simple algebraic equations for the assessment
criteria, a modified Taylor series expansion is applied to
determine the rotor angle.
a) Aggregation of Machines and Formulation of the
OMIB system: The two sets of machines are aggregated as
follows.
Ma,s =
∑
i∈A,S
Mi; δa,s = M
−1
a,s
∑
i∈A,S
Miδi; (16)
where S is the set of the machines of the critical cluster; s is
its equivalent aggregated to one machine and t+0 = 0
+ is the
time immediately following the disturbance. In the same way
the ’remaining’ machines can be aggregated, where A is the
set of the ’remaining’ machines; a is its equivalent aggregated
to one machine. The OMIB system is then described by
Mδ¨ = Pm − Pe = Pm − [Pc + Pmax sin(δ − v)] (17)
The equations for Pm, Pc, Pmax and v can be found in [26].
b) Determine acceleration and deceleration area: The
two areas can be computed as follows.
Aacc = (Pm − PcD)(δτ − δ0)
+PmaxD[cos(δτ − vD)− cos(δ0 − vD)] (18)
Adec = (PcP − Pm)(pi − δτ − δP + 2vP )
+PmaxP [cos(δτ − vP )− cos(δP − vP )] (19)
c) Critical Clearing Time (CCT): In order to determine
the CCT, the rotor angle is expressed in a Taylor series.
δτ = δ0 +α
−1
1 α
−2
2 γ(τ
2/2) +α−11 α
−4
2 γ¨(τ
4/24); γ = δ¨ (20)
where α1,2 are corrective factors to compensate for the trun-
cation error [26]. The Taylor series expansion solely contains
even derivatives of δ, this is due to continuity which dictates
that δ˙ is equal to zero at t+0 and that causes the cancellation
of all higher-order odd derivatives of δ [26].
The stability of the power system with respect to a certain
contingency can be assessed by determining the CCT. There-
fore, (18) and (19) are solved for δc and (20) is utilized to
calculate tc. A simple comparison of the CCT and the actual
clearing time yields the stability assessment result.
d) Identification Critical Machine(s): In order to identify
a (cluster of) critical machine(s), the authors of [26] suggest
the acceleration criterion σi.
σi = (Pmi − Pei(δ(t+0 )))/Mi (21)
The machines with the largest acceleration criterion are the
critical machines. Critical groups can be identified, when con-
sidering the CCTs of the machines and their interconnection.
A critical group is formed if two to three generators at the top
of the list have similar CCTs and are strongly interconnected.
3) SIME: SIngle Machine Equivalent (SIME) poses an
hybrid approach, which combines the advantages of a direct
method and the time domain simulation approach.
In [30] different applications of the method are described.
For fast stability assessment the predictive SIME seems to be
appropriate and is considered in this analysis.
In the following a short description of the method is given.
It solely comprises the most important features and the reader
is referred to [27], [30] for a complete description.
5a) Identification of Critical Machines: In order to iden-
tify the critical machines, the rotor angles of the generators
are analyzed in every time step of the post-fault time domain
simulation. In [28], [30] the generators are sorted according to
their rotor angles and the angles of consecutive generators are
compared to detect the ’maximum gap’. The generators above
each gap are considered to form the set of critical generators
and a corresponding candidate OMIB is formed. The time-
domain simulation is continued until a candidate OMIB fulfills
the instability criteria stated in (22).
b) Formulation of OMIB: After the critical machines are
identified the system generators can be transformed into two
equivalent machines and the OMIB system can be set up.
The inertia coefficients of the equivalent machines can be
calculated utilizing (16). The OMIB can then be described
by (17), after Pm, Pc, Pmax and v are determined.
c) Stability criterion: In [27] the stability criteria for the
OMIB trajectories are determined as follows.
Unstable trajectory is a trajectory, which reaches an angel
δu at time tu where
Pa(tu) = 0; dPa/dt|t=tu > 0 (22)
Stable trajectory is a trajectory, which reaches an angel
δr < δu at time tr, where ω(tr) = 0; Pa(tr) < 0.
d) Stability margin: The stability margin can then be
determined as follows.
η = −∫ δu
δi
Padδ − (1/2)Mω2i (23)
δi = δ(ti) OMIB angle at time ti short after fault clearance
In order to determine the stability margin, a weighted least-
square approximation (WLS) is used in [30] and Pa(δ) is
extrapolated between δr to δu. The parameters a, b and c in
eq. (24) are determined using values of Pa at three successive
time steps
Pa(δ) = aδ
2 + bδ + c (24)
e) Predictive SIME: In [30] the predictive SIME method
is used within a closed emergency control loop. The method
is assumed to receive real-time measurements, which contain
the rotor angles, speeds and accelerations. Subsequently, the
method is used to carry out a predictive stability assessment,
which can be used to determine appropriate control actions.
The procedure of the predictive SIME is described in [30]
as follows. Step 1: At a time shortly after the disturbance
clearance, consider three successive incoming measurements
of the individual machines. Step 2: Use Taylor series to
predict machine angles some time ahead and identify critical
machines as described in section II-B3a. Step 3: Construct the
corresponding OMIB as described in section II-B3b. Step 4:
Determine OMIB parameters from the received measurements.
Step 5: Approximate Pa − δ curve with WLS approximation.
Step 6: Solve eq. (24) to determine δu. Step 7: Determine
stability margin as described in section II-B3d.
f) Modification of Predictive SIME: In order to use the
predictive SIME method for a fast stability assessment, the
real-time measurements are used as initial conditions for a
time domain simulation. The simulation is run until shortly
PMU
data
Update Admit.
matrix Yinit
Determ.
YDuring
YPost
for 1 . . . k
contingencies
TSA
Fig. 2. PMU data utilization
TABLE I
COMPLEXITY ESTIMATION, b: NUMBER OF BRANCHES; m:NUMBER OF
GENERATORS; n: NUMBER OF BUSES; k: NUMBER OF CONTINGENCIES
Function Time Frequency
PMU data O(n+ b) 1 O(n+ b)
Admittance matrix O(m+ n+ b) 1 O(m+ n+ b)
YDuring , YPost O(m+ n+ b) k kO(m+ n+ b)
TOTAL kO(m+ n+ b)
after the disturbance is cleared and the simulated values are
used instead of the measured values in the predictive SIME.
The stability analysis can then be carried out following the
steps described in the previous section.
III. RESULTS
The runtime analysis of the examined methods are presented
in the following. It is assumed that PMU data providing full
observability of the system are received in real-time.
The complexity of the algorithms of the distinct methods
are compared in the following. This estimation should be
valid for future power system and, consequently, the effects of
structural changes, such as the increasing installation of DER,
should be reflected in the results. Therefore, the algorithms of
the different methods are compared using the big O-notation,
which is common practice when analyzing algorithms [45].
If simulations were carried out instead, the analysis would be
tied to the particular test case, and effects of structural changes
would not be accounted for. A simulation of a relatively small
test power system such as the IEEE test system cases would
assess runtime on current power systems, and the results would
fail to capture dependence on the system size and topology.
A. PMU data utilization
The procedure to extract the needed information from the re-
ceived PMU measurements is shown in figure 2. It is assumed
that voltage measurements from each node are received as
well as current measurements from both ends of each branch.
These measurements are used to update the admittance matrix
and with a list of contingencies the admittance matrices for
the during- and post-fault condition are set up.
The matrices are extended by the internal nodes of the
machines behind their transient reactance X ′d, since some of
the methods assume the voltages behind X ′d to be constant.
The number of operations to update these matrices is
proportional to the number of branches, nodes and machines
in the system. The results in O-notation are shown in table I.
B. Scalar Lyapunov’s Direct method
The discussed methods assessing transient stability using
Lyapunov’s method are only differing in the way the critical
6Y from
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1 . . . k
Red. matrices
YD , YP
Matrix Partitioning
Time domain
simulation
Determ.
Vcrit
Determ.
Vcl at
clearance
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>
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Fig. 3. Flow diagram scalar Lyapunov method
transient energy is determined. Therefore, the general proce-
dure is shown in fig. 3 and in subsequent sections it is solely
described how each method calculates the critical energy.
The methods based on a scalar Lyapunov function use the
reduced admittance matrix, which means that the nodes where
no current enters or leaves the network are eliminated. This
elimination is carried out using matrix algebra and partitioning
of the admittance matrix [46]. The most complex step, in
determining the reduced admittance matrix, is to find the
inverse of the (n×n) admittance matrix. However, the matrix
is highly sparse, which enables to determine the inverse much
faster than for the case of a full matrix. In order to use the
algorithm proposed by Takahishi et al. [47], the matrix has to
be transformed into a banded matrix by applying the reverse
Cuthill-McKee algorithm, which complexity was shown in
[48] to be proportional to the number of edges and, hence,
proportional to O(b). The complexity of calculating the whole
inverse of a banded matrix can be approximated by O(n2d)
[49], where d is the bandwidth. It can be argued that in the
case of power system networks the bandwidth of the ordered
admittance matrix is small compared to the number of nodes
and in large system smaller than the number of machines. In
the IEEE 14-bus system d is larger than m. In the IEEE 300-
bus system the bandwidth is considerably smaller than the
number of machines (d: 35, m: 68).
In order to determine the transient energy of the system
at the point of fault clearance, a time domain simulation of
the whole system until the clearance has to be carried out.
An explicit integration method such as Runge-Kutta (R-K)
method is used to calculate the time response. In order to carry
out the time domain simulation a set of algebraic equations
and differential equations has to be solved. When utilizing
the R-K method the complexity of solving the differential
equation is proportional to O(m2). In order to solve the
algebraic equation fast the sparsity of the admittance matrix
is utilized and corresponding fast algorithms are used. By per-
forming a LU-factorization and through forward and backward
substitution the process can be considerably accelerated. The
LU-factorization is, however, the operation with the highest
computational cost and can be approximated by O(d2n) [49].
After the values of the state variables at fault clearance are
determined, the transient energy of the system at that point
in time can be determined. The complexity of calculating the
transient energy itself is O(m2), due to the double sum (see
eq. (1)). Additionally to the state variables at fault clearance,
the state variables at the during-fault stable equilibrium need
to be known. To find the SEP the Newton Raphson (N-R)
method is used and this leads to a complexity of O(m3).
TABLE II
COMPLEXITY ESTIMATION PROCESSES SHARED BY THE TWO SCALAR
LYAPUNOV METHODS, d: BANDWIDTH OF BANDED MATRIX
Function Time Freq.
Y from PMU O(m+ n+ b) 1 O(m+ n+ b)
Reduce Matrices O(dn2) 1 O(dn2)
Time domain simulation† O(d2n) x xO(d2n)
Determine Vcl O(m3) 1 O(m3)
Determine Vcrit III-B1 & III-B2
Compare Vcl and Vcrit 1 1 1
TOTAL‡(one disturbance) O(dn2)
 : Matrix reduction by partitioning of the matrix, see [46, section 2.1]
† : Using an explicit integration method Runge-Kutta with x time steps
‡ : Runtime evaluation without determination of the critical energy
YP
Determ. θs,P
(using NR)
Determ. V
of type-1
UEPs
Determ.
Vcrit =
mini V
Vcrit
Fig. 4. Flow diagram determine Vcrit in the closest UEP method
TABLE III
COMPLEXITY ESTIMATION CLOSEST UEP
Function Time Freq.
Lyapunov method frame O(dn2) 1 O(dn2)
Determine V of type-1 UEPs O(m3) m O(m4)
Determine Vcrit (merge sort) O(m logm) 1 O(m logm)
TOTAL(one disturbance) O(m4)
 : see table II
YD , YP
Sim. faulted
system until
PEBS crossing
Sim. post fault
reduced
system
Find CUEP
and
V (θU , 0)
Vcrit
Fig. 5. Flow diagram determine Vcrit in the BCU method
Finally, the determined transient energy at fault clearance
and the critical energy of the post-fault system are compared.
1) Closest UEP: Figure 4 shows the block diagram of
the closest UEP method, which determines the critical energy
of the post-fault system by considering all type-1 UEP. The
procedure to determine all m type-1 UEPs is the computational
most expensive step, because the UEPs are identified using N-
R method which comprises the inversion of an 2m×2m-matrix
resulting in a complexity proportional to O(m3).
The next step to identify the lowest critical energy is fast
with O(m logm), when applying the merge sort algorithm.
The runtime evaluation results are presented in tab. III.
2) BCU method: The procedure to determine the critical
energy when applying the BCU method is depicted as block
diagram in fig. 5. The corresponding estimation of the runtime
is depicted in table IV. When applying an explicit integration
method to carry out the time domain simulation, its complexity
is proportional to the square of the number of machines in the
system. The second time domain simulation, which is of the
reduced system, comprises a reduced number of differential
equation, the number of equations and the complexity to solve
those is, however, still proportional to the number of machines
squared O(m2). In both cases in each simulation step a set
of algebraic equations has to be solved using LU-factorization
with complexity proportional to O(d2n).
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COMPLEXITY ESTIMATION BCU
Function Time Freq.
Lyapunov method frame O(dn2) 1 O(dn2)
Sim. until PEBS crossing † O(d2n) y yO(d2n)
Sim. reduced system ‡ O(d2n) z zO(d2n)
Find CUEP O(m3) 1 O(m3)
Determine Vcrit O(m2) 1 O(m2)
TOTAL(one disturbance) O(dn2)
 : see table II
† : Time dom. sim. continued using R-K with y time steps
‡ : Time dom. sim. of red. system using R-K with z time steps
Y from
PMU
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eq.(20)
CCT
>
tcl?
Stable
yes
Fig. 6. Flow diagram extended equal area criterion
In order to find the controlling UEP, the N-R method is
applied, where the results of the time domain simulation
serve as an initial guess. The complexity of this step is
consequently proportional to O(m3) and the calculation of
Vcrit is proportional to O(m2).
C. Equal Area Criterion Methods
The equal area in its pure form is promising to be very fast
due to the lack of time domain simulation, the results, however,
are expected to be conservative, because of the assumed con-
stant voltage magnitude behind the transient reactance frozen
at the time just before the fault occurrence. The SIME method
tries to overcome these challenges through the combination of
a direct method with time domain simulation.
1) Extended Equal Area Criterion: Figure 6 shows the
procedure to determine stability using the EEAC method de-
picted as a block diagram. The method utilizes the admittance
matrices provided from the PMU data procedure. The matrices
are reduced as described in the preceding section (O(dn2)).
Following, the acceleration criterion is calculated for each
machine, which allows to determine the critical machine(s).
Therefore, the electrical power injection of each machine at
fault occurrence has to be calculated O(m2).
The critical machines can then be identified after sorting the
calculated acceleration criteria and identifying the machines
with the largest values, this can be achieved by employing the
merge sort algorithm (O(m logm)).
In the next step the machines are aggregated into two
equivalent machines and the OMIB system is determined.
The number of operations associated with this process is
proportional to the square of the number of machines.
Eventually, the critical angle and the CCT can be calculated
and the results can be compared to the settings of the associ-
ated protection relays to evaluate stability. The results of the
runtime assessment are shown in table V.
TABLE V
COMPLEXITY ESTIMATION EEAC
Function Time Freq.
Y from PMU O(m+ n+ b) 1 O(m+ n+ b)
Reduce Matrices O(dn2) 1 O(dn2)
Acceleration criteria O(m) m O(m2)
Identify critical O(m logm) 1 O(m logm)
Aggregate & form OMIB O(m2) 1 O(m2)
Determine δc, CCT 1 1 1
Compare tcl and CCT 1 1 1
TOTAL(one disturbance) O(dn2)
 : Matrix reduction by partitioning of the matrix, see [46, section 2.1]
Y from
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1 . . . k
Time-domain
simulation
until tc + 3∆t
Taylor series
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rotor angles
Identify
critical
machines
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P − δ approx.
with WLS
to find δu
Calculate
stability
margin η
η < 0?Unstable
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Fig. 7. Flow diagram modified predictive SIME
TABLE VI
COMPLEXITY ESTIMATION SIME
Function Time Freq.
PMU data O(m+ n+ b) 1 O(m+ n+ b)
Time domain sim.† O(d2n) x xO(d2n)
Rotor angle (pred.) 1 m O(m)
Ident. critical mach. O(m logm) 1 O(m logm)
Aggregate & form OMIB ‡ O(m) 1 O(m)
P − δ approx. 1 1 1
Det. stability margin 1 1 1
TOTAL(one dist.) xO(d2n)
† : Explicit integration method (R-K method) with x time steps
‡ : Differs to EEAC see text for explanation
2) Modified Predictive SIME: Figure 7 shows the transient
stability assessment using the SIME method in a block dia-
gram. The first step in the method based on SIME is to carry
out a time-domain simulation until three time steps after the
fault clearance. For the time domain simulation a number of
differential equations proportional to the number of machines
in the system have to be solved using an explicit integration
method. The complexity of the individual differential equa-
tions varies and in some cases, e.g. the derivative of the rotor
speed depends on the remaining generators, which leads to
a total complexity estimation proportional to O(m2). The
second step in the time domain simulation is to update the
network parameters, therefore n algebraic equations have to
be solved. Due to the fact that the admittance matrix is highly
sparse special algorithms can be used to solve these equations
and this results in a complexity approximated by O(d2n).
In the following, the rotor angle of each individual machine
advancing in time are predicted through a Taylor series ex-
pansion, where complexity is estimated to be proportional to
O(m). The predicted rotor angles are sorted and the critical
machine candidates are identified through the biggest ’gap’
(merge sort O(m logm)). After identification of the critical
machines, the machines can be aggregated and transformed
into an OMIB system, this processes is less complex than in
8the EEAC method due to the availability of parameters from
the time domain simulation. The P − δ-curve is then approx-
imated with the simulated data and equation (24). Thereupon,
the angle δu and time tu, which meet the conditions stated
in eq. (22), are identified and used to determine the stability
margin utilizing (23). Eventually, by evaluating the stability
margin the stability can be determined. The overall complexity
of the SIME method can then be approximated by xO(d2n).
IV. DISCUSSION
The results in tab. I to VI make it possible to identify
the dominant operation in all methods. The complexity of
the processes of handling the PMU data and updating of the
matrices is linear and negligible in all the analyzed methods.
In the analysis of the closest UEP method it was shown that
identification of all the type-1 UEPs is the most complex step
with an associated complexity proportionally O(m4). In the
case of the BCU method and the EEAC the operation with the
highest associated computational costs is the reduction of the
admittance matrix O(dn2), which is for the case of the EEAC
in good agreement with the results in [26]. The SIME method
overcomes some of the challenges of the EEAC method by
including time domain simulation. This results in a complexity
proportional to O(d2n).
In direct comparison with the closest UEP method, the
BCU method is faster and less conservative because of the
determination of the CUEP. The use of Lyapunov’s methods
compared to the EEAC allows more detailed models of the
system and the machines. While the EEAC is restricted to
the classic model, more complex structure-preserving models
can be utilized in Lyapunov’s method. The SIME circumvents
the restriction to the classical model by using a detailed
time domain simulation. It should be noted that the needed
simulation is shorter compared to the BCU method.
In the complexity analysis the time domain simulation was
assumed to be carried out using an explicit integration method,
this method is not A-stable and, consequently, requires a small
integration time step [44]. An improvement of the accuracy
of the time domain simulation and the usage of larger time
steps could be enabled by employing an implicit integration
method, which uses for example the trapezoidal rule. However,
this may lead to an increase of the complexity to xO(dn2).
Because the aim of the paper is to investigate the method’s
real-time capability, it was decided to use a faster but less
accurate integration method.
The results of the analysis of the time domain simulation are
as well dependent on the accuracy of the representation of the
loads. For this analysis it was assumed that the impedances
of the loads vary during the disturbance and, consequently,
the admittance matrix needs to be updated and factorized
in each simulation step. When load impedances are assumed
to be constant, the simulation is still dominated by the LU-
factorization, but it has to be carried out only two times.
Another critical issue is the comparison of complexities
proportional to the number of machines and proportional to
the number of nodes in the system. Nowadays, due to the
centralized power generation, in a power system the number
of machines is considerably lower than the number of nodes.
This ratio is to change in the future, due to increasing instal-
lation of DER. Consequently, the number of machines in the
system could approach values closer to the number of nodes,
which may lead to changes in the complexity evaluation, e.g.
domination of the Lyapunov method frame by O(m3).
Under the consideration that in the future power system the
number of machines in the system will be considerably higher
than today, the analysis of the complexity suggest that the
SIME method may provide the fastest stability evaluation of
the system. However, an additional uncertainty is introduced
due to the prediction of the rotor angles using a Taylor series
and a weighted least-square approximation of the P−δ-curve.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper begins with a review of methods using Lya-
punov’s method and the EAC, which are further analyzed.
When using the Lyapunov approach the challenge is to
derive an appropriate energy function, which fulfills the criteria
for a Lyapunov function, and to identify the appropriate critical
energy for the stability evaluation. The BCU method combined
with a structure-preserving model seems to overcome these
challenges in a promising way.
The second approach uses the equal area criterion. The
EEAC method allows to carry out the transient stability
assessment without the need for time domain simulations, but
requires the reduced admittance matrix and is limited to the
use of the classical model, which leads to conservative results.
SIME overcomes some of the limitation of the EEAC
method through the use of a detailed time domain simulation.
The results suggest that the methods utilizing the equal
area criterion are faster than the methods using energy func-
tions when assessing transient stability in large systems with
distributed power generation. The SIME method may be the
preferable tool to fast evaluate the transient stability of a large
power system, due to the less conservative results.
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Abstract 
 
In this paper, it is investigated how detailed the model of 
a synchronous machine needs to be in order to assess 
transient stability using a Single Machine Equivalent 
(SIME). The results will show how the stability 
mechanism and the stability assessment are affected by 
the model detail. In order to identify the transient stability 
mechanism, a simulation with a high-order model was 
used as reference. The Western System Coordinating 
Council System (WSCC) and the New England & New 
York system are considered and simulations of an 
unstable and a stable scenario are carried out, where the 
detail of the machine models is varied. Analyses of the 
results suggest that a 4th-order model may be sufficient to 
represent synchronous machines in transient stability 
studies.1 
 
Introduction 
 
Today's society is highly dependent on a stable and secure 
supply of electric power. In the future, this is not expected 
to change. The shift from fossil energy sources to 
renewable energy sources, which can be observed in 
many countries around the world and the aim of reaching 
a Danish society with minimal dependency on fossil fuels 
[1], represents a great challenge for the power system. 
These ambitious plans can only be achieved, when a large 
share of the electric power generation uses renewable 
energy sources, whose energy sources are non-
controllable sources such as wind and solar radiation [1].  
The integration of such non-controllable sources will lead 
to increased fluctuations of the power system's operating 
point. This will make the planning of secure and stable 
operation hours ahead no longer feasible and the need for 
real-time stability assessment tools will arise. 
In [2], [3], [4] phasor measurement technology is said to 
be the technology enabling the development of real-time 
wide area monitoring and control applications [5], [6]. 
Consequently, recently developed stability assessment 
methods try to solve the task of on-line security and 
stability assessment by utilizing synchronized phasor 
measurements. This is done by either developing an 
                                                           
1This research was supported by the Danish Strategic Research Council. 
entirely new approach such as in [7], [8] or by adaption of 
an off-line method to real-time operation, e.g. in [9], [10]. 
In [11] the adaptability of various direct transient stability 
assessment (TSA) methods to real-time operation was 
investigated. The analysis showed that the SIME method 
allows the fastest TSA. The method utilizes input from 
time-domain simulation. In order to achieve fast 
computation, it is desirable to reduce the number of 
differential equations to be solved. Hence, in the 
following it is investigated, how detailed the model of a 
synchronous generator needs to be to depict the transient 
stability mechanism accurately enough to allow a 
detection of the instability and its origin. However, it 
should be noted that in this work the focus is solely on 
assessing first swing instability.  
In this work the RAMSES software [12] developed at the 
University of Liège was used to perform the dynamic 
time-domain simulations. 
 
Transient Stability Assessment 
 
Transient stability assessment (TSA) analyzes the 
system’s ability to sustain large transient disturbances 
such as loss of generation or failure on transmission 
facilities [13]. These disturbances lead to large excursion 
of the machines rotor angle, which are described by the 
strongly non-linear relations governing the dynamics in 
power systems. Consequently, transient stability cannot 
be assessed through linearization of the system equations.  
 
Direct methods 
 
In order to allow fast transient stability assessment, direct 
TSA methods were developed. These methods try to 
avoid explicitly solving the system differential equations. 
One of the main approaches is based on Lyapunov’s 
method [14] and a second main approach is applying the 
equal area criterion [15]. 
 
Lyaponov’s method. In order to apply Lyapunov’s method 
the system is described by a transient energy function, 
which allows determining transient stability after 
identification of the stable and unstable equilibrium point 
(UEP) of the post-fault system [14]. However, since the 
system is described by one single transient energy 
 function, it is difficult to determine the origin of the 
instability. One of the most recent developments applying 
this approach is the so called BCU method [16]. 
 
Equal Area Criterion. The equal area criterion (EAC) 
allows assessing transient stability of one-machine infinite 
bus (OMIB) systems without explicitly solving the swing 
equation [13]. The criterion essentially states that the 
system needs to be capable of absorbing the kinetic 
energy of the generator gained during the fault. The 
gained kinetic energy and the energy absorbing capability 
are represented by areas defined by the mechanical power 
and the ܲ െ ߜ-curve, which describes the non-linear 
relation of the electric power injection and the rotor angle. 
Hence, with certain assumptions and simplifications the 
stability criteria can be formulated as an integral. 
This approach was further developed with the extended 
equal area criterion [17] and most recently with the hybrid 
method SIME [15].  
An analysis of the computational burden of the two 
mentioned methods with respect to real-time 
implementation was carried out in [11]. The results 
suggest that methods based on the EAC are faster than 
methods using Lyapunov’s method. Hence, in the 
following SIME is considered for the fast screening 
method. 
 
Single Machine Equivalent (SIME) Method 
 
Transient stability assessment with a SIngle Machine 
Equivalent (SIME) is based on the Equal Area Criterion 
and considered to be a hybrid method, since it combines 
the advantages of a direct method and time-domain 
simulation. A detailed description of the method can be 
found in [15]. 
 
Concept. The SIME method determines in each 
simulation step parameters of a candidate one-machine 
infinite bus (OMIB) system, which describes the 
dynamics of a critical generator group and a group of 
remaining (non-critical) generators. The machines in the 
system are split up into the critical and the non-critical 
group corresponding to their rotor angles. The machines 
in each group are aggregated and the parameters of the 
OMIB system are determined. After aggregation of the 
machines the transient stability of the resulting OMIB can 
be assessed using the equal area criterion. 
 
Transient stability margin. The stability margin of such a 
system can be calculated as follows [15]. 
 ߟ ൌ  െ ׬ఋ೔
ఋೠ
௔ܲ݀ߜ െ  1/2 ܯ߱௜ଶ (1) 
ܯ Inertia coefficient of candidate OMIB ሾݏଶ ݎܽ݀⁄ ሿ 
௔ܲ Accelerating power of candidate OMIB ሾ݌ݑሿ 
ߜ௜ Current rotor angle of candidate OMIB ሾݎܽ݀ሿ 
ߜ௨  Rotor angle at UEP of candidate OMIB ሾݎܽ݀ሿ 
ߟ Transient stability margin in ሾݎܽ݀ሿ 
߱௜ Current rotor speed of candidate OMIB ሾݎܽ݀ ݏ⁄ ሿ 
Here a negative margin represents an unstable case and a 
positive margin a stable case [15]. The unit of the stability 
margin computed with eq. (7) is radians. Often the margin 
is normalized with respect to the inertia coefficient of the 
OMIB, which results in a normalized stability margin 
with unit ሺݎܽ݀/ݏሻଶ. 
 
Implementation. In this case the implementation of SIME 
is used to carry out a fast screening of the current system 
condition with respect to N-1-contingencies and first 
swing transient stability. The implementation is derived 
from E-SIME, e.g. described in [15], [18]. E-SIME uses 
measurements of the post-fault system, which are 
acquired in real-time. These measurements are replaced in 
this implementation by data received from the time-
domain simulation software RAMSES. This 
implementation of SIME is called preventive SIME [15]. 
With the application of SIME the aim is to get an early 
stop criterion for the simulation, which declares a 
contingency to be definitely stable or unstable. 
In order to determine first swing stability of the particular 
contingency scenario, a time-domain simulation is run 
until at least three data sets of the post-fault system are 
available. Then the predictive SIME method is executed 
the first time and, subsequently, the stability assessment is 
updated with data sets acquired in each successive 
simulation step. 
In the following the procedure of preventive SIME is 
described in more detail (see also [11] and [15]). 
Step 1: Consider the first three data sets received from the 
time-domain simulation in the post-fault configuration. 
Step 2: Predict the rotor angle of each individual 
generator some time ahead (~100݉ݏ) using Taylor series 
expansion truncated after the quadratic term. Step 3: Rank 
generators according to the predicted rotor angles and 
identify the critical machine candidates looking for the 
maximum angular deviation of two successive machines. 
The machines above this gap form the candidate critical 
machines and the ones below the candidate the non-
critical machines. The machines are then aggregated 
accordingly and the candidate OMIB is determined. 
Step 4: Subsequently, the parameter of the candidate 
OMIB can be computed and, utilizing the accelerating 
power and the rotor angle from at least three successive 
data sets, the ௔ܲ െ ߜ curve can be estimated as follows. 
 ௔ܲሺߜሻ ൌ ܽߜଶ ൅ ܾߜ ൅ ܿ (2) 
Note: First, the parameters ܽ, ܾ and ܿ can be determined 
using the three acquired data sets and, in the following, 
with additional acquired data the prediction can be refined 
using a weighted least square technique. Step 5:  The 
angle ߜ௨ at the unstable equilibrium point is determined 
by solving ௔ܲሺߜ௨ሻ ൌ 0 and by checking if the instability 
conditions of eq. (3) are met. 
 ௔ܲሺߜ௨ሻ ൌ 0;  ሶܲ௔ሺߜ௨ሻ ൐ 0 (3) 
If the instability conditions (3) are not met, then a new set 
of data is acquired and the procedure is repeated from 
Step 2. If the conditions are met the stability margin is 
computed utilizing eq. (1), then a new set of data is 
 acquired and the Steps 2 to 5 are repeated to refine the 
computed ߜ௨ and the estimated stability margin ߟ. The 
procedure is terminated when the stability margin 
converged to a constant value or the angle of maximum 
excursion ߜ௥ is reached where the following conditions 
are met. 
 ௔ܲሺߜ௥ሻ ൏ 0; ߱௥ ൌ 0 (4) 
Since the method to determine transient stability requires 
time-domain simulation a speed up of the assessment can 
be achieved, when the model detail of the power system 
components, used in the simulation, can be reduced. 
Hence, in the following the method is tested with reduced 
order synchronous machine models. 
 
Synchronous machine models 
 
In the following section the described synchronous 
machine (SM) models were adopted from [19]. The 6th- 
and 4th-order model are readily integrated in RAMSES. 
The 3rd-order and 2nd-order model were realized through 
appropriate selection of the time constants in the 4th-order 
model. 
 
Four winding model (6th-order) 
 
In the 6th-order model, four windings are considered, two 
on the q-axis and two on the d-axis. However, the 
network and stator transients are neglected. According to 
[13] the dynamics introduced by these transients may be 
neglected and this will lead to slightly conservative 
results, which is preferable in stability studies and in 
particular for fast screening where all critical and unstable 
scenarios should be identified.  
In dynamic analysis, when using the 6th-order model, the 
synchronous machine is described by the following six 
equations [19]. 
 
ௗܶ௢ᇱ
݀ܧ௤ᇱ
݀ݐ ൌ  െܧ௤
ᇱ െ  ሺܺௗ െ ܺௗᇱ ሻ ቈܫௗ
െ ܺௗ
ᇱ െ ܺௗᇱᇱ
ሺܺௗᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦ሻଶ ൫߰ଵௗ
൅ ሺܺௗᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦ሻܫௗ ൅ ܧ௤ᇱ ሻ቉
൅ ܧ௙ௗ 
(5) 
 
ௗܶ௢ᇱᇱ
݀߰ଵௗ
݀ݐ ൌ  െ߰ଵௗ ൅ ܧ௤
ᇱ െ ሺܺௗᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦ሻܫௗ (6) 
 
௤ܶ௢ᇱ
݀ܧௗᇱ
݀ݐ ൌ  െܧௗ
ᇱ ൅ ൫ܺ௤ െ ܺ௤ᇱ ൯ ൥ܫ௤
െ ܺ௤
ᇱ െ ܺ௤ᇱᇱ
൫ܺ௤ᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦൯ଶ
൫߰ଶ௤
൅ ൫ܺ௤ᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦൯ܫ௤ ൅ ܧௗᇱ ൯቉ 
(7) 
 
௤ܶ௢ᇱᇱ
݀߰ଶ௤
݀ݐ ൌ  െ߰ଶ௤ ൅  ܧௗ
ᇱ െ ൫ܺ௤ᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦൯ܫ௤ (8) 
 ݀ߜ
݀ݐ ൌ  ߱ െ ߱௦ (9) 
 2ܪ
߱௦
݀߱
݀ݐ ൌ ெܶ െ
ܺௗᇱᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦
ሺܺௗᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦ሻ ܧ௤
ᇱ ܫ௤
െ ܺௗ
ᇱ െ ܺௗᇱᇱ
ሺܺௗᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦ሻ ߰ଵௗܫ௤
െ ܺ௤
ᇱᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦
൫ܺ௤ᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦൯
ܧௗᇱ ܫௗ
൅ ܺ௤
ᇱ െ ܺ௤ᇱᇱ
൫ܺ௤ᇱ െ ௟ܺ௦൯
߰ଶ௤ܫௗ
െ ൫ܺ௤ᇱᇱ െ ܺௗᇱᇱ൯ܫௗܫ௤ െ ிܶௐ 
(10) 
ܧௗ,௤ᇱ  Transient voltage in d-/q-axis 
ܧ௙ௗ Field voltage 
ܪ Inertia constant 
ܫௗ,௤ Current in d-/q-axis 
ௗܶ௢,௤௢ᇱ  Transient time constant of d- /q-axis 
ௗܶ௢,௤௢ᇱᇱ  Subtransient time constant of d- /q-axis 
ிܶௐ Additional damping torque prop. to rotor speed 
ெܶ Mechanical torque 
ܺௗ,௤ᇱ  Transient reactance in d- /q-axis 
ܺௗ,௤ᇱᇱ  Subtransient reactance in d-/q-axis 
௟ܺ௦ Leakage reactance 
ߜ Rotor angle 
߰ଵௗ Flux linkage d-axis damper winding 
߰ଶ௤  Flux linkage q-axis damper winding 
߱ Rotor speed 
߱௦ Synchronous rotor speed: 2ߨ݂ 
Equation (5) and (6) describe the dynamics in the d-axis, 
while equation (7) and (8) describe the dynamics in the q-
axis. Equation (9) and (10) represents the well-known 
swing equation. 
In all models additional damping may be added through 
the optional torque component ிܶௐ, which introduces a 
damping torque proportional to the rotational speed. 
 
Two-axis model (4th-order) 
 
In the 4th-order two axis model, the damper winding 
dynamics ߰ଵௗ and ߰ଶ௤are neglected. As described in [19], 
this is achieved by setting ௗܶ௢ᇱᇱ  and ௤ܶ௢ᇱᇱ  equal to zero, 
which leads to the following mathematical description of 
the synchronous machine. 
 
ௗܶ௢ᇱ
݀ܧ௤ᇱ
݀ݐ ൌ െܧ௤
ᇱ െ ሺܺௗ െ ܺௗᇱ ሻܫௗ ൅ ܧ௙ௗ (11) 
 
௤ܶ௢ᇱ
݀ܧௗᇱ
݀ݐ ൌ െܧௗ
ᇱ ൅  ൫ܺ௤ െ ܺ௤ᇱ ൯ܫ௤  (12) 
 ݀ߜ
݀ݐ ൌ ߱ െ ߱௦ (13) 
 2ܪ
߱௦
݀߱
݀ݐ ൌ ெܶ െ ܧ௤
ᇱ ܫ௤ െ ܧௗᇱ ܫௗ െ ൫ܺ௤ᇱ െ ܺௗᇱ ൯ܫௗܫ௤
െ ிܶௐ
(14) 
It should be noted that, while the ߰ଵௗ and ߰ଶ௤  dynamics 
are neglected, the ܧௗᇱ  and ܧ௤ᇱ  dynamics are maintained. 
 
 
 
 
 One-axis model (3rd-order) 
 
In the one-axis model, the representation of the 
synchronous machine is reduced by another degree. 
Therefore, the damper windings dynamics ܧௗᇱ  are 
eliminated. This reduction is achieved by setting ௤ܶ௢ᇱ  
equal to zero and results in the following equations [19]. 
 
ௗܶ௢ᇱ
݀ܧ௤ᇱ
݀ݐ ൌ  െܧ௤
ᇱ െ  ሺܺௗ െ ܺௗᇱ ሻܫௗ ൅ ܧ௙ௗ (15) 
 ݀ߜ
݀ݐ ൌ  ߱ െ ߱௦ (16) 
 2ܪ
߱௦
݀߱
݀ݐ ൌ  ெܶ െ ܧ௤
ᇱ ܫ௤ െ ൫ܺ௤ െ ܺௗᇱ ൯ܫௗܫ௤
െ ிܶௐ 
(17) 
 
Classical model (2nd-order) 
 
The last synchronous machine model, which is considered 
in this analysis, is the classical model. In this model the 
voltage behind the transient reactance is assumed to be 
constant. For such a representation only the swing 
equation is needed to describe the dynamics of a 
synchronous machine. 
 ݀ߜ
݀ݐ ൌ  ߱ െ ߱௦ (18) 
 2ܪ
߱௦
݀߱
݀ݐ ൌ  ெܶ െ
ܧᇱ்ܸ
ܺௗᇱ sin ሺߜ െ ߠ்ሻ െ ிܶௐ 
(19) 
ܧᇱ Internal voltage behind transient reactance 
்ܸ  Terminal voltage 
 
Test systems and scenarios 
 
Two test systems, namely the Western System 
Coordinating Council system as well as the New 
England & New York system, were considered for the 
analysis. For each of the test systems a transient stable 
and a transient unstable test scenario were considered. 
 
Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) 
 
The WSCC system is a 9-bus system with 3 generators. 
The load flow and the dynamic data were adopted from 
[19]. However, in order to further stress the system, the 
system loading was increased by approximately 50%. The 
power generation of the generators was increased 
correspondingly. 
The parameters of the synchronous machine models can 
be seen in Table 1. In the original WSCC system the 
generators are solely described by a 4th-order model. 
Consequently, for the 6th-order model standard parameter 
were added, which were taken from [13]. 
In order to allow assessment of solely the influence of the 
generator model, the excitation systems were removed 
from the model and the excitation was assumed to be 
manually. Furthermore, no governor model was 
implemented. 
 
Table 1 Parameter of the three generators in the WSCC test system on 
machine basis adopted from [15] 
Parameter GEN-1 GEN-2 GEN-3 
ܯܸܣ௕௔௦௘ 500.0 300.0 300.0
ܪሾݏሿ 4.728 2.133 1.003 
Xௗሾ݌ݑሿ 0.7300 2.6874 3.9375 
ܺௗᇱ ሾ݌ݑሿ 0.3040 0.3594 0.5439 
ܺௗᇱᇱሾ݌ݑሿ1 0.2500 0.2500 0.3000 
X௤ሾ݌ݑሿ 0.4845 2.5935 3.7734 
ܺ௤ᇱ ሾ݌ݑሿ 0.3040 0.3594 0.5439 
ܺ௤ᇱᇱሾ݌ݑሿ1 0.2500 0.2500 0.3000 
ௗܶ௢ᇱ ሾݏሿ 8.690 6.000 5.890 
ௗܶ௢ᇱᇱ ሾݏሿ1 0.030 0.045 0.030 
௤ܶ௢ᇱ ሾݏሿ 0.310 0.535 0.600 
௤ܶ௢ᇱᇱ ሾݏሿ1 0.040 0.035 0.040 
1: Standard parameter chosen from [13] 
 
In order to assess how detailed the synchronous machine 
model needs to be to depict the instability mechanism of 
the first swing accurately and to allow correct stability 
assessment using SIME, two test scenarios are 
considered, an unstable and a stable case. 
In [20] it is stated that it is sufficient to represent 
turbogenerators by their 6th-order model in stability 
analysis. Therefore, the simulations using the 6th-order 
generator model serve as a reference case and it is 
assumed to reflect reality sufficiently. 
 
Unstable case. In the unstable case, the stressed system is 
driven to instability through the loss of the heavily loaded 
line connecting bus 7 and 8 100 ms after simulation 
begin. In this case, it is assumed that the line is tripped 
due to overloading and it is not reconnected. 
 
Fig. 1: Unstable response of the rotor angles of the generators to the 
transient disturbance 
Figure 1 shows that the loss of the heavily loaded 
transmission line triggers a first swing instability and 
causes generator 2 to lose synchronism. 
 
Stable case. In the stable case the same fault as in the 
unstable case is considered, but the transmission line is 
reconnected after 150݉ݏ. This reconnection leads to a 
relative deceleration of the affected generators and 
 eventually the system reaches a new steady state 
operating point. Figure 2 displays the rotor angle response 
of all three generators. 
 
Fig. 2: Stable response of the rotor angles of the generators to the 
transient disturbance 
New England and New York 
 
The second test system represents the New England and 
New York system. The system was adopted from Graham 
Rogers [21] and consists of sixteen generators and 
68 buses. The synchronous generators are modeled using 
a 6th-order model, thermal turbine/governor model and 
static exciters. All generators but generator 7 and 14 are 
equipped with a PSS. The parameters and a detailed 
model description can be found in [21]. In the following 
two transient stability scenarios are considered.  
 
Stable case. The stable case is adopted from chapter 5 in 
[21]. The considered fault is a three phase short circuit 
very close to bus 21 applied 1ݏ after simulation begin. 
The fault is cleared after 150݉ݏ by opening the breakers 
at both ends of the transmission line connecting bus 16 
and bus 21. The case represents a marginal stable 
scenario, which is apparent due to the large angular 
excursion of the rotor angles of the generators 6 and 7. 
Figure 3 shows the rotor angles over time, when the 
synchronous machines are represented by a 6th-order 
model. Like before this simulation will serve as reference 
for the TSA when using SIME. 
 
Fig. 3: Stable response of the rotor angles of the generators to the 
transient disturbance 
Unstable case. In order to obtain an unstable case, the 
power flow of the marginal stable case was modified. To 
further stress the system, the power generation of the 
critical generators was increased. Therefore, the power 
generation of generator 4 was decreased by 10ܯܹ and at 
the same time the power output of generator 6 was 
increased by the same amount. This accounts to a change 
in power generation of approx. 1.5% at both generators. 
This modification of the power flow and the same fault as 
in the stable case triggered a transient first swing 
instability and the loss of synchronism of generators 6 and 
7. The reference unstable case using 6th-order 
synchronous machine models and the rotor angles over 
time of all 16 generators can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Unstable response of the rotor angles of the generators to the 
transient disturbance 
Simulation results 
 
In the following section, the simulation results using the 
various generator models are discussed with respect to 
representation of the stability mechanism and possibility 
to assess transient stability using preventive SIME. 
 
Representation of the stability mechanism 
 
In order to detect instability correctly, the stability 
mechanism has to be depicted accurately. For the case of 
transient stability, the rotor angles of the machines allow 
to detect loss of synchronism and the origin of the 
stability problem. Hence, a comparison of the rotor angles 
may give an indication on the needed model detail. In the 
following, the rotor angle responses of the critical 
machines are compared when using varying SM models. 
 
WSCC unstable and stable case. In the two cases 
generator 2 was identified as the critical machine. A 
comparison of the unstable rotor angle responses of 
generator 2 using the four different machine models is 
shown in Figure 5. 
It can be seen that approximately for the first 400 ݉ݏ 
after the fault, the development of the rotor angles of 
generator 2 over time are differing only slightly. 
However, thereafter the development begins to diverge. 
The generator appears to be first swing stable, when using 
low order generator models such as the 2nd- and 3rd-order 
 model. The simulation using a 4th-order model shows the 
same instability mechanism as the reference case using 
the 6th-order model. It even seems to be slightly 
pessimistic since the rotor angle is increasing faster than 
in the reference case. 
 
Fig. 5: Unstable case: Rotor angle response of generator 2 using the four 
different generator model details 
A comparison of the rotor angle trajectories of the stable 
case lead to a similar conclusion. Figure 6 shows that the 
rotor angle trajectories are similar for the first 200 ݉ݏ 
after the disturbance, but begin to deviate subsequently. 
The deviations for 2nd- and 3rd-order models are larger 
than for the 4th-order model. However, the first swing 
characteristic is the same for all four models, where the 
4th-order model is, with respect to the maximum angle 
excursion, slightly more pessimistic and the 3rd-order 
model slightly more optimistic. 
 
Fig. 6: Stable case: Rotor angle response of generator 2 using the four 
different generator model details 
New England and New York. For the two scenarios of the 
second test system the generators 6 and 7 were identified 
as critical. Subsequently, the rotor angle trajectories of 
one of the critical generators (generator 6) are compared 
for the stable and unstable case. The different rotor angle 
curves are obtained from varying the SM model. 
Figure 7 shows the rotor angle responses for the stable 
case and it can be seen that only the simulation using the 
second order model fails to represent the correct stability 
mechanism; meaning that all but the 2nd-order model 
simulation show a stable rotor response. 
Approximately, for the first 400݉ݏ the different rotor 
angle trajectories only vary slightly. However, afterwards 
a clear separation is visible. When excluding the 2nd-order 
model, it can be observed that with decreasing order of 
detail, the maximum return angle decreases and it seems 
that the angle response is becoming less critical. 
 
 
Fig. 7: Stable case: Rotor angle response of generator 6 using the four 
different generator models 
Figure 8 shows the rotor angle response of generator 6 for 
the unstable case and varying model. Again it can be 
observed that for the first 400݉ݏ the rotor angle 
trajectories vary only slightly. In this case only the 
simulation with 3rd-order model does not depict the 
correct instability mechanism, since the machine appears 
to be first swing stable. However, the simulations utilizing 
2nd- and 4th-order models show a similar behavior as the 
reference case with 6th-order model, namely the loss of 
synchronism of the generator within the first swing. 
 
Fig. 8: Unstable case: Rotor angle response of generator 6 using the four 
different generator model details 
Stability Assessment Results using SIME 
 
Determination of the stability margin. In the following, 
the determined stability margins are analyzed for the 
discussed transient stability scenarios of the two test 
systems. The aim is to investigate if a reduced order 
model of a synchronous machine is sufficient to represent 
its dynamics during and following a transient disturbance. 
In the stable as well as in the unstable case of the WSCC 
test system, the estimation of the ܲ െ ߜ curve and the 
 calculation of the stability margin led to the conclusion 
that only generator 2 is critical and, hence, the following 
analysis solely considers the stability assessment of this 
generator as the critical generator group. 
It is expected that the estimation of the stability margin is 
improving with increasing number of considered 
simulated data. Furthermore, it is expected that the 
stability margin converges to a constant value. Figure 9 
shows the determined margin for the unstable case. For 
the four simulations with differing generator model, it can 
be seen that the margins converge to a constant value. 
The simulations, when using low order generator models, 
showed that the system is first swing stable in the unstable 
reference case (see Figure 5). The transient stability 
assessment of the first swing using SIME confirms this, 
since the stability margin converges to a positive value. 
The rotor angles over time for simulations with higher 
order generator model showed a loss of synchronism 
within the first swing. The TSA of these cases correctly 
predicts this loss of synchronism, which is apparent due to 
the convergence to a negative stability margin 
 
Fig. 9: Stability margins over time for the critical generator group 
consisting only of generator 2 and with differing degree of model detail 
Consequently, SIME determined stability in the four 
simulations accurately. However, the stability mechanism 
is only depicted correctly with models of 4th-order and 
higher. 
In the section analyzing the stability mechanism of the 
stable case, it was shown that the first swing characteristic 
was similar for all the generator models. Consequently, it 
is expected that SIME will determine all the four 
simulations to be first swing stable. Figure 10 shows the 
calculated stability margin of the stable case. Due to the 
rather fast first swing and the few data sets available to 
extrapolate the ܲ െ ߜ curve, the estimated stability 
margin seems to converge to a constant value, but does 
not reach it. Hence, for the presented stable case any of 
the considered synchronous machine models seems to be 
sufficient to assess stability. 
For the case of the New England and New York system 
generator 6 and 7 were identified as the critical generator 
group in both scenarios. Since the stable case is 
marginally stable and the unstable case marginally 
unstable, it is expected that the stability margin will 
converge to a value very close to zero in both cases. 
Figure 11 shows the computed stability margin over time 
of the stable case. 
 
Fig. 10: Stability margins over time of the stable scenario for the critical 
generator group consisting only of generator 2 and with differing degree 
of model detail 
The analysis of the rotor angle of generator 6 (see 
Figure 7) showed a stable response using SM models of 
3rd-order and higher. Consequently, SIME determines 
those simulations as stable and only the simulation using 
a 2nd-order SM model as unstable. 
 
 
Fig. 11: Stability margins over time of the stable scenario for the critical 
generator group consisting of generator 6 and 7 with differing degree of 
model detail 
The stability margin determined for the 2nd-order model 
simulation changes only slightly with time. This may be 
explained by the fact that TSAs using EAC are derived 
from the assumption of fixed voltage behind the transient 
reactance, which is also assumed for the case of a 
2nd-order model. The stability margin of the simulation 
using a 3rd-order model is the next fastest simulation to 
reach a (temporarily) constant stability margin. The 
subsequent rise of the stability margin may be explained 
by the observance that very close to the return angle the 
quadratic estimation of the ௔ܲ െ ߜ curve is no longer 
sufficient. For the 4th-order model the stability margin 
remains positive until the end of the simulation. However, 
the stability margin does not reach a constant value. The 
stability margin computed from values of the simulation 
using 6th-order SM models begin with a negative margin, 
 but it converges over time and with improving estimation 
of the ௔ܲ െ ߜ curve to a slightly positive value. 
Figure 12 shows the stability margin of the unstable case 
of the New England and New York system. Recall 
Figure 8 for this case all simulations but the simulation 
using 3rd-order generator model depicted an unstable rotor 
angle response similar to the reference case. The stability 
margin of the 2nd-order simulation is slightly more 
negative than in the prior case, but as steady as before. 
The simulation with 3rd-order models is much too 
optimistic and the stability assessment indicates a stable 
case. With a fourth order model the stability margin 
begins with a positive value, but slowly converges to a 
slightly negative margin indicating an unstable case. The 
stability margin determined from the 6th-order model 
simulation begins with a negative margin and converges 
to a negative margin close to zero, which was expected 
since the case is marginal unstable. In this case the 
simulations with 4th- and 6th-order models allowed a 
correct stability assessment, where the results with 
4th-order were slightly more optimistic. 
 
Fig. 12: Stability margins over time of the unstable case for the critical 
generator group consisting only of generator 6 and 7 with differing 
degree of model detail 
Conclusion 
 
The paper begins with a short description of the SIngle 
Machine Equivalent (SIME) method, which is based on 
the equal area criterion, and can be used to assess 
transient stability. SIME is a hybrid method combining 
the advantages of using time-domain simulation and using 
a direct method for transient stability assessment (TSA).  
In this paper SIME is used to carry out a fast transient 
stability screening of the current power system condition. 
For that purpose the computational burden of the TSA 
method should be minimized. In order to speed up the 
necessary time-domain simulation, a reduction of the 
synchronous machine model is considered in this work. 
The modeling degree of the synchronous generators was 
varied in two test power systems and two transient 
stability scenarios. For that purpose 6th-, 4th-, 3rd- and 
2nd-order models were considered, the stability 
mechanism by means of the rotor angle trajectories of the 
critical machines were compared and the resulting 
transient stability assessment results using the preventive 
SIME implementation were investigated. In all cases the 
simulation with 6th-order model was used as reference. 
The results showed that simulations using a synchronous 
machine model of 3rd-order and below do not exhibit the 
correct stability mechanism and, consequently, the 
transient stability assessment with SIME fails. 
Furthermore, it was shown that a representation of the 
synchronous machines by a 4th-order model may be 
sufficient, since the simulation displayed in all four cases 
the right stability mechanism and allowed to correctly 
determine transient stability. It should be mentioned that 
in the case of the New England and New York system the 
TSA with the 4th-order model led to slightly more 
optimistic stability assessment results than in the 
reference case. It should be noted the stable and unstable 
scenario of the New England and New York system were 
marginal stable and unstable and nevertheless, the 
4th-order generator model representation was sufficient. 
The simulation results at hand may suggest that a 
representation of the synchronous machine by their 
4th-order model is sufficient to assess transient first swing 
stability. 
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Abstract
This paper presents a framework for an on-line implementation of a contingency screening method using wide-
area measurements. For that purpose, a fast method is proposed, which carries out contingency screening and on-line
stability assessment with respect to first-swing transient stability. The proposed method utilizes the single machine
equivalent (SIME) method and attempts to improve the prior developed contingency screening methods. The proposed
method only carries out one time-domain simulation per contingency and in average requires only a few hundred
milliseconds of simulation after fault clearance. The method provides an assessment of the system’s stability and
classifies the respective contingency. The contingencies are categorized under the consideration of the parameters
of the determined equivalent one machine infinite bus (OMIB) system. Furthermore, a method to detect islanding
is proposed, which is appropriate for on-line operation, since it utilizes the efficient algorithms from graph theory.
This enables the stability assessment of individual islands. The New England & New York system is used to test the
proposed method with respect to assessment accuracy and computation time.
Index Terms
PMU, power system stability, transient stability, contingency screening, island detection
I. INTRODUCTION
In several countries around the world, power systems are going through major changes, which are induced by
political decisions and are leading to increased penetration of renewable energy sources (RES). The European
Commission published in 2010 a roadmap on how to reach a greenhouse gas emission reduction of 80 % compared
to 1990 by 2050 [1]. This will be a great challenge for the operators of power systems, which have to ensure a
reliable as well as stable and secure supply.
Research supported by the Danish Council for Strategic Research (DSF).
2In the future power system energy generation will be based on RES, such as wind and sunlight. These sources are
non-controllable and the generation planing will be dependent on forecasting accuracy. In contrast to today’s power
system, the production pattern in such a future system may change fast and will lead to increased fluctuations of
the power system’s operating point. This will introduce a need for real-time assessment methods for the future
transmission grid [2]. The current tools and methods for stability assessment are based on extensive off-line
calculations and, consequently, may no longer be sufficient. The development of individual assessment methods,
where each addresses a particular instability mechanism, was proposed in [3]. The assessment method proposed in
[3] uses algebraically derived stability boundaries [4] and was reported to allow assessment of 1325 generators in
a 7917 bus system in a few milliseconds [5]. Further methods for real-time stability and security assessment have
been presented in [6]–[8].
In this paper a fast stability assessment and contingency screening method is proposed, which assesses transient
stability of the system and can be part of an extensive dynamic security assessment (DSA) toolbox. Due to the
aforementioned changes in the power system, the transmission grid might be often operated at its limits and, hence,
a fast online-DSA is of crucial importance [9]. Moreover, a framework for the implementation of the method into
a real-time environment is presented.
A wide range of approaches and methods have been proposed for DSA [10] and fast contingency screening.
In [11] the authors discussed various severity indices for dynamic security analysis and ranking of contingencies.
The indices are based on coherency, transient energy conversion or on dot products of certain system states. A
detailed time-domain simulation is carried out until 500 ms after fault clearance. Then the indices are computed
to determine stability of the system and rank the respective contingency. In [12] a screening method utilizing the
transient energy function was proposed, which filters out the non-severe disturbances in three steps. A recent case
screening approach based on the extended equal area criterion (EEAC) was presented in [13]. Here the main idea
was to filter out the majority of the stable cases with data gathered just after fault clearance and to carry out
detailed time domain simulation combined with the integrating EEAC on the remaining yet undetermined cases.
In [14] the authors propose a SIME based contingency, filtering, ranking and assessment (FILTRA) method. The
method consists of two blocks. The first block filters stable contingencies and the second block ranks and assesses
the remaining possible harmful contingencies according to their estimated critical clearing times (CCTs). For that
purpose, up to two time-domain simulations have to be carried out for each contingency. The fast contingency
screening approach presented in [15] is also based on the SIME method. The authors introduce a new index for
grouping of the generators and a classification based on the power-angle shape of the OMIB. In order to classify
and rank the contingencies, the presented method carries out one to three time-domain simulations with varying
fault clearing time for each contingency.
The method proposed in this paper builds on the prior developed approaches based on the SIME method, since
it was identified in [16] as being potentially the fastest direct transient stability assessment (TSA) method. In the
present paper the idea of classifying the contingencies by considering the power-angle shape was further developed,
in order to allow the use of only one simulation per contingency. The fault clearing time is chosen corresponding
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the proposed screening and assessment method integrated into a framework for online assessment
to the respective protective relay settings and the aim is to extract from the simulation sufficient information to get
an estimate of the security and stability condition of the power system. Furthermore, the paper proposes a method
to detect the formation of islands and to identify the generators and loads in each island. The method utilizes the
efficient algorithms from graph theory and, hence, it is suitable for on-line application. Finally, the paper presents
a detailed runtime assessment of the proposed screening method.
II. METHOD
Figure 1 shows the block diagram of the proposed transient stability assessment (TSA) and contingency screening
method integrated into an on-line power system assessment framework, similar to the power system simulation
platform described in [17]. In the following, each block will be described in detail.
A. System Snapshot
This block reads validated system snapshots consisting of complex bus voltages from all system buses as well as
currents flowing in and out of each transmission line or transformer. These snapshots are determined from wide-area
measurements and provide full system observability.
B. Static and dynamic system parameters
The database contains the model parameter for all electric components in the monitored power system. It is
assumed that the provided parameters are sufficient to represent the power system components (e.g. generators,
transformers, loads, etc.) with enough detail to allow accurate simulation of the transient system response. This
means that e.g. the rotor dynamics of synchronous generators are at least represented by a 4th-order model, which
was suggested in [18].
C. Power system model
In this block the obtained system snapshot and the system parameters are utilized to set-up a power system model
including the admittance matrix Y. Furthermore, the data are used to initialize the model to represent the current
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the fast contingency screening and TSA assessment algorithm
system state. Finally, a list of contingencies is generated which will be used for the contingency screening and
stability assessment.
D. Fast contingency screening and TSA assessment
Figure 2 shows the block diagram of the proposed on-line contingency screening and stability assessment
algorithm.
1) Fault parameter selection: The parameters of the fault next on the contingency list are extracted from the
system model. These include type of fault (e.g. three-phase short circuit), fault location, fault clearing time and fault
clearance. The fault location corresponds to the bus or branch where the fault occurs. The fault clearing time is
given by the protection relays in the vicinity of the fault. The fault clearance provides information on e.g. breakers
to be opened to isolate the fault.
2) Prepare and execute simulation: After the fault parameters have been determined, the time-domain simulation
of the scenario can be prepared. The simulation is initialized with the current system state provided by the snapshot.
The model database provides all the needed component data to set-up the models used in the simulation and to
compute the dynamic system response.
3) Identify and assess islands: In this block it is determined, if the fault and its clearance are causing a splitting
of the power system into separated islands. In order to use the efficient algorithms from graph theory, the power
grid model needs to be converted into a graph. Therefore, the admittance matrix is imported and altered according
to the assumed fault clearance. For example, if the fault is cleared by disconnecting a particular branch, the
branch admittance is added to the respective off-diagonal entries and subtracted from the diagonal entries of the
buses connected by the branch. If the only direct connection between two buses was the respective branch, the
corresponding off-diagonal entries will be equal to zero after the modification, which indicates that there is no
longer a transmission line connecting the two buses. Hence, the admittance matrix can easily be converted into an
adjacency matrix (Adj) of an undirected graph by generating a copy of Y and setting all non-zero values equal to
one. Then the efficient algorithms from graph theory can be applied. Algorithm 1 shows the implementation of the
island identification and assessment algorithm as pseudocode. It uses a recursive depth-first search (DFS) algorithm
5Algorithm 1 Algorithm to identify and assess islands
Input: Admittance matrix Y, from-bus,to-bus and data of tripped branch b data
Output: Buses isl, generators gen and loads load in each island
Compute admittance of tripped branch utilizing b data
Alter Y in correspondence to tripping of the branch
Convert Y → Adj
Execute DFS starting at from-bus with target to-bus . DFS returns Ind = 1, if graph remains connected, and
a vector of explored buses
if Ind is equal to 0 then . If islands were created
Store explored buses in isl
Store generator connected to explored buses in gen
Store loads connected to explored buses in load
next← first not-explored bus
while Graph not completely explored do
Execute DFS starting at next
Store explored buses in isl
Store generator connected to explored buses in gen
Store loads connected to explored buses in load
if All nodes in the graph were explored then
Graph completely explored
else
next← first not-explored bus
end if
end while
end if
[19] to identify the creation of islands and to determine if generator or loads are in the respective island. The
algorithm’s output indicates if islands were created or not. If the power system was split, it provides information
on the buses, generators and loads in each island.
4) First-swing TSA of simulation results: The simulation as well as the island identification & assessment results
are forwarded to the TSA block, where in each time step the transient stability of the system or, if fault clearance
created islands, of each island is assessed using the preventive SIME method.
Preventive SIME is a hybrid transient stability assessment method, which combines the advantages of both
detailed time-domain simulation and equal area criterion (EAC). In [14] a detailed description of the method can
be found and [20] recently presented a discussion of the achievements and prospects of Emergency SIME. SIME is
derived based on the assumption that the post-fault dynamics of a multi-machine power system can be represented
by a suitable OMIB equivalent. EAC can then be applied to assess transient stability. Figure 3 shows the proposed
first-swing TSA algorithm, which is described in more detail in the following.
a) Required data sets: In order to assess transient stability, the method requires only a limited number of data
and parameters from the system and the generators. The only time invariant parameters required are the inertia
coefficient of each generator and, if islands were created, the generators in each island. Apart from that the method
needs at least three successive data sets of rotor angles, rotor speeds, mechanical powers and electrical active powers
from all generators in the post-fault configuration. In this implementation of the method up to six successive data
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Fig. 3. First-swing transient stability assessment algorithm
sets are considered.
b) Identification of critical and non-critical machine candidates: In order to determine an OMIB equivalent,
which represents the dynamics of the system, the generators are split into two groups: a group of critical machines
(CMs), which is the group of generators that are likely to lose synchronism, and a group of non-critical machines
(NMs). Candidate CMs and NMs are identified under consideration of the evolution of the generators’ individual
rotor angles. For that purpose, the rotor angles are predicted some time ahead (e.g. 100 ms) using Taylor series
expansion. The candidate CMs are then determined by ranking the machines according to the predicted rotor angle
and searching for the largest angular gaps between two successive machines. The machines above the gap are
identified to be the CMs and the NMs are the machines below the gap. In this implementation in each assessment
step up to three candidate CM and NM groups were selected.
c) Formulation of the OMIB parameters: In the next step, the gathered simulation data sets are used to
formulate the OMIB equivalent, which represents the dynamics between a group of CMs and NMs. This is done
for each candidate group of CMs and NMs. The OMIB is characterized by its rotor angle δ(t), speed ω(t), inertia
coefficient M and acceleration power Pa(t). The rotor angle δ of the OMIB is defined as the difference of the
center of angle (COA) of the CMs and NMs.
δ(t) = δCM (t)− δNM (t) (1)
The COAs of the CMs δCM (t) and NMs δNM (t) are defined as follows.
δCM (t) =M
−1
CM
∑
k∈CM Mkδk(t)
δNM (t) =M
−1
NM
∑
j∈NM Mjδj(t)
(2)
Mk,j and δk,j(t) are the inertia coefficients and the rotor angles of the individual machines in the respective group.
MCM and MNM are corresponding to the aggregated inertias of the individual generators in the two groups, which
are computed as follows.
MCM =
∑
k∈CM
Mk; MNM =
∑
j∈NM
Mj (3)
7The rotor speed of the OMIB is defined as the difference between the speed of the aggregated NCs and NMs.
ω(t) = ωCM (t)− ωNM (t) (4)
where ωCM (t) and ωNM (t) are computed in the same manner as the rotor angles (2). The acceleration power Pa(t)
of the OMIB is computed as the difference between its mechanical power Pm(t) and electrical power Pe(t).
Pa(t) = Pm(t)− Pe(t) (5)
The parameters Pm(t) and Pe(t) are computed as follows.
Pm(t) =M
(
M−1CM
∑
k Pmk(t)−M−1NM
∑
j Pmj(t)
)
Pe(t) =M
(
M−1CM
∑
k Pek(t)−M−1NM
∑
j Pej(t)
)
Finally, the inertia coefficient M of the OMIB is defined by:
M =
MCMMNM
MCM +MNM
(6)
d) Computation of stability margin and determination of stability: By employing the EAC, the determined
parameter of the candidate OMIB allow to compute the transient stability margin η, which is negative for an unstable
and positive for a stable case [14]:
η = −∫ δu
δi
Padδ − 1/2Mω2i (7)
where δi and ωi correspond to δ(ti) and ω(ti) and δu is the angle where the following instability conditions are
met:
Pa(δu) = 0 and P˙a(δu) > 0 (8)
In the Preventive SIME method the angle δu is estimated through an approximation of the Pa(δ)-curve of the
OMIB. To this purpose, (at least) three successive data sets of the OMIB, consisting of Pa and δ, are used to
compute a quadratic approximate of the curve:
Pa(δ) = aδ
2 + bδ + c (9)
of which the parameters a, b and c are computed from the three data sets and, subsequently, are refined using a
weighted least square technique.
Theory dictates that the Pa(δ)-curve of the OMIB opens upwards, which results in the requirement of parameter
a being larger than zero. If the parameter a is zero or less for the approximated Pa(δ)-curve, it is rejected and
the next set of data is acquired. The two curves shown in Fig. 4 represent valid approximation of the Pa(δ)-curve
and the stability margin computation is straight forward. In Case I (see Fig. 4a), the angle δu is found employing
the condition in (8) and the stability margin is computed with (7). When the OMIB does not have an equilibrium
point, meaning that the estimated Pa(δ)-curve does not intersect Pa = 0, as shown in Case II in Fig. 4b, a stability
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margin cannot be computed with (7). However, in that case, as suggested in [14], the kinetic energy of the OMIB
can be used to represent the negative stability margin and can be computed as follows.
η = −1/2Mω2i (10)
e) Early Stop Criteria: The time-domain simulation and the stability assessment can be stopped, when from
the candidate OMIBs the most critical one is identified and the computed stability margin converged to a constant
value. The most critical OMIB in an unstable case is either the one, which first crosses δu and, hence, the unstable
equilibrium point (UEP), or the one, which first reaches the minimum of the Pa(δ)-curve in case that no post-fault
equilibrium exists. In a stable case, the most critical OMIB is the one, which is the last one to reach the return
angle δr, where the following stability conditions are met.
Pa(δr) < 0 and ωr = 0 (11)
For that purpose, the candidate OMIBs are assessed with respect to the criteria identifying the most critical OMIB
and when the most critical has been identified, the assessment is continued until the stability margin reached a
constant value. Once the two conditions are satisfied the stability margin and the CMs of the respective OMIB are
stored and forwarded to the contingency classification block (see Fig. 2).
5) Classification of faults: In order to classify the faults, a classification index is introduced. It utilizes charac-
teristics of the approximated Pa(δ)-curve and states of the OMIB at the time the early stop criteria were satisfied.
Therefore, it also allows the classification of a contingency with respect to individual islands. The proposed
classification is similar to the one proposed in [15] and is shown in Table I. A contingency is classified to be
Definitely Unstable (DU), if the Pa(δ)-curve, as shown in Fig. 4b, does not intersect zero and a post-contingency
equilibrium point does not exist. Moreover, in case of a splitting of the power system into islands, a contingency is
rated DU for an island, when the island only contains generators, but no loads. A contingency is classified Unstable
(U), if the determined stability margin is negative. If the most critical OMIB has reached its return angle δr and δr
is lying on the side of the Pa(δ)-curve, where dPa/dδ > 0, then the contingency is assessed to be Marginal Stable
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CLASSIFICATION OF CONTINGENCIES (WHERE g: NUMBER OF GENERATORS AND l: NUMBER OF LOADS)
Classifier η dPa
dδ
∣∣
δ=δr
ω Number of
generators & loads
Definitely − − − −
Unstable (DU) − − − g ≥ 1; l = 0
Unstable
< 0 − − −(U)
Not Classi- − − − g = 1; l ≥ 1fiable (NC)
Marginal > 0 > 0 − g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1
Stable (MS) − > 0 < 0 g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1
Stable > 0 < 0 − g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1
(S) − < 0 < 0 g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1
Definitely − − < ωlim g ≥ 2; l ≥ 1Stable (DS)
(MS). However, if δr lies on the side of the Pa(δ)-curve, where dPa/dδ < 0, then it is classified Stable (S). A
contingency is only classified Definitely Stable (DS), if the relative rotor speed of all the candidate OMIBs after
fault clearance are below a certain threshold (e.g. ωlim < 0.1 rad/s) or if the maximum simulation time was reached
without identification of the most critical OMIB. Finally, if an island only contains one generator and loads, the
method cannot determine stability of the island, since no reference is available to determine loss of synchronism.
Hence, it is categorized as Not Classifiable (NC). Table I summarizes the classifiers and the criteria used to classify.
The classification of the contingencies can be used to determine further assessment strategies. For example, NC
or MS cases could be investigated in more detail e.g. with extensive time-domain simulation and DU cases could
be prioritized, when determining preventive control actions.
E. Publish assessment results
After fault screening and TSA assessment, the obtained results are published (see Fig. 1) to make them available
for other function or method, e.g. visualization tools or methods determining preventive controls. This may be
realized through a client as described in [17].
III. RESULTS
A. Test system, cases and set-up
1) Test system: The test system employed to validate the presented screening method is the New England
& New York system described in [21]. It consists of 68 buses and 16 generators. The loads are modelled as
constant impedances in the time-domain simulation. The generators are represented by a sixth order model. They
all have a simple excitation and voltage regulation system, as well as a thermal turbine/governor model. Moreover,
all generators, but GEN-7 and GEN-14, are equipped with a power system stabilizer.
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TABLE II
PERFORMED TESTS AND ASSESSMENT RESULTS FROM TIME-DOMAIN SIMULATION
Test Clearing Number of Number of
time [ms] stable unstable
Test I 50 168 40
Test II 200 137 71
Test III 500 55 153
2) Test cases: For the purpose of testing the on-line contingency screening method, a set of contingencies was
defined. The set includes two three-phase fault scenarios per transmission line, where one time the fault is close
to the from-bus and the second time the fault is close to the to-bus. This resulted in 172 cases. Furthermore, the
method was tested with three different fault clearing times to vary the total number of stable and unstable cases
(see Table II). In order to determine if the stability assessment with the on-line screening method is correct, the
result needs to be compared against a reference. For this purpose, the rotor angle of the generators within an island
are assessed at the end of the time domain simulation of 4 s, which is sufficient to ensure capturing of the first
swing. If at the end of the simulation the rotor angle of at least two generators within an island are more than
120◦ apart, then the island is identified to be unstable, else stable. This maximum angle was chosen, since it is a
common setting for generator out-of-step protection [22]. The reference stability assessment results are shown in
Table II. The total number of assessments is larger than the number of test cases, because in cases, where the fault
clearance leads to splitting of the system, the stability of each individual island is determined, which leads to a
total of 208 stability assessments.
3) Test set-up: The tests were carried out on a standard laptop with the following characteristics: Intel R©CoreTM
i7-2620M, 2.7 GHz, 8 GB DDR3 RAM, running on 64-bit Ubuntu Linux 14.04 LTS. The time-domain simulations
were carried out using the software RAMSES developed at the Univ. of Lie`ge [23]. The entire method, which
was shown in Fig. 1, was implemented in MATLAB. The CPU times were measured directly in MATLAB and
include all steps of the contingency screening. Due to the use of a fast external time-domain simulator and not an
integrated numerical integrator, the system variables are not accessible during the simulation. Hence, the simulations
are carried out for a fixed time (e.g. 4 s) and the trajectories of the needed system variables are stored in a file,
which is imported into MATLAB to be used in the contingency screening algorithm.
B. Contingency screening and stability assessment results
In the following, the results of the screening method of the assessment of the New England & New York test
system are presented. First, the accuracy of the method will be evaluated by comparing the stability assessment
results with the reference. Second, the performance of the method will be presented in terms of the runtime. Finally,
the classification results are presented and discussed.
1) Accuracy of the proposed method: The accuracy will be presented by assessing the number of correctly
identified stable/unstable cases, where the reference stability assessment results were extracted from time-domain
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TABLE III
ACCURACY OF FAST SCREENING METHOD
Test Clearing Identified Identified
time [ms] stable cases unstable cases
Test I 50 94.64% 100.00%
Test II 200 93.43% 98.59%
Test III 500 90.91% 100.00%
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE OF FAST SCREENING METHOD WITH FIXED SIMULATION TIME (HERE 4 S)
Test Runtime with Runtime of Needed
simulation [s] assessment [s] average
per cont. total per cont. total sTDI [s]
Test I 0.449 77.30 0.057 9.78 0.667
Test II 0.536 92.17 0.055 9.53 0.570
Test III 0.636 109.36 0.051 8.85 0.609
simulation. Table III shows the results of the accuracy assessment for the three different tests, where the fault
clearing time was varied between 50, 200 and 500 ms. First of all, it should be mentioned that the success rates
of the proposed contingency screening method are very high. Between 90.91 − 94.64 % of the stable cases are
correctly identified by the proposed contingency screening method and the success rate for identifying unstable
cases is even higher with 98.59 − 100.0 %. It should be noticed that the rate for identifying an unstable case is
generally higher, which corresponds to a slightly more conservative characteristics of the method. This is preferable
since a progressive characteristic would increase the rate of unstable cases being assessed as stable.
2) Performance of the screening method with fixed simulation time: The performance of the method is assessed
in two ways. First, the runtime of the implementation is assessed and, afterwards, the potential speed up is estimated,
for the case that the method would be seamlessly integrated with a time-domain simulator, which enables stopping
the simulation when the early stop criteria are satisfied.
Table IV displays the runtimes obtained in the three tests, where each time the 172 contingencies were assessed.
It shows the total runtime and the average runtime per contingency for two setups. In the first setup, the time-
domain simulation is included. In the second, the already computed simulation data are solely read and utilized
for the stability assessment. The total runtimes including the simulation are in the range of 77.30 s to 109.36 s,
which corresponds to an average runtime of 449 − 636 ms per contingency. It can be observed, that the runtime
increases quite significantly with increasing fault clearance time and, consequently, with growing number of unstable
cases. This may be explained by the increase of the runtime of the time-domain simulation. In order to speed up
the time-domain (T-D) simulation a variable step size is used, in the case of a stable case the step size can be
increased soon after fault clearance, while for an unstable case the step size needs to be kept small for a longer
period. Consequently, an increase of the number of unstable cases leads to an increase of the runtime. Without the
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Fig. 5. Runtime of the major parts of the screening method with fixed simulation time
simulation, the total runtimes are in the range of 8.85 s to 9.78 s corresponding to 51− 57 ms per contingency.
Figure 5 shows the runtime of the three tests split up into three parts, namely time-domain simulation, which
includes the time of data preparation and post-processing, reading of simulation data and stability assessment. The
graph shows that around 90 % of the runtime is spend on the time-domain simulation with fixed simulation time.
Hence, a variable simulation time has a large potential for reducing the runtime, where an early stability prediction
with SIME enables the early simulation stop.
In [14], it was proposed to measure the performance of SIME based methods in needed seconds of time-domain
integration (sTDI) until determination of stability. The sTDI’s for each contingency and the three tests are shown
in Fig. 6 and the needed average for each test was presented in Table IV. In the graph the average simulation
time needed is indicated by a horizontal dashed line, the maximum simulation time by a solid line and the colours
indicate the corresponding test. The graph shows that in the majority of the cases a simulation time of less than a
second is sufficient and that there are only very few cases, where the maximum simulation time was reached.
3) Performance of the screening method with variable simulation time: In the previous section, it was shown that
time-domain simulation with fixed simulation time is dominating the runtime of the screening method. In order to
further speed up the screening, the three tests were conducted with variable simulation time, where the simulation
is stopped once the TSA method has determined stability of the particular case. Hence, the simulation time of the
individual cases correspond to the sTDI, shown in Fig. 6, plus pre-fault simulation and fault clearing time (here
100 ms and, depending on the test, 50− 500 ms respectively).
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Fig. 6. Seconds of Time-Domain Integration (sTDI) required from fault clearance and until stability determination
TABLE V
PERFORMANCE OF FAST SCREENING METHOD WITH VARIABLE SIMULATION TIME
Test Runtime with Runtime of Needed
simulation [s] assessment [s] average
per cont. total per cont. total sTDI [s]
Test I 0.263 45.31 0.045 7.54 0.667
Test II 0.275 47.32 0.042 7.24 0.570
Test III 0.296 51.05 0.038 6.53 0.609
Table V shows the runtime of the three tests of the screening method with variable simulation time and reveals
that this leads to considerable shorter runtimes in the first setup, where the time-domain simulations were included.
The runtimes are reduced by 41.4 % to 53.3 % and are in the range of 45.31 − 51.05 s for the assessment of
the 172 contingencies. It should be noticed that it also led to shorter runtimes for the setup without time-domain
simulation, which is due to a reduction of the time needed to read the simulation data.
Figure 7 shows a comparison of the runtimes with fixed and variable simulation time. The graph shows as
expected that the main runtime reduction stems from the reduced time spent on time-domain simulation. Firstly,
it is noticeable that the reduction is significant in particular in the third test with clearing time of 500 ms and,
consequently, a large number of unstable cases. This can be explained by the fact that the needed time step for
unstable cases is required to be smaller and that the simulation of an unstable system response can be shortened due
to the early stop criteria, described in section II-D4e. Secondly, a reduction of the time needed to read the simulation
14
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
T-D simulation 
 (incl. pre- & post-
processing)
Read sim. 
 data
TSA 
 with SIME
[s]
Test I (fixed)
Test II (fixed)
Test III (fixed)
Test I (variable)
Test II (variable)
Test III (variable)
Fig. 7. Comparison of the runtime of the major parts of the screening method with fixed and variable simulation time
data is noticeable and this results from the lower number of simulation data, which was already mentioned earlier.
Finally, it should be noted that the time needed for the TSA assessment using SIME is not affected by the variation
of the simulation time, which was expected.
4) Classification of faults: The bar graph in Fig. 8 summarizes the results of the classification of the contingencies
as proposed in section II-D5. It should be mentioned that in this section only the results of the contingencies are
depicted, which were correctly assessed by the proposed assessment method. The different contingency categories
are shown on the x-axis. The number of identified contingencies in each test in the respective category are displayed
by the bars belonging to the left y-axis. The bar graph shows that with longer clearing times the number of definitely
unstable (DU) as well as unstable (U) cases increases and vice versa the number of definitely stable (DS) cases
increases with shorter clearing times. Moreover, it should be noticed that the number of marginal stable (MS) cases
peaks in the test with intermediate clearing time. These results are in good agreement with intuition. It should be
mentioned, that independent of the fault clearing time two cases always were identified as not classifiable (NC).
These are corresponding to faults that lead to islanding, where one island consists of one generator and a load. In
the case of a single machine in an island, stability can not be determined as mentioned earlier.
The data points in Fig. 8 depict the average critical clearing times (CCTs) of the contingencies in the respective
categories and tests (shown on the right y-axis). Furthermore, an error bar is added to each average critical clearing
time, which stretches from the minimum to the maximum CCT in the respective category and test. It should be
noted that the algorithm used to identify CCTs stopped the search for CCTs when the clearing time became larger
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than 3 s. It is assumed that these cases are stable in the during fault as well as post fault condition. The CCTs of
the contingencies in the unstable categories (DU + U) are, as expected, always below the respective actual clearing
times (50/200/500 ms). Furthermore, it can be observed, that the average clearing time in the category DU is lower
than in the category U, which confirms the effectiveness of the categorization. The results obtained for the stable
cases and categories (MS, S, DS) are less clear. The maximum and minimum CCTs in each stable category vary
greatly. However, it may be argued that a general upward trend can be observed for the average CCTs from DU
to DS, when ignoring outliers such a the few MS cases in Test III, which correspond to only 3 % of the correctly
assessed cases. The upward trend of the CCTs indicates again the effectiveness of the proposed classification of the
contingencies. The problem of precisely classifying the stable cases may be explained by the difficulty to determine
the correct critical group of machines. A method or criteria to early and accurately identifying this group could
lead to an improvement of the classification of stable cases. Finally, it should be mentioned that the categories are
not intended to strictly split the contingencies with respect to their CCTs, but allow a categorization relative to the
fault clearing time and the severity of the disturbance in the current system condition.
IV. DISCUSSION
This paper proposed a framework for on-line contingency screening using wide-are measurements and a fast
stability and contingency screening method, which aims at identifying first-swing unstable contingencies and
providing a classification of the stable as well as the unstable cases with respect to their severity. The method
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uses a system snapshot and data from a corresponding model database to determine the current admittance matrix
of the system. Following, for each considered contingency the admittance matrix is modified to represent the post-
fault condition and a graph theory based approach is used to identify islanding. If islands are detected, it is assessed
which generators and loads are in the individual islands. The system snapshot is used to initialize a time-domain
simulation, where a particular contingency is applied. The simulation data are forwarded to the TSA block, where
the stability of the case is evaluated employing SIME and the assessment is stopped once the early stop criteria
are fulfilled. Furthermore, each contingency is categorized with information extracted from the Pa(δ) curve of the
OMIB. The accuracy and speed of the method was tested on the New England & New York test system. Three tests
with different fault clearing times were carried out, where each was composed of 172 contingencies. The accuracy
assessment showed a very high success rate with respect to stability assessment. It was shown, that the proposed
method filters between 90.9− 94.6 % of the stable cases and correctly identifies 98.6− 100 % of the unstable
cases. Consequently, the method is slightly more conservative, which is preferable for a screening method. The
assessment of the runtime exposed that the majority of the CPU time is spent on the time-domain simulation and
it was shown that by introducing a variable simulation time a considerable speed up can be achieved. Finally, the
results of the classification of contingencies were presented by comparing the results to the CCTs of the individual
contingencies, which showed that the categorization approach is promising. However, it is expected that the results,
particular for stable cases, could be further improved through an early and accurate identification of the correct
critical and non-critical group of generators.
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Critical Machine Cluster Identification
using the Equal Area Criterion
Tilman Weckesser Hjo¨rtur Jo´hannsson Jacob Østergaard
Abstract—The paper introduces a new method to early identify
the critical machine cluster (CMC) after a transient disturbance.
For transient stability assessment with methods based on the
equal area criterion it is necessary to split the generators into
a group of critical and non-critical machines. The generators
in the CMC are those likely to lose synchronism. The early
and reliable identification of the CMC is crucial and one of the
major challenges. The proposed new approach is based on the
assessment of the rotor dynamics between two machines and the
evaluation of their coupling strength. A novel coupling coefficient
is derived and a cluster identification algorithm is developed. The
algorithm determines the CMC based on the impact of the fault
on the derived coupling coefficient of individual generator pairs.
The results from two cases are presented and discussed, where
the CMC is successfully determined just after fault clearance.
I. INTRODUCTION
STABLE and secure supply of electric energy is a funda-mental requirement of modern society. In order to ensure
operation of the power system within stability and security
limits, the system operator is dependent on tools and methods,
which provide situational awareness. Analysis that determine
if a system can remain within the stability & security bound-
aries for a given set of credible contingencies are referred to as
dynamic security assessment (DSA) [1]. An efficient transient
stability assessment (TSA) method is an important part of a
DSA toolbox. In order to reach real-time performance in TSA,
approaches using so-called direct methods are appealing. A
large number of these methods are either using the transient
energy function, such as the BCU method [2], or the equal
area criterion (EAC), such as the EEAC method [3] and the
SIME method [4]. The mentioned methods employing the
EAC are requiring that the generators in the system are split
into a group of critical generators also called critical machine
cluster (CMC), which is the group likely to lose synchronism,
and a group of non-critical generators. This stems from the
assumption that no matter how complex a system is the
transient stability problem arises from the separation of two
generator groups [4]. An early and reliable identification of
the CMC is crucial to enable correct stability assessment.
In [4] it is proposed to extrapolate the individual rotor angle
trajectories using a set of measurements and e.g. Taylor series
expansion. The extrapolations are used to predict the individual
rotor angles some time ahead. The predicted rotor angles are
sorted descending and the gaps between entries are assessed.
The generators are split into the critical and the non-critical
group according to the maximum angular gap. [5] proposes
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Fig. 1. The´venin and Norton equivalents of generator
an index for grouping the generators, which is called angle
increment. It is a measure of the relative rotor angle change of
an individual generator since fault clearance and with respect
to the average change of the rotor angles of all generators.
In this paper a new method is proposed to identify the
CMC, which utilizes efficient algorithms from graph theory.
For that purpose, a novel coupling coefficient is derived, which
represents the coupling strength between pairs of generators.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II the
model used for the computation of the clustering coefficient as
well as the EAC are briefly described. This is followed by the
derivation of the one-machine equivalent (OME) of pairs of
machines and the coupling strength coefficient. In Sec. III the
cluster identification algorithm is introduced. Afterwards, in
Sec. IV the results from test cases are presented and discussed.
Finally, in Sec. V some concluding remarks are offered.
II. DERIVATION OF COUPLING COEFFICIENTS
A. Modelling for coupling analysis
In order to derive the coupling coefficients, the synchronous
generators are represented by the so-called “classical” transient
stability model [6]. Each generator is represented by its
The´venin equivalent and correspondingly by an e.m.f. E′ of
constant magnitude behind the transient reactance X ′d (see
Fig. 1a). This simple generator model is only valid for a very
short time period, due to e.g. fast automatic voltage regulators.
Therefore, the model is fitted to the current operating point
using the latest measurements or simulation data. When the
complex voltage V¯ and the complex current injection I¯ at the
machine terminal are known, the e.m.f. can be computed.
E¯′ = E′ 6 δ = V¯ + jX ′dI¯ (1)
where δ corresponds to the rotor angle of the machine.
When each generator is represented by its Norton equivalent
(see Fig. 1b) and, hence, by a current source E¯′/jX ′d in
parallel with the admittance corresponding to X ′d, then the
algebraic network equations describe the relation between the
bus voltages, current injections and network admittances.
I¯ = Y V¯ (2)
Here, I¯ corresponds to the vector of the complex current
injections at the generator buses, V¯ to the vector of complex
bus voltages and Y to the “augmented” admittance matrix,
which is obtained by adding the admittances corresponding
to the transient reactances of the generators and loads to the
original admittance matrix.
In order to compute the power injection of a generator
as a function of the e.m.f.s of the remaining generators, the
augmented admittance matrix Y needs to be extended to the
internal nodes of the generators, which correspond to fictive
nodes behind the respective X ′d. Then the resulting extended
admittance matrix Yex will be reduced to the internal nodes.
Yex =
(
Y Ybg
Y Tbg Ygg
)
(3)
Ybg corresponds to the matrix representing the connection
of the machine internal nodes to the respective machine
terminal buses and Y Tbg is its transpose. Ygg corresponds to
the square admittance matrix of order m, where m is the
number of generators and which holds the admittances to
the corresponding X ′d on its diagonal. This extended and
augmented admittance matrix allows computing the current
injections I¯tr into the internal nodes as follows.(
0
I¯tr
)
=
(
Y Ybg
Y Tbg Ygg
)(
V¯
E¯′
)
(4)
where E¯′ corresponds to a vector of the e.m.f.s. Here, the
generators are again represented by their The´venin equivalent.
In order to reduce the matrix to the internal nodes and
eliminate all nodes, where no current injection takes place, a
Kron reduction is carried out, which results in a reduced matrix
Yred and the algebraic equations of the reduced network.
I¯tr = YredE¯
′ (5)
With (5) the apparent power injection S¯ into the internal node
of each machine can be computed as:
S¯ = E¯′I¯∗tr (6)
where I¯∗tr represents the vector of the complex conjugate of the
current injections into the internal nodes. Following, the active
power injection Pe,k of generator k can then be computed as
a function of the e.m.f.s of the remaining generators.
Pe,k =
∑m
l=1E
′
kE
′
lYk,l cos(δk − δl − θk,l) (7)
with θk,l and Yk,l being the angle and the magnitude of
the admittance [Yred]k,l = Yk,l 6 θk,l. Under consideration of
the “classical” model, the dynamics of the k-th machine are
governed by the swing equation [6].
δ˙k = ωk (8)
ω˙k = δ¨k =
ω0
Mk
(Pm,k − Pe,k) (9)
where ω0 corresponds to the synchronous speed, Mk is the
inertia coefficient and Pm,k is the mechanical power.
B. Equal area criterion
The equal area criterion (EAC) allows determining transient
stability of a one-machine infinite bus system (OMIB) without
carrying out time-domain simulation. Therefore, a number
of simplifications and assumptions are considered. The syn-
chronous machine is represented by its The´venin equivalent
and the mechanical power is assumed to be constant. Further-
more, the machine’s damping is neglected and the loads are
represented by constant impedances. Under these assumptions,
for a OMIB (9) can be rearranged as follows [6]:[
dδ
dt
]2
=
∫
2
M (Pm − Pe(δ)) dδ (10)
If a function for the active electric power Pe(δ) is known, a
stability margin can be computed as shown below.
η = −
∫ δu
δc
[Pm−Pe,P (δ)] dδ−
∫ δc
δ0
[Pm−Pe,D(δ)] dδ (11)
The subscripts D and P denote conditions during and after
fault clearance respectively. δc is the rotor angle at fault
clearance and δu the angle at the unstable equilibrium point. A
positive margin represents a stable case, a negative an unstable.
C. Formulation of a one-machine equivalent (OME)
The proposed aggregation is similar to the one used in
[7], where a OMIB equivalent of two aggregated groups of
machines is computed. However, here the aim was to assess
the dynamics of pairs of machines. For that purpose, a relative
rotor angle φij for each pair is determined as the difference
of the rotor angles of generator i and j.
φij = δi − δj (12)
Similarly, the relative speed ωij and acceleration φ¨ij can be
computed.
φ˙ij = ωij = ωi − ωj = δ˙i − δ˙j
φ¨ij = ω˙i − ω˙j = δ¨i − δ¨j (13)
With (9) the relative acceleration may be rewritten as follows:
φ¨ij =
ω0
Mi
(Pm,i − Pe,i)− ω0Mj (Pm,j − Pe,j) (14)
As in [7] the inertia coefficient of the OME is computed as:
Mij = MiMj/MT with MT = Mi +Mj (15)
Following, the dynamics of the OME of a pair of machines
can be described by a new swing equation.
φ¨ij =
ω0
Mij
(Pm,ij − Pe,ij) (16)
where
Pm,ij = M
−1
T (MjPm,i −MiPm,j) (17)
Pe,ij = M
−1
T (MjPe,i −MiPe,j) (18)
Under the assumption that the mechanical power of both
generators remains constant, the relative acceleration of the
OME is dependent on the electric power of the individual
machines. It can be shown that (18) can be reformulated as:
Pe,ij(φij) = Pc,ij + Pmax,ij sin(φij − νij) (19)
where
Pc,ij =
1
MT
[
MjE
′
i
2
Yiicos(θii)−MiE′j2Yjjcos(θjj)
]
Pmax,ij =
√
D2ij + C
2
ij and νij = − tan−1 CijDij
(20)
with
Cij =
1
MT
[Mj
∑m
k=1E
′
iE
′
kYik cos(δj − δk − θik)
−Mi
∑m
k=1E
′
jE
′
kYjk cos(δi − δk − θjk)
]
Dij = − 1MT [Mj
∑m
k=1E
′
iE
′
kYik sin(δj − δk − θik)
+Mi
∑m
k=1E
′
jE
′
kYjk sin(δi − δk − θjk)
] (21)
With (19) the swing equation of the OME can be expressed
as follows, which allows computation of the EAC.
φ¨ij =
ω0
Mij
[Pm,ij − (Pc,ij + Pmax,ij sin(φij − νij))] (22)
D. Coupling coefficients
In this analysis the coupling strength between two genera-
tors is defined as the available excess dissipation energy and,
hence, it can be computed as the difference between available
dissipation energy after fault clearance and kinetic energy
gained during the fault. In order to determine the coupling
coefficient, (10) can be reformulated as follows.
1
2
Mij
ω0
φ˙2ij =
∫
Pa,ijdφij (23)
where φ˙ij = ωij and Pa,ij with (17) & (19) is described as:
Pa,ij = Pm,ij − [Pc,ij + Pmax,ij sin(φij − νij)] (24)
Under consideration of the EAC, in (23) the left-side term
represents the kinetic energy Ekin,ij and the right-side the
dissipation energy Edis,ij , which corresponds to the maximum
kinetic energy that the OME can absorb. The OME is stable, if
the available Edis,ij is greater or equal to Ekin,ij induced by
the fault. Therefore, it is proposed that the coupling strength
is approximated by the coupling coefficient cij .
cij = Edis,ij − Ekin,ij (25)
where
Edis,ij = −
∫ φu,ij
φc,ij
Pm,ij − Pe,ij(φij)dφij
Ekin,ij =
1
2
Mij
ω0
ω2ij
(26)
The proposed coupling strength cij is negative, when the
coupling is very weak and the two machines are likely to
lose synchronism, and it is positive, when there is strong
coupling, which makes it likely that the two machines remain
in synchronism. By computing the coupling strength between
each pair of machines a coupling matrix H can be constructed.
E. Impact of fault on coupling strength
The coupling matrix H can be computed for steady state
and dynamic system conditions. In steady state the relative
speed between the generators is equal to zero and, hence, the
coupling coefficients are solely determined by the available
dissipation energy. In order to determine the CMC after the
occurrence and the clearance of a fault, the change in coupling
strength due to the fault was found to be essential. Therefore,
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the critical cluster identification algorithm.
it is proposed to use ∆H, which is the difference in coupling
strength between post- and pre-fault condition.
∆H = H(t+c )−H◦ (27)
where H(t+c ) is the coupling matrix determined at the time
just after fault clearance t+c and H
◦ is the coupling matrix
determined at steady state before the fault. By using the
difference in coupling strength, focus is set on changes,
structural as well as dynamic, due to the fault. If the coupling
between two generators is weakened in the post-fault condition
the corresponding entry in ∆H becomes negative, while a
strengthening of the coupling results in a positive value.
III. CRITICAL MACHINE CLUSTER IDENTIFICATION
In order to identify the CMC, an algorithm was developed.
A block diagram of the algorithm is shown in Fig. 2. In
this approach two snapshots, one of the pre- and one of
the post-fault system condition, are used to compute the
coupling matrices H◦ and H(t+c ). These matrices are then
used to compute the change in coupling strength between
individual generators due to the fault, which results in the
matrix ∆H. The entries of ∆H are copied into the vector
∆h, where the entries are sorted ascending. Moreover, an
adjacency matrix Adj is initialized with the same dimension
as ∆H and corresponding to a complete graph G, where each
node of G corresponds to a generator. In order to identify the
CMC, individual edges are removed one by one from G until
the graph is split. The edges are removed beginning with the
lowest change in coupling strength and according to the list
of increasing changes in ∆h. After each removal a depth-first
search (DFS) is carried out to check if G is still connected. If a
splitting of the graph occurred, a second DFS based algorithm
is executed to identify the created clusters. Since each node
of G corresponds to a generator in the system, a splitting of
the graph corresponds to a separation of the generators into
clusters and the proposed approach is designed to identify the
weakest coupled clusters.
IV. RESULTS FOR CMC IDENTIFICATION
A. Test system and scenario
The power system model, employed to test the presented
method, is the New England & New York system described
in [8]. It consists of 68 buses and 16 generators. The loads are
modelled as constant impedances and the generators are repre-
sented by a sixth order model in the time-domain simulation.
All generators have a simple excitation and voltage regulation
system as well as a thermal turbine/governor model. Moreover,
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Fig. 3. Coupling matrix computed by (25) in steady state initial conditions.
all generators, but GEN 7 and GEN 14, are equipped with
a power system stabilizer. The initial state of the system
was as well adopted from [8]. To test the proposed method
three-phase short circuits on individual transmission lines were
considered, which last for 250 ms and are cleared by opening
of the breakers at both ends of the respective transmission line.
B. Coupling strength at initial conditions
In the following the coupling strength matrix is computed
for the pre-fault steady state conditions with the equations
derived in Sec. II-D, the results are used to show the apparent
correlation of the proposed coupling coefficients and the
structure of the power system. The coupling matrix in the
initial conditions is shown in Fig. 3. The obtained coupling
coefficients of the generators are compared to each other rela-
tively, where greater values, e.g. above 25, indicate a stronger
coupling, while lower values, e.g. below 20, correspond to
a weaker coupling. Visual inspection of the graph allows
identifying patterns, which may indicate a stronger coupling
between certain generators. The coupling coefficients between
the generators GEN 1 & 13−16 may suggest a tight coupling.
In the one-line diagram, which can be found in e.g. [9], it can
be seen that the generators GEN 14 − 16 are close and well
connected. Moreover, generator GEN 1 is strongly connected
with two transmission lines to the area, which may explain
the strong coupling to this generator group. The generators
GEN 4−8 & 10−11 seem to be tightly coupled as well. The
coupling strength of generator GEN 12 appears to be relatively
high with respect to all generators but generator GEN 9. This
could indicate that generator GEN 12 has a large impact on all
generators, which may also be explained by its central location
in the system. GEN 9 appears to have weaker coupling to the
other generators. This may be explained by its remote location
and the few lines connecting it to the rest of the system.
C. Case 1: Transient stable
In this section an example case is shown, where a transient
disturbance occurs but does not lead to a loss of synchronism
of generators. The considered contingency is a three-phase
short circuit on the transmission line connecting bus 1 and 30.
1) Rotor angle response: The rotor angle response of a
selection of generators is shown in Fig. 4. The selection
contains the two generators GEN 10 & 11, which are strongest
effected by the fault, six generators (GEN 1, 4 & 6 − 9),
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Fig. 4. Case 1: Rotor angle response of a selection of generators.
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Fig. 5. Case 1: ∆H computed by (27) at t+c .
which experience a less significant deviation in rotor angle,
and generator GEN 12, which is in the vicinity of the fault
but barely effected. Although the fault causes significant
oscillation of the rotor angles of generator GEN 10 & 11,
the system remains stable and returns to a new steady state.
2) Critical cluster identification: The matrix ∆H can be
displayed as a two-dimensional grid, where the matrix en-
tries and, consequently, the changes in coupling strength are
displayed by different colors. Figure 5 shows the changes in
coupling strength computed at t+c . The graph suggests that the
coupling strength between most generators was barely affected
by the fault. However, the coupling of GEN 10 & 11 to the
remaining generators appears to be weakened by the fault,
which is well aligned with the observations from Fig. 4.
When the proposed algorithm is employed, individual con-
nections of the graph corresponding to the values in ∆H are
removed beginning with the largest negative change. The re-
moving of the connections is done by setting the corresponding
entries in the adjacency matrix to zero. Figure 6 shows the
adjacency matrix at the instance when the proposed clustering
algorithm splits the graph into two. The proposed method
identifies by employing the DFS based algorithm presented in
Fig. 2 that GEN 10 & 11 are the generators with the weakest
coupling to the remaining system. This is well aligned with
the observations described in Sec. IV-C1.
D. Case 2: Transient unstable
In this section the performance of the method is presented
on a transient unstable case. The contingency is a three-phase
short circuit on the transmission line connecting bus 4 and 5.
1) Rotor angle response: The rotor angle responses of a
selection of generators are shown in Fig. 7. The selection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
G
en
er
at
or
Generator
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
Fig. 6. Case 1: Adjacency matrix after graph split into two disjoint subsets.
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2
(deg)
t (s)
tc
+
GEN 2
GEN 3
GEN 4
GEN 6
GEN 7
GEN 9
GEN 10
GEN 11
GEN 12
Fig. 7. Case 2: Rotor angle response of a selection of generators.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
G
en
er
at
or
Generator
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
 0
Fig. 8. Case 2: ∆H computed by (27) at t+c .
contains the two generators GEN 2 & 3, which are losing
synchronism, the generators GEN 4, 6, 7 & 9, which are also
significantly impacted by the fault, and GEN 10− 12, which
are initially less affected by the fault. The loss of generator
GEN 2 & 3 is leading to a considerable lag of power, which
leads to a system collapse. The rotor angles at t+c may suggest
that the generators initially splits into two clusters, where the
first consists of GEN 2 − 4, 6, 7 & 9 and the second of
GEN 10 − 12. Later the generators split into three groups
namely, GEN 2 & 3, GEN 4, 6, 7 & 9 and GEN 10− 12.
2) Critical cluster identification: Figure 8 shows the change
in coupling strength. The visual inspection of the graph
allows identifying three machine clusters. The first cluster is
GEN 1 & 4 − 9, the second cluster is GEN 10 − 16 and the
third cluster is GEN 2 & 3. This is in good agreement with the
observations extracted from the rotor angles shown in Fig. 7.
The ∆H matrix is again forwarded to the cluster identifi-
cation algorithm, where the matrix is converted into a graph.
Figure 9 shows the adjacency matrix of the corresponding
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Fig. 9. Case 2: Adjacency matrix after graph split into two disjoint subsets.
graph, when the first decoupled set of generators is identified
with the proposed algorithm. It can be seen that all connections
from generators GEN 2 & 3 are removed and, hence, already
at t+c the algorithm identifies those generators as the CMC.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper a new approach was proposed for identifying
the CMC after a transient disturbance. For that purpose, a
novel coupling coefficient was derived, which is determining
the coupling strength of each pair of generators. This coeffi-
cient can be used to set up a coupling matrix, which describes
the coupling strength between all generators in the system. In
order to determine the CMC after a fault, the coupling strength
matrix is determined for the initial condition and just after fault
clearance. The difference of the two matrices is a new matrix,
which describes the change of the coupling strength due to the
fault and can be utilized to identify the CMC. A method, which
uses efficient algorithms from graph theory, was proposed to
identify the CMC. In two test cases it was demonstrated that
although the coupling coefficients do not encompass all the
existing controls, the clustering algorithm allows early and
correct determination of the CMC. Another application of the
developed cluster coefficients may be the early identification
of stable cases, which will be further investigated.
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Sensitivity based Assessment of Transient Voltage
Sags caused by Rotor Swings
Tilman Weckesser Hjo¨rtur Jo´hannsson Jacob Østergaard Thierry Van Cutsem
Abstract—The paper introduces an approach to investigate
voltage sags, which are caused by large generator rotor swings
following a transient disturbance. Therefore, the method exploits
sensitivities derived from the algebraic network equations. These
provide information on the impact of a generator on the voltage
magnitude at a load bus and the effect of load variation on the
generator’s power injection. It is shown that these sensitivities
give valuable information to identify critical generator-load pairs
and locations for applying preventive control measures.
Index Terms—power system stability, sensitivity to rotor
swings, transient stability, voltage sag
I. INTRODUCTION
IN literature on power quality, voltage sags/dips is a topicvastly addressed [1]. While the primary cause is the occur-
rence of a fault, a less pointed out reason for voltage sags
is rotor angle swing, more precisely angular separation of
generators, resulting from a fault. From a practical viewpoint,
a scenario may be assessed transiently stable considering
that generators remain in synchronism, while voltage sags
due to the relative rotor angle displacement already result in
transiently low voltages for which the system response should
be considered unacceptable.
The prediction of this type of voltage sag using the Transient
Energy Function was described in the early reference [2].
In [3] sensitivities relative to voltage dip were derived using
this method as well. The sensitivities relate the voltage sag
depths to certain parameters such as terminal voltages and
power generation. The authors of [4] address the transient
voltage dip acceptability problem using a two-dimensional
table of critical voltage level and critical voltage dip duration.
Moreover, the issue of transient voltage stability of dynamic
loads such as induction machines is analysed. In the more
recent reference [5] the authors use sensitivities to carry out
contingency filtering and ranking with respect to voltage dips.
Furthermore, the assessment addresses power quality issues
and short-term voltage stability. In [6], the authors present a
survey of current practices for transient voltage sag criteria
related to power system stability.
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The present paper also investigates voltage sags with focus
on power system stability rather than power quality. Transient
voltage sags are identified using time-domain simulation.
Then, sensitivities are derived which provide information on
tight couplings between relative change of rotor angles and
load voltage magnitudes. These sensitivities are easier to
compute than those considered in the above references.
The sensitivities can be used, for instance, to identify the
contribution of each generator to a drop in voltage magnitude
experienced at a particular load bus. A voltage depression at a
load bus can trigger consecutive events such as load tripping.
Therefore, a second sensitivity is derived, which assesses the
impact of a change of load power on generator active powers.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II the power
system model used for the computation of sensitivities is
described and the voltage sensitivities are derived. This is
followed by the presentation of the corresponding results
in Section III. The derivation of the second sensitivities,
addressing the effect of variation of load on generator power,
can be found in Section IV and the corresponding results are
shown in Section V. Finally, in Section VI concluding remarks
are offered.
II. DERIVATION OF LOAD VOLTAGE SENSITIVITIES
A. Modelling for sensitivity analysis
The model used for sensitivity analysis is the so-called
“classical” transient stability model [7]. Each generator is
modeled by an e.m.f. E¯′ of constant magnitude behind the
transient reactance X ′d (see Fig. 1(a)), the mechanical power
input is assumed constant, and loads are converted to constant
shunt admittances. The simple generator model is valid in
the first second after fault clearance and the justification for
using it is twofold. First, this model is used for sensitivity
analysis. As indicated in the Introduction, this analysis is
aimed at complementing a detailed time-domain simulation
in which much more refined models can be used. Second, the
classical model is not used with constant e.m.f. throughout
the whole simulation: instead, the e.m.f. is adjusted so that
the classical model fits specific operating points where the
sensitivity analysis is carried out.
For convenience each generator is represented by its Norton
equivalent (see Fig. 1(b)), i.e. a current source E¯′/(jX ′d) in
parallel with the admittance 1/(jX ′d). Based on these assump-
tions, the following well-known linear algebraic equations can
be used:
I¯ = Y V¯ (1)
E¯′=E′ 6 δ
X ′d
V
(a) Thevenin Equivalent
E′ 6 δ
jX′
d
V
X ′d
(b) Norton Equivalent
Fig. 1. The´venin and Norton equivalents of generator
where I¯ is the vector of complex currents injected at the
generator buses (stemming from the Norton equivalents), V¯ is
the vector of complex bus voltages, and Y is the “augmented”
bus admittance matrix obtained by adding the contribution of
generators and loads to the matrix relative to the network.
A system with n buses and m machines is considered
(n > m). It is assumed, without loss of generality, that the
buses where machines are connected are numbered from
n−m+ 1 to n. Hence, Eq. (1) can be detailed as:
0
...
0
E¯′1/(jX
′
d,1)
...
E¯′m/(jX
′
d,m)

= Y

V¯1
...
V¯n−m
V¯n−m+1
...
V¯n

(2)
where the zero sub-vector has dimension n−m and V¯i is the
complex voltage at the i-th bus.
B. Load voltage sensitivities
In this section, sensitivities are derived to identify the load
buses whose voltage magnitudes are strongly affected by
changes of the rotor angle of particular generators. They are
referred to as “load voltage sensitivities”. The latter will be
used to determine the contribution of individual generators to
an observed voltage sag at a load bus.
The effect of a small rotor angle change is assessed through
modification of Eq. (2). To this purpose, the e.m.f. phasor
of the k-th generator, E¯′k, is slightly rotated, while the other
generators remain unchanged. This corresponds to a small
change of the rotor angle, when generators are represented
by the classical model. The new bus voltages V
†
that result
from a small increase  in the phase angle of E¯′k are easily
computed by solving the modified linear system:
0
...
0
E¯′1/(jX
′
d,1)
...
E¯′k e
j/(jX ′d,k)
...
E¯′m/(jX
′
d,m)

= Y

V¯ †1
...
V¯ †n−m
V¯ †n−m+1
...
...
...
V¯ †n

(3)
Clearly, in order to speed up computations, the admittance
matrix Y is LU -factorized once for all, and Eq. (3) is solved
for each change  in the left-hand-side vector.
The changes of magnitudes between the “new” and the
reference bus voltages are calculated and normalized. The
sensitivities of the various bus voltage magnitudes to the i-th
generator rotor angle are computed as:
(sV,Gi)` =
|V¯ †` | − |V¯`|
pi/180
` = 1, . . . ,m− n (4)
where  is expressed in degrees. The resulting sensitivity
vector has the unit [pu/rad] or [V/rad]. This vector can be de-
termined for each generator in the system and the aggregation
of the individual vectors gives a sensitivity matrix SV,G, where
each column corresponds to a generator and each row to a
load bus. This matrix allows identifying the generators having
a dominant impact on a certain load bus voltage magnitude.
The entries also indicate whether increasing a rotor angle will
increase a voltage magnitude or will depress it.
C. Contribution of individual generators to a voltage sag
Once it has been found from time simulation that a sig-
nificant voltage sag is experienced at some load bus, the
voltage sensitivities presented in the previous sub-section can
be utilized to identify the contribution of each individual
generator. The procedure described hereafter was found to
provide the most accurate results.
The time-domain simulation is carried out until the min-
imum voltage is reached at the load bus of interest. In
order to ignore bus voltage variations caused by topologi-
cal changes, the voltage magnitude reduction is considered
between the time tc of fault clearing and the instant tVmin
where the minimum of voltage is reached. The excursions
∆δj (j = 1, . . . ,m) of rotor angles are considered over the
time interval [tc tVmin]. Furthermore, the load voltage sen-
sitivities SV,G are determined at time t+c . Therefore, the bus
voltages V (t+c ) and the power consumption of the loads just
after the system has entered its post-fault configuration are
used to update the admittance matrix and, subsequently, to
compute the Norton equivalent of the generators.
Therewith, an estimate of the voltage magnitude drop at
bus i can be calculated through linearisation, using the load
voltage sensitivities, as follows:
∆Vi =
∑m
j=1 [SV,G]ij ∆δj =
∑m
j=1∆Vi,j (5)
Finally, the share of the k-th generator in the total change
of voltage magnitude can be determined as:
fi,k =
∆Vi,k∣∣∣∑mj=1 ∆Vi,j∣∣∣ (6)
Using this fraction and the voltage trajectory obtained from
time-domain simulation, the actual share of the k-th generator
in the voltage sag at the i-th bus can be computed as:
∆V ∗i,k = fi,k
∣∣Vi(t+c )− Vi(tVmin)∣∣ (7)
where Vi(t+c ) is the voltage at bus i immediately after fault
clearing and Vi(tVmin) its minimum value.
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III. RESULTS FOR LOAD VOLTAGE SENSITIVITIES
A. Test system and example case
1) Test system: The test system employed to validate the
presented sensitivities is the well-known New England & New
York system described in [8]. It consists of 68 buses and 16
generators. The loads are modelled as constant impedances in
the time-domain simulation. The generators are represented
by a sixth order model. They all have a simple excitation
and voltage regulation system, and a thermal turbine/governor
model. Furthermore, all generators, but GEN-7 and GEN-14,
are equipped with a power system stabilizer.
2) Test scenario: The test scenario was as well adopted
from [8]. In this case, the considered contingency is a
three-phase short-circuit on the transmission line connecting
buses 16 and 21. The short-circuit occurs one second after the
simulation begins and is assumed to be very close to bus 21.
It is cleared after 150 ms by opening the breakers at both ends
of the faulted transmission line.
The disturbance causes some generators to accelerate rela-
tive to the others, which leads to a significant separation of
the generator rotor angles. Figure 2 shows the evolution of
the rotor angles of nine among the sixteen generators: the five
generators with the largest increase of rotor angle (GEN-1,
GEN-4, GEN-5, GEN-6 and GEN-7), the three generators
with the largest decrease (GEN-14, GEN-15 and GEN-16)
and one which is barely affected (GEN-13). The graph shows
that the generators are affected to different degrees by the
disturbance; in particular, GEN-6 and GEN-7 are experiencing
large rotor angle excursions. However, all generators remain
in synchronism and reach a new stable equilibrium point.
Consequently, the scenario is assessed to be stable. Figure 3
displays the time evolution of voltage magnitudes at a selection
of load buses. The selection consists of the five buses which
experience the lowest voltages (buses 15, 16, 21, 23 and 24),
the three buses whose voltage magnitude are slightly increased
(buses 50, 51 and 52), and one bus barely affected (bus 20).
As expected the voltage magnitudes drop dramatically in the
fault-on period, and recover immediately after fault clearing.
However, in the subsequent evolution, a voltage sag can be
observed at certain buses. At some buses the voltage drops
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Fig. 4. Load voltage sensitivities
below the critical value of 0.7 pu, which is unacceptably low
and long lasting.
B. Identification of critical generator-load pairs
In order to clearly identify which generators strongly impact
load bus voltage magnitudes, the load voltage sensitivities
described in the previous section are computed using Eq. (4)
and data obtained from time-domain simulation, just after fault
clearance. Figure 4 shows the resulting sensitivities. The bar
graph shows for all load buses the expected change in voltage
magnitude (in pu/rad) resulting from an increase of individual
generator rotor angle. The values clearly indicate that an angle
increase can either depress or boost a voltage magnitude.
In the example scenario, GEN-6 and GEN-7 experience
large rotor angle excursions and are likely to cause the
observed voltage sags. Indeed, Fig. 4 indicates that GEN-6
and GEN-7 mainly affect the voltage magnitudes at buses with
numbers in the range of 15− 24. Furthermore, from Fig. 2 it
can be observed that GEN-14, GEN-15 and GEN-16 experi-
ence a slight decrease of their rotor angle. The sensitivities
in Fig. 4 indicate that GEN-16 strongly affects the load buses
with numbers in the range of 49−52. In the following, a more
detailed analysis of this group is considered.
Figure 5 shows a selection of sensitivities displayed in
the bar graph of Fig. 4, relative to above mentioned subset
of generators and load buses. Dominant negative sensitivi-
ties indicate that increasing the corresponding rotor angles
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Fig. 6. Contribution of individual generators to voltage depressions
would decrease the voltage magnitude at the respective load
buses, and vice versa. These high sensitivities combined with
the generator rotor angle deviations can explain the voltage
magnitude evolutions at the load buses shown in Fig. 3. The
sensitivities in Fig. 5 suggest that the load buses where GEN-6
and GEN-7 are dominant, will experience a voltage depression,
which is the case for buses 15, 16, 21, 23 and 24. The voltage
at bus 20 is less affected, which is in good correlation with
the lower sensitivities to the critical generators GEN-6 and
GEN-7. Furthermore, Fig. 5 suggests that the load buses where
GEN-16 is dominant experience a slight increase of their
voltage magnitudes corresponding to the negative sensitivity
and the decreasing rotor angle of GEN-16. This is in very
good agreement with the voltage evolutions shown in Fig. 3.
C. Contribution of individual generators
Another use of the load voltage sensitivities is to determine
the contribution of each generator to an observed voltage sag
at a particular bus, as described in Section II-C, more precisely
by Eq. (7). For the same test scenario, the contributions ∆V ∗i,k
of each generator to the voltage sags are presented in Fig. 6.
As for the load voltage sensitivities, the individual contri-
butions of the generators show that each generator strongly
impacts load buses in a certain vicinity and can have either
a positive or a negative effect on the voltage magnitude.
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Moreover, it can be seen that, at an individual load bus, either
a positive or a negative contribution can be dominant (see
for instance buses 23, 24, 50 and 51), or the contributions
of various generators compensate each other to a large extent
(see for instance buses 37 and 42).
D. Application to generator re-dispatch
The above individual generator contributions also point out
effective locations for preventive control aimed at mitigating
the voltage sags.
In the scenario under concern, GEN-6 has been identified
as one major source of the voltage sags. Consequently, a
reduction of its rotor angle excursion due to the fault could
significantly improve the post-fault voltage evolutions. This
can be achieved by reducing the critical generator’s pre-
fault active power and re-dispatching the power difference to
appropriate non-critical generators.
The results of such a re-dispatch are presented next. The
power output of GEN-6 was reduced by merely 50 MW
(from 700 to 650 MW) while the power output of GEN-13
was increased to cover the difference. These two generators
were chosen, because GEN-6 has a large contribution to the
severe voltage sags at buses 15, 16, 21, 23 and 24, while the
sensitivities shown in Fig. 5 suggest that a rotor angle increase
of GEN-13 tends to increase the same voltage magnitudes.
Alternatively, any other generator with a negligible sensitivity
could have been chosen to compensate the power reduction of
the critical generator. In this test scenario the critical group of
machines, which is the group that will loose synchronism in
case of a fault cleared a little after the critical clearing time,
consists of GEN-6 and GEN-7. Due to the tight coupling of
those two generators, a preventive control applied to one of
them will as well have a positive affect on the other.
Figure 7 shows a comparison of the rotor angle responses of
GEN-6, GEN-7 and GEN-13, before and after the re-dispatch,
respectively. It can be observed that, due to the active power
re-dispatch, the large rotor angle excursion is significantly
reduced for GEN-6 and GEN-7. Furthermore, the duration of
the first swing is almost halved. The beneficial effect on the
voltage evolutions is evident in Fig. 8, showing the voltage
evolutions at the load buses 15, 16, 21, 23 and 24. The depth
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of the voltage sag at each load bus is reduced dramatically
and the duration of the swing is more than halved.
The individual generator contributions updated after the
power re-dispatch are shown in Fig. 9. It can be observed that
all the negative contributions are significantly lower in magni-
tude. At the same time, the load voltage sensitivities have been
little affected by the small power re-dispatch. Consequently,
the voltage improvement results essentially from the decreased
rotor angle excursion of the critical generators.
The above example has demonstrated the usefulness of load
voltage sensitivities and individual generator contributions to
identify the source of voltage sags and appropriate locations
for preventive control. It should be noted that, at this stage,
those indexes do not provide information on the required
amount of preventive control.
IV. DERIVATION OF GENERATOR POWER SENSITIVITIES
A. Motivation
A depressed voltage, falling below a certain critical level,
may trigger consecutive events such as load disconnection by
internal protections, or possibly under-voltage load shedding
in a system provided with this integrity protections scheme.
The subsequent reduction of power consumption at some
load buses may lower the maximum of the P (δ)-curves of
some generators. This leads to a reduction of the available
deceleration area, which is detrimental for stability if those
generators belong to the critical group, and beneficial if they
belong to the non-critical one [9].
In order to investigate the effect of load variations on
generator active powers, a second type of sensitivities is
considered, based on the same model as in Section II-A. The
increase of load consumption is obtained from an extra load
admittance ∆y added at the bus of concern, and the goal is
to determine the effect on the generator active powers. It was
found that these sensitivities provide the most accurate results
when calculated directly after fault clearance, at time t+c .
B. Derivation of generator power sensitivities
The first step consists in estimating the bus voltages after
increasing the load admittance at the k-th bus by a small value
∆y. To this purpose, let us assume that this additional admit-
tance draws a current ∆I¯k from the network. The resulting
change in bus voltages is given by:
∆V¯ = −∆I¯k Y −1ek (8)
where ek is the unit vector with the k-th entry equal to one.
The bus voltages after variation of the load admittance are
given by:
V¯ = V¯ o + ∆V¯ = V¯ o −∆I¯k Y −1ek (9)
where the upper script o denotes a value before the load
change. This equation particularized to the k-th bus gives:
V¯k = V¯
o
k −∆I¯k
[
Y −1ek
]
k
= V¯ ok −∆I¯k
[
Y −1
]
kk
(10)
where
[
Y −1
]
kk
is nothing but the The´venin impedance seen
from bus k. Furthermore, the current ∆I¯k relates to the bus
voltage V¯k through:
∆I¯k = ∆y V¯k (11)
Combining Eqs. (10) and (11) and solving for ∆I¯k yields:
∆I¯k =
V¯ ok
[Y −1]kk +
1
∆y
(12)
Replacing ∆I¯k by this expression in Eq. (9) provides the
expression of bus voltages resulting from the addition of the
admittance ∆y at the k-th bus:
V¯ = V¯ o − V¯
o
k
[Y −1]kk +
1
∆y
Y −1ek (13)
The second step consists in determining the variations of
generator active powers that result from the change of voltages
from V¯ o to V¯ . From the The´venin equivalent of the j-th
generator (Fig. 1(a)), one easily derives the current before the
load change:
I¯oj = (E¯
′ − V¯ oj )/jX ′j (14)
and after the load change:
I¯j = (E¯
′ − V¯j)/jX ′j (15)
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Fig. 10. Generator power sensitivities
The variation of active power of the j-th generator is merely
given by:
∆Pj = Re
(
V¯j I¯
∗
j − V¯ oj (I¯oj )∗
)
(16)
where ∗ denotes the complex conjugate.
Equation (16) provides the sensitivities of the generator
active powers to a change of the load admittance at the
k-th bus. The main computational effort involves solving one
sparse linear system from the LU factors of Y with the sparse
independent term ek. By repeating the computation for the
various load buses of interest, a sensitivity matrix can be
assembled column by column. As shown in the sequel, this
matrix gives useful information on e.g. the effect of load
tripping/shedding on generators during a transient voltage sag.
V. RESULTS FOR GENERATOR POWER SENSITIVITIES
A. Investigation of the effect of load variation
In the following an application of the power injection
sensitivities is presented, where the sensitivities are used to
estimate the effect of under-voltage load tripping.
Figure 10 shows the generator power sensitivities computed
from Eq. (16) for the same scenario as in Section III. The
bar graph shows how much a 1 pu increase of the load
admittance under constant power factor (of 0.89) affects the
active powers of generators. It can be seen that increasing load
power generally results in increasing generator active powers.
However, in some rare cases, depending on the load power
factor, the opposite effect can be observed. It can be also
seen that, as for the load voltage sensitivities, there is a strong
coupling between certain loads and certain generators.
Figure 11 shows a detail of the bar graph of Fig. 10. It can
be seen that the power injection of GEN-6 and GEN-7, which
experience a large rotor angle excursion and were found to
have high impact on the voltages at buses 21 and 23, are as
well sensitive to the load power consumed at these buses.
All in all, the relations between, on the one hand, voltage
magnitudes at load buses and rotor angles and, on the other
hand, active power of generators and load consumptions yield
a more complete picture of the system response observed.
Namely, the fault causes GEN-6 and GEN-7 to have their rotor
angles significantly increased. This, in turn, causes the voltage
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Fig. 11. Excerpt of generator power sensitivities at prior selected buses
magnitudes at load buses 21 and 23 to drop significantly,
with the consequence that the voltage-sensitive load power
is reduced. Eventually, the reduction of the power consumed
by these loads further reduces the active powers of both
generators, which results in a lower deceleration and, hence,
a larger rotor angle excursion.
B. Effect of load tripping/shedding
Hereafter, the detrimental or beneficial effect of load trip-
ping is discussed, based on the same scenario as before.
Figure 12 shows the voltage evolution at bus 23 in three
different cases. The red solid curve refers to the original
scenario with a pronounced voltage sag. The green dashed
curve is the same voltage evolution when 30 MW of load are
tripped at the same bus, under constant power factor, 100 ms
after the voltage has dropped below the critical value of 0.7 pu.
A loss of synchronism results, which can be explained from
the sensitivities of Fig. 11. Indeed, reducing the load power
at bus 23 decreases the active power of GEN-6 and GEN-7,
which make up the critical group. The blue dotted curve shows
the voltage evolution at bus 23 when load is tripped at bus 20.
Stability is improved, the depth of the voltage sag is reduced
and voltage recovery is faster. This is to be expected from
the sensitivities of Fig. 11 which indicate that acting at bus
20 little affects the critical generators GEN-6 and GEN-7 but
reduces the active power of GEN-4 and GEN-5 which belong
to the non-critical group.
This observation could be at the heart of an intelligent load
shedding scheme, detecting a voltage sag caused by rotor
angle separation and selecting the loads to curtail in order
to improve the system response. The case shown with the
blue dotted curve in Fig. 11 was obtained by assuming a
response-based scheme of this type, acting in several steps
in order to apply a proper amount of corrective control. In
this very simple example, a first block of 40 MW of load is
curtailed when the voltages stay below 0.7 pu for more than
100 ms, followed by one block of 40 MW every 200 ms until
all bus voltages recover above 0.7 pu. The power factor is
kept constant. In the scenario of concern, this scheme leads
to shedding a total of 160 MW. The effect on generator
active powers is illustrated in Fig. 13, relative to the critical
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generator GEN-7. The red solid curve shows the evolution
of its active power in the base case with no load shedding.
The counterproductive load tripping scenario (30 MW shed at
bus 23) is depicted by the green dashed curve. Load tripping
takes place at t = 1.80 s. The magnified plot in Fig. 13 shows
that this slightly reduces the power injected by the generator.
This decreases the deceleration power (i.e. the difference better
the active and mechanical powers) and eventually results in a
loss of synchronism. In the stabilizing load tripping scenario,
shown by the blue dotted curve (160 MW shed at bus 20),
the active power of the same generator is not reduced by the
shedding. It is even higher than in the base case. This increase
may be explained by a lower relative rotor angle between the
critical and non-critical machines as well as a less pronounced
voltage drop and, consequently, a higher power consumption.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a method is proposed to assess transient
voltages sags caused by rotor swings. This can occur when
generators experience large relative rotor angle displacements
after a fault. The system may be assessed transiently stable,
since no loss of synchronism takes place, but the voltage sag
leads to critically low voltage levels and the system response
should be considered unacceptable.
The voltage sag assessment uses new sensitivities, derived
from the well-known linear algebraic network equations and
aimed at complementing detailed time-domain simulations. To
this purpose, generators are represented by the classical model
adjusted to fit some points of the system evolution. Under these
assumptions, two sensitivities were developed.
The first sensitivity provides information on the impact of
rotor angle changes on the voltage magnitude of load buses.
This sensitivity can be used to detect critical generator-load
pairs. Furthermore, it allows computing the contribution of a
generator to an observed voltage sag, which gives valuable
information to point out a location for preventive control.
Presently, the sensitivity must be complemented with infor-
mation on the amount of preventive measure. The second
sensitivity reveals the impact of load consumption variation
on the active power injected by generators. Simulations have
shown that this sensitivity can be used to determine if under-
voltage load tripping/shedding will improve or deteriorate
transient stability and, thereby, identify critical locations for
under-voltage load shedding.
Since the sensitivities are obtained from a very fast compu-
tation, they could be used to determine preventive actions in
real time. Assuming the availability of fast communication
means, the sensitivities could also be used for emergency
control. This, however, requires a reliable early detection of
voltage sags and proper tools to compute the amount and type
of control.
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Derivation and Application of
Sensitivities to Assess Transient
Voltage Sags caused by Rotor
Swings
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Introduction
In literature on power quality, voltage sags/dips is a topic vastly
addressed [2]. While the primary cause is the occurrence of a fault,
a less pointed out reason for voltage sags is rotor angle swing, more
precisely angular separation of generators, resulting from a fault.
From a practical viewpoint, a scenario may be assessed transiently
stable considering that generators remain in synchronism, while
voltage sags due to the relative rotor angle displacement already
result in transiently low voltages for which the system response
should be considered unacceptable.
The prediction of this type of voltage sag using the Transient
Energy Function was described in the early reference [3]. In [4]
sensitivities relative to voltage dip were derived using this method
as well. The sensitivities relate the voltage sag depths to certain
parameters such as terminal voltages and power generation. The
authors of [5] address the transient voltage dip acceptability
problem using a two-dimensional table of critical voltage level
and critical voltage dip duration. Moreover, the issue of transient
voltage stability of dynamic loads such as induction machines is
analyzed. In the more recent reference [6] the authors use
sensitivities to carry out contingency ﬁltering and ranking with
respect to voltage dips. Furthermore, the assessment addresses
power quality issues and short-term voltage stability. In [7], the
authors present a survey of current practices for transient voltage
sag criteria related to power system stability.
The present paper also investigates voltage sags with focus on
power system stability rather than power quality. Transient volt-
age sags are identiﬁed using time-domain simulation. Then, sensi-
tivities are derived which provide information on tight couplings
between relative change of rotor angles and load voltage
magnitudes. These sensitivities are easier to compute than those
considered in the above references. The sensitivities can be used,
for instance, to identify the contribution of each generator to a
drop in voltage magnitude experienced at a particular load bus. A
voltage depression at a load bus can trigger consecutive events
such as load tripping. Therefore, a second sensitivity is derived,
which assesses the impact of a change of load power on generator
active powers.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section ‘‘Voltage sags
caused by rotor angle swings’’ the power system model used for
the discussion of voltage sags and the computation of sensitivities
is described. Moreover, a brief discussion of the mechanism
causing these transient voltage sags is presented. The voltage
sensitivities are derived in Section ‘‘Derivation of load voltage
sensitivities’’. This is followed by the presentation of the
corresponding results in Section ‘‘Results for load voltage sensi-
tivities’’. The derivation of the second sensitivities, addressing the
effect of variation of load on generator power, can be found in
Section ‘‘Derivation of generator power sensitivities’’ and the
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2015.02.013
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corresponding results are shown in Section ‘‘Results for generator
power sensitivities’’. Finally, in Section ‘‘Conclusion’’ concluding
remarks are offered.
Voltage sags caused by rotor angle swings
Modelling for discussion of the mechanism causing the voltage sags
and for sensitivity analysis
The model used for synchronous generator is the so-called
‘‘classical’’ transient stability model [8]. Each generator is modeled
by an e.m.f. E0 of constant magnitude behind the transient reac-
tance X0d (see Fig. 1(a)), the mechanical power input is assumed
constant, and loads are converted to constant shunt admittances.
The simple generator model is valid in the ﬁrst second after fault
clearance and the justiﬁcation for using it is twofold. First, this
model is used for sensitivity analysis and, as indicated in the
Introduction, this analysis is aimed at complementing a detailed
time-domain simulation in which much more reﬁned models can
be used. Second, the ‘‘classical’’ model is not used with constant
e.m.f. throughout the whole simulation: instead, the e.m.f. is
adjusted so that the ‘‘classical’’ model ﬁts speciﬁc operating points
where the sensitivity analysis is carried out.
For convenience each generator is represented by its Norton
equivalent (see Fig. 1(b)), i.e. a current source E0=ðjX0dÞ in parallel
with the admittance 1=ðjX0dÞ. Based on these assumptions, the fol-
lowing well-known linear algebraic equations can be used:
I ¼ Y V ð1Þ
where I is the vector of complex currents injected at the generator
buses (stemming from the Norton equivalents), V is the vector of
complex bus voltages, and Y is the ‘‘augmented’’ bus admittance
matrix obtained by adding the contribution of generators and loads
to the matrix relative to the network.
A system with n buses andmmachines is considered ðn > mÞ. It
is assumed, without loss of generality, that the buses where machi-
nes are connected are numbered from nmþ 1 to n. Hence, Eq. (1)
can be detailed as:
0
..
.
0
E01=ðjX0d;1Þ
..
.
E0m=ðjX0d;mÞ
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
¼ Y
V1
..
.
Vnm
Vnmþ1
..
.
Vn
2
66666666664
3
77777777775
ð2Þ
where the zero sub-vector has dimension nm and Vi is the com-
plex voltage at the i-th bus.
Voltage sag mechanism
The mechanism behind voltage sags caused by rotor swings can
be discussed and illustrated graphically under consideration of a
simple example system such as the one shown in Fig. 2.
As mentioned in the previous section the generators are repre-
sented by the ‘‘classical’’ transient stability model. The angle of the
e.m.f. can then be used to represent the rotor angle of the generator
[8]. Moreover, in this example the generators’ mechanical powers
are assumed constant and the loads are modeled as constant
impedances for sake of simplicity.
With these and the aforementioned assumptions, Eq. (2) reveals
that the complex voltage at a bus is the sum of contributions of the
generators. The contribution of a generator is determined by its
e.m.f., which is scaled and rotated corresponding to the entry in
the inverse of the admittance matrix divided by the respective
transient reactance.
Fig. 3(a) shows the complex voltage at Bus 2 (from the simple
example system) and the contributions of the individual gen-
erators, which add up to the voltage measured at the respective
bus.
The effect of an increase in rotor angle, e.g. due to a transient
disturbance, on a particular bus voltage can be assessed under con-
sideration of the linear algebraic equation Eq. (2).
In the example shown in Fig. 2, a short-circuit occurs on the
transmission line connecting Buses 4 and 5. The fault alters the
admittance matrix and leads to a change of the electric power
injection of the generators, which causes a relative acceleration
or deceleration of the generator rotors. In the example, it is
assumed for clarity that the fault only affects generator G4 result-
ing in its acceleration and an advancing of its rotor angle relative to
the remaining generators.
The effect on the voltage at Bus 6 is shown in Fig. 3(b) from
which it can be observed that the relative increase in rotor angle
depresses the voltage magnitude at the bus. This observation gave
the impulse for the investigation of transient voltage sags using
sensitivities.
Fig. 1. Thévenin and Norton equivalents of generator.
Fig. 2. One-line diagram of a simple example test system with 6 buses. A three-
phase short-circuit on the transmission line connecting Buses 1 and 6, which is
indicated by the red zigzag arrow, causes a change DPi in the power injection of
each generator Gi.
V2
V2,G1
V2,G2
V2,G3
V2,G4
(a) Bus voltage at initial
state
V2
V2,G1
V2,G2
V2,G3
V2,G4
V2
(b) Eﬀect of rotor angle
increase of generator G4
Fig. 3. Example of complex voltage at Bus 2 as sum of generator contributions.
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Derivation of load voltage sensitivities
Load voltage sensitivities
In this section, sensitivities are derived to identify the load bus-
es whose voltage magnitudes are strongly affected by changes of
the rotor angle of particular generators. They are referred to as
‘‘load voltage sensitivities’’. The latter will be used to determine
the contribution of individual generators to an observed voltage
sag at a load bus.
The effect of a small rotor angle change is assessed through
modiﬁcation of Eq. (2). To this purpose, the e.m.f. phasor of the
k-th generator, E0k, is slightly rotated, while the other generators
remain unchanged. This corresponds to a small change of the rotor
angle, when generators are represented by the ‘‘classical’’ model.
The new bus voltages Vy that result from a small increase  in the
phase angle of E0k are easily computed by solving themodiﬁed linear
system:
0
..
.
0
E01=ðjX0d;1Þ
..
.
E0k e
jp=180=ðjX0d;kÞ
..
.
E0m=ðjX0d;mÞ
2
666666666666666664
3
777777777777777775
¼ Y
V y1
..
.
V ynm
V ynmþ1
..
.
..
.
..
.
V yn
2
666666666666666664
3
777777777777777775
ð3Þ
In order to speed up computations and make the approach well
suited for real-time application, the admittance matrix Y is LU-fac-
torized once for all, and Eq. (3) is solved for each change  in the
left-hand-side vector.
The changes of magnitudes between the ‘‘new’’ and the refer-
ence bus voltages are calculated and normalized. The sensitivities
of the various bus voltage magnitudes to the i-th generator rotor
angle are computed as:
sV ;Gi
 
‘
¼ jV
y
‘j  jV ‘j
p=180
‘ ¼ 1; . . . ;m n ð4Þ
where  is expressed in degrees. The resulting sensitivity vector has
the unit ½pu=rad or ½V=rad. This vector can be determined for each
generator in the system and the aggregation of the individual vec-
tors gives a sensitivity matrix SV ;G, where each column corresponds
to a generator and each row to a load bus. This matrix allows iden-
tifying the generators having a dominant impact on a certain load
bus voltage magnitude. The entries also indicate whether increasing
a rotor angle will increase a voltage magnitude or will depress it.
Contribution of individual generators to a voltage sag
Once it has been found from time simulation that a signiﬁcant
voltage sag is experienced at some load bus, the voltage sensitivities
presented in the previous sub-section can be utilized to identify the
contribution of each individual generator. The procedure described
hereafter was found to provide the most accurate results.
The time-domain simulation is carried out until the minimum
voltage is reached at the load bus of interest. In order to ignore
bus voltage variations caused by topological changes, the voltage
magnitude reduction is considered between the time tc of fault
clearing and the instant tVmin where the minimum of voltage is
reached. The excursions Ddj ðj ¼ 1; . . . ;mÞ of rotor angles are
considered over the time interval ½tc tVmin. Furthermore, the load
voltage sensitivities SV ;G are determined at time tþc . Therefore, the
bus voltages Vðtþc Þ and the power consumption of the loads just
after the system has entered its post-fault conﬁguration are used
to update the admittance matrix and, subsequently, to compute
the Norton equivalent of the generators.
Therewith, an estimate of the voltage magnitude drop at Bus i
can be calculated through linearization, using the load voltage
sensitivities, as follows:
DVi ¼
Xm
j¼1
SV ;G½ ijDdj ¼
Xm
j¼1
DVi;j ð5Þ
Finally, the share of the k-th generator in the total change of
voltage magnitude can be determined as:
f i;k ¼
DVi;kPm
j¼1DVi;j


ð6Þ
Using this fraction and the voltage trajectory obtained from time-
domain simulation, the actual share of the k-th generator in the
voltage sag at the i-th bus can be computed as:
DVi;k ¼ f i;k Viðtþc Þ  ViðtVminÞ
  ð7Þ
where Viðtþc Þ is the voltage at Bus i immediately after fault clearing
and ViðtVminÞ its minimum value.
Results for load voltage sensitivities
Test system and example case
Test system
The test system employed to validate the presented sensitivities
is the well-known New England and New York system described in
[9]. It consists of 68 buses and 16 generators. A one-line diagram is
shown in Fig. 4. The loads are modeled as constant impedances in
the time-domain simulation. The generators are represented by a
sixth order model. They all have a simple excitation and voltage
regulation system, and a thermal turbine/governor model.
Furthermore, all generators, but GEN-7 and GEN-14, are equipped
with a power system stabilizer.
Test scenario
The test scenario was as well adopted from [9]. In this case, the
considered contingency is a three-phase short-circuit on the trans-
mission line connecting Buses 26 and 28. The short-circuit occurs
one second after the simulation begins and is assumed to be very
close to Bus 28. It is cleared after 120 ms by opening the breakers
at both ends of the faulted transmission line.
The disturbance causes some generators to accelerate relative
to the others, which leads to a signiﬁcant separation of the gen-
erator rotor angles. Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the rotor angles
of nine among the sixteen generators: the ﬁve generators with
the largest increase of rotor angle (GEN-4, GEN-5, GEN-6, GEN-7
and GEN-9), the three generators with the largest decrease (GEN-
14, GEN-15 and GEN-16) and one which is little affected (GEN-8).
The graph shows that the generators are affected to different
degrees by the disturbance; in particular, GEN-9 is experiencing
a large rotor angle excursion. However, all generators remain in
synchronism and reach a new stable equilibrium point.
Consequently, the scenario is assessed to be stable. Fig. 6 displays
the time evolution of voltage magnitudes at a selection of load bus-
es. The selection consists of the four buses which experience the
lowest voltages (Buses 26, 27, 28 and 29), the three buses whose
voltage magnitude are slightly increased (Buses 50, 51 and 52),
and two buses little affected (Buses 18 and 25). As expected the
voltage magnitudes drop dramatically in the fault-on period, and
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recover immediately after fault clearing. However, in the subse-
quent evolution, a voltage sag can be observed at certain buses.
At some buses the voltage drops below the critical value of
0.7 pu, which is unacceptably low and long lasting.
Identiﬁcation of critical generator–load pairs
In order to clearly identify which generators strongly impact
load bus voltage magnitudes, the load voltage sensitivities
described in the previous section are computed using Eq. (4) and
data obtained from time-domain simulation, just after fault clear-
ance. Fig. 7 shows the resulting sensitivities. The bar graph shows
for all load buses the expected change in voltage magnitude
(in pu/rad) resulting from the increase of one individual generator
rotor angle. The values clearly indicate that an angle increase can
either depress or boost a voltage magnitude.
In the example scenario, GEN-9 experiences a large rotor angle
excursions and is likely to cause the observed voltage sags. Indeed,
Fig. 7 indicates that GEN-9 mainly affects the voltage magnitudes at
Buses 18 and 25–29. Furthermore, from Fig. 5 it can be observed that
GEN-14, GEN-15 and GEN-16 experience a slight decrease of their
rotor angle. The sensitivities in Fig. 7 indicate that GEN-16 strongly
affects the load buses with numbers in the range of 50–52. In the fol-
lowing, a more detailed analysis of this group is considered.
Fig. 8 shows a selection of sensitivities displayed in the bar graph
of Fig. 7, relative to above mentioned subset of generators and load
buses. Dominant negative sensitivities indicate that increasing the
corresponding rotor angles would decrease the voltage magnitude
at the respective load buses, and vice versa. These high sensitivities
combined with the generator rotor angle deviations can explain the
voltage magnitude evolutions at the load buses shown in Fig. 6. The
sensitivities in Fig. 8 suggest that the load buses where GEN-9 is
dominant, will experience a voltage depression, which is the case
for Buses 26, 27, 28 and 29. The voltage at Buses 18 and 25 are less
affected, which is in good correlation with the lower sensitivities to
the critical generator GEN-9. Furthermore, Fig. 8 suggests that the
load buses where GEN-16 is dominant experience a slight increase
of their voltage magnitudes corresponding to the negative sensi-
tivity and the decreasing rotor angle of GEN-16. This is in good
agreement with the voltage evolutions shown in Fig. 6.
Contribution of individual generators
Another use of the load voltage sensitivities is to determine the
contribution of each generator to an observed voltage sag at a
Fig. 4. One-line diagram of the New England and New York system [10].
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particular bus, as described in Section ‘‘Contribution of individual
generators to a voltage sag’’, more precisely by Eq. (7). For the same
test scenario, the contributions DVi;k of each generator to the volt-
age sags are presented in Fig. 9.
As for the load voltage sensitivities, the individual contributions
of the generators show that each generator strongly impacts load
buses in a certain vicinity and can have either a positive or a nega-
tive effect on the voltage magnitude. Moreover, it can be seen that,
at an individual load bus, either a positive or a negative contribu-
tion can be dominant (see for instance Buses 28, 29, 50 and 51), or
the contributions of various generators compensate each other to a
large extent (see for instance Bus 37).
Application to generator re-dispatch
The above individual generator contributions also point out
effective locations for preventive control aimed at mitigating the
voltage sags.
In the scenario under concern, GEN-9 has been identiﬁed as the
major source of the voltage sags. Consequently, a reduction of its
rotor angle excursion due to the fault could signiﬁcantly improve
the post-fault voltage evolutions. This can be achieved by reducing
the critical generator’s pre-fault active power and re-dispatching
the power difference to appropriate non-critical generators.
The results of such a re-dispatch are presented next. The power
output of GEN-9 was reduced by merely 50 MW (from 850 to
800 MW) while the power output of GEN-8 was increased to cover
the difference. These two generators were chosen, because GEN-9
has a large contribution to the severe voltage sags at Buses 26–
29, while the sensitivities shown in Fig. 8 suggest that a rotor angle
increase of GEN-8 tends to increase the voltage magnitudes at the
most critical Buses 28 and 29. Alternatively, any other generator
with a negligible sensitivity could have been chosen to compensate
the power reduction of the critical generator. In this test scenario
the critical group of machines, which is the group that will loose
synchronism in case of a fault cleared a little after the critical
clearing time, consists of solely GEN-9.
Fig. 10 shows a comparison of the rotor angle responses of
GEN-8 and GEN-9, before and after the re-dispatch, respectively.
It can be observed that, due to the active power re-dispatch, the
large rotor angle excursion is signiﬁcantly reduced for GEN-9.
Furthermore, the duration of the ﬁrst swing is almost halved. The
beneﬁcial effect on the voltage evolutions is evident in Fig. 11,
showing the voltage evolutions at the load Buses 25–29. The depth
of the voltage sag at each load bus is reduced dramatically and the
duration of the swing is halved.
The individual generator contributions updated after the power
re-dispatch are shown in Fig. 12. It can be observed that all the
negative contributions are signiﬁcantly lower in magnitude. At
the same time, the load voltage sensitivities have been little affect-
ed by the small power re-dispatch. Consequently, the voltage
improvement results essentially from the decreased rotor angle
excursion of the critical generator.
The above example has demonstrated the usefulness of load
voltage sensitivities and individual generator contributions to
identify the source of voltage sags and appropriate locations for
preventive control. It should be noted that, at this stage, those
indexes do not provide information on the required amount of pre-
ventive control.
Derivation of generator power sensitivities
Motivation
A depressed voltage, falling below a certain critical level,
may trigger consecutive events such as load disconnection by
internal protections, or possibly under-voltage load shedding
in a system provided with this integrity protection scheme.
The subsequent reduction of power consumption at some load
buses may lower the maximum of the PðdÞ-curves of some gen-
erators. This leads to a reduction of the available deceleration
area, which is detrimental for stability if those generators
belong to the critical group, and beneﬁcial if they belong to
the non-critical one [11].
In order to investigate the effect of load variations on generator
active powers, a second type of sensitivities is considered, based on
the same model as in Section ‘‘Modelling for discussion of the
mechanism causing the voltage sags and for sensitivity analysis’’.
The increase of load consumption is obtained from an extra load
admittance Dy added at the bus of concern, and the goal is to deter-
mine the effect on the generator active powers. It was found that
these sensitivities provide the most accurate results when calculat-
ed directly after fault clearance, at time tþc .
Derivation of generator power sensitivities
The ﬁrst step consists in estimating the bus voltages after
increasing the load admittance at the k-th bus by a small value
Dy. To this purpose, let us assume that this additional admittance
draws a current DIk from the network. The resulting change in
bus voltages is given by:
DV ¼ DIk Y1ek ð8Þ
where ek is the unit vector with the k-th entry equal to one. The bus
voltages after variation of the load admittance are given by:
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V ¼ Vo þ DV ¼ Vo  DIk Y1ek ð9Þ
where the upper script  denotes a value before the load change.
This equation particularized to the k-th bus gives:
Vk ¼ Vok  DIk Y1ek
 
k ¼ Vok  DIk Y1
 
kk ð10Þ
where Y1
 
kk is nothing but the Thévenin impedance seen from Bus
k. Furthermore, the current DIk relates to the bus voltage Vk
through:
DIk ¼ Dy Vk ð11Þ
Combining Eqs. (10) and (11) and solving for DIk yields:
DIk ¼ V
o
k
Y1½ kk þ 1Dy
ð12Þ
Replacing DIk by this expression in Eq. (9) provides the expres-
sion of bus voltages resulting from the addition of the admittance
Dy at the k-th bus:
V ¼ Vo  V
o
k
Y1½ kk þ 1Dy
Y1ek ð13Þ
The second step consists in determining the variations of gen-
erator active powers that result from the change of voltages from
Vo to V. From the Thévenin equivalent of the j-th generator
(Fig. 1(a)), one easily derives the current before the load change:
Ioj ¼ ðE0  Voj Þ=jX0j ð14Þ
and after the load change:
Ij ¼ ðE0  VjÞ=jX0j ð15Þ
The variation of active power of the j-th generator is merely given
by:
DPj ¼ Re VjIj  Voj ðIoj Þ
  ð16Þ
where ⁄ denotes the complex conjugate.
Eq. (16) provides the sensitivities of the generator active powers
to a change of the load admittance at the k-th bus. The main com-
putational effort involves solving one sparse linear system from
the LU factors of Y with the sparse independent term ek, which
again is well suited for real-time application, e.g. determination
of preventive controls. By repeating the computation for the var-
ious load buses of interest, a sensitivity matrix can be assembled
column by column. As shown in the sequel, this matrix gives useful
information on e.g. the effect of load tripping/shedding on gen-
erators during a transient voltage sag.
Results for generator power sensitivities
Investigation of the effect of load variation
In the following an application of the power injection sensi-
tivities is presented, where the sensitivities are used to estimate
the effect of under-voltage load tripping.
Fig. 13 shows the generator power sensitivities computed from
Eq. (16) for the same scenario as in Section ‘‘Results for load volt-
age sensitivities’’. The bar graph shows how much a 1 pu increase
of the load admittance under constant power factor affects the
active powers of generators. It can be seen that increasing load
power generally results in increasing generator active powers.
However, in some rare cases, depending on the load power factor,
the opposite effect can be observed. Moreover, it can be seen that
there is a strong coupling between certain loads and certain gen-
erators, which was as well observed for the load voltage
sensitivities.
Fig. 14 shows a detail of the bar graph of Fig. 13. It can be seen
that the power injection of GEN-9, which experiences a large rotor
angle excursion and was found to have high impact on the voltages
at Buses 28 and 29, is as well sensitive to the load power consumed
at these buses.
All in all, the relations between, on the one hand, voltage
magnitudes at load buses and rotor angles and, on the other hand,
active power of generators and load consumptions yield a more
complete picture of the system response observed. Namely, the
fault causes GEN-9 to have its rotor angles signiﬁcantly increased.
This, in turn, causes the voltage magnitudes at load Buses 28 and
29 to drop signiﬁcantly, with the consequence that the voltage-
sensitive load power is reduced. Eventually, the reduction of the
power consumed by these loads further reduces the active powers
of the generator, which results in a lower deceleration and, hence,
a larger rotor angle excursion.
Effect of load tripping/shedding
Hereafter, the detrimental or beneﬁcial effect of load tripping is
discussed, based on the same scenario as before.
Fig. 15 shows the voltage evolution at Bus 28 in three different
cases. The red solid curve refers to the original scenario with a pro-
nounced voltage sag. The green dashed curve is the same voltage
evolution when 50 MW of load are tripped at the Buses 28 and
29, under constant power factor, 100 ms after the voltage has
dropped below the critical value of 0.7 pu. A loss of synchronism
results, which can be explained from the sensitivities in Fig. 14.
Indeed, reducing the load power at Buses 28 and 29 decreases
the active power of GEN-9, which is the critical generator. The blue
dotted curve shows the voltage evolution at Bus 28 when load is
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.3
−0.25
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 g
en
er
at
or
s 
to
 v
ol
ta
ge
 s
ag
 (p
u)
Bus Number
 
 
GEN−1
GEN−2
GEN−3
GEN−4
GEN−5
GEN−6
GEN−7
GEN−8
GEN−9
GEN−10
GEN−11
GEN−12
GEN−13
GEN−14
GEN−15
GEN−16
Fig. 9. Contribution of individual generators to voltage depressions.
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
R
ot
or
 a
ng
le
 δ
 (d
eg
) 
Time t (s)
GEN-8 (orig.)
GEN-9 (orig.)
GEN-8 (re-disp.)
GEN-9 (re-disp.)
Fig. 10. Rotor angle responses before and after power re-dispatch.
6 T. Weckesser et al. / Electrical Power and Energy Systems xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article in press as: Weckesser T et al. Derivation and application of sensitivities to assess transient voltage sags caused by rotor swings. Int J
Electr Power Energ Syst (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2015.02.013
tripped at Bus 25. Stability is improved, the depth of the voltage
sag is reduced and voltage recovery is faster. This is to be expected
from the sensitivities in Fig. 14 which indicate that acting at Bus 25
little affects the critical generator GEN-9 but reduces the active
power of GEN-8, which belongs to the non-critical group.
This observation could be at the heart of an intelligent load
shedding scheme, detecting a voltage sag caused by rotor angle
separation and selecting the loads to curtail in order to improve
the system response. The case shown with the blue dotted curve
in Fig. 15 was obtained by assuming a response-based scheme of
this type, acting in several steps in order to apply a proper amount
of corrective control. In this very simple example, a ﬁrst block of
45 MW of load is curtailed when the voltages stay below 0.7 pu
for more than 100 ms, followed by one block of 45 MW every
100 ms until all bus voltages recover above 0.7 pu. The power fac-
tor is kept constant. In the scenario of concern, this scheme leads to
shedding a total of 225 MW. The effect on generator active powers
is illustrated in Fig. 16, relative to the critical generator GEN-9. The
red solid curve shows the evolution of its active power in the base
case with no load shedding. The counterproductive load tripping
scenario (50 MW shed at both Buses 28 and 29) is depicted by
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Fig. 12. Contribution of individual generators to voltage depressions after power
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the green dashed curve. Load tripping takes place at t ¼ 1:50 s. The
magniﬁed plot in Fig. 16 shows that this slightly reduces the power
injected by the generator. This decreases the deceleration power
(i.e. the difference between the active and mechanical power)
and eventually results in a loss of synchronism. In the stabilizing
load tripping scenario, shown by the blue dotted curve (225 MW
shed at Bus 25), the active power of the same generator is not
reduced by the shedding. It is even higher than in the base case.
This increase may be explained by a lower relative rotor angle
between the critical and non-critical machines as well as a less
pronounced voltage drop and, consequently, a higher power
consumption.
Conclusion
In this paper, a method is proposed to assess transient voltage
sags caused by rotor swings. This can occur when generators expe-
rience large relative rotor angle displacements after a fault. The
systemmay be assessed transiently stable since no loss of synchro-
nism takes place, but the voltage sag leads to critically low voltages
and, hence, to an unacceptable system response.
The voltage sag assessment uses new sensitivities, derived from
the well-known linear algebraic network equations and aimed at
complementing detailed time-domain simulations. To this pur-
pose, generators are represented by the ‘‘classical’’ model adjusted
to ﬁt some points of the system evolution obtained with the full
model. Under these assumptions, two sensitivities were developed.
The ﬁrst sensitivity provides information on the impact of rotor
angle changes on the voltage magnitude of load buses. This sensi-
tivity can be used to detect critical generator–load pairs.
Furthermore, it allows computing the contribution of a generator
to an observed voltage sag, which gives valuable information to
point out a location for preventive control. Presently, the sensi-
tivity must be complemented with information on the amount of
preventive measure. The second sensitivity reveals the impact of
load consumption variation on the active power injected by gen-
erators. Simulations have shown that this sensitivity can be used
to determine if under-voltage load tripping/shedding will improve
or deteriorate transient stability and, thereby, identify critical loca-
tions for under-voltage load shedding.
The simulation results showed that although the sensitivities do
not encompass all the existing controls, they provide useful infor-
mation about the voltage sags caused by rotor swings. Moreover,
since the sensitivities are obtained from a very fast computation,
they could be used to determine preventive actions in real time.
Assuming the availability of fast communication means, the sensi-
tivities could also be used for emergency control. This extension of
the work reported in this paper, however, requires a reliable early
detection of voltage sags and proper tools to compute the amount
and type of control.
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Early Prediction of Transient Voltage Sags caused
by Rotor Swings
Tilman Weckesser Hjo¨rtur Jo´hannsson Thierry Van Cutsem
Abstract—The paper investigates various methods to predict
voltage sags at load buses caused by large generator rotor swings
and following a transient disturbance. Three different prediction
methods are proposed, which all use real-time measurements
from PMUs. One of the methods uses a slightly extended version
of the E-SIME method. The other two methods use measurements
and process them by recursive least square estimation. It is shown
that the prediction method employing E-SIME allows the earliest
detection of a critical voltage sag with satisfactory accuracy.
Index Terms—power system stability, rotor swings, transient
stability, voltage sag prediction
I. INTRODUCTION
THE primary cause for voltage sags/dips is the occurrenceof a fault. In the literature on power quality voltage
sags/dips is a topic vastly addressed [1]. A rarely addressed
reason for voltage sags is angular separation of generators
or rotor angle swing resulting from a fault. Certain fault
scenarios cause large rotor angle displacements, which result
in transiently low voltages for which the system response
should be considered unacceptable. However, from a rotor
angle stability viewpoint, such a scenario may be assessed
transiently stable, since the generators remain in synchronism.
Voltages falling below a critical level can cause subsequent
events such as unintentional load tripping, which may further
deteriorate the system condition. An early and accurate de-
tection of an unacceptable voltage sag can be used to trigger
appropriate control actions and avoid such detrimental events.
The prediction of this type of voltage sag using the Transient
Energy Function was described in the early reference [2]. In
[3] sensitivities relative to voltage dips were derived using
this method. The sensitivities relate the voltage sag depths to
certain parameters such as terminal voltages and power genera-
tion. However, approaches using the transient energy function
always suffer from restrictions placed on the power system
model. In [4] the authors treated the transient voltage dip
acceptability problem using a two-dimensional table of critical
voltage level and critical voltage dip duration. The paper also
analyzed the issue of transient voltage stability of dynamic
loads such as induction machines. In the recent publication
[5], the authors developed a method for contingency filtering
and ranking with respect to voltage dips using sensitivities.
A survey of current practices for transient voltage sag criteria
related to power system stability was presented in [6].
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In the present paper voltage sags are investigated with focus
on system dynamics rather than power quality. The aim is to
derive a method, which in real-time allows early and accurate
prediction of voltage sags caused by angular separation. To this
purpose, different approaches have been implemented and their
performance is assessed. In order to avoid limitations due to
the model or data, the proposed methods utilize synchronized
phasor measurements.
II. VOLTAGE SAG PREDICTION
In this section three approaches are described, which intend
to early predict an imminent voltage sag. These approaches
will later be compared and benchmarked against time-domain
simulation. It should be noted that all the proposed methods
use wide-area measurements, which introduce a delay due to
the communication time needed to collect the measurements.
A. Modelling for voltage sag prediction
For voltage sag prediction, the generators are modelled
using the so-called “classical” model [7]. This corresponds
to a representation of each generator by an e.m.f. E¯′ of
constant magnitude behind the transient reactance X ′d while
loads are converted to constant shunt admittances. The reason
for using this very simple model is threefold. First, the time
frame of concern is short, in the order of one second after
fault clearing. Second, the model is only used to get a fast
estimation of the voltage sag. Third, the method utilizes real-
time measurements from phasor measurement units (PMUs)
to fit the parameters of the classical model to the current
operating point. To simplify matters the Norton equivalent,
i.e. a current source E¯′/(jX ′d) in parallel with the admittance
1/(jX ′d), is chosen to represent each generator. Under these
assumptions, the following well-known algebraic equations
can be used:
I¯ = Y V¯ (1)
where the vector of complex current injections is I¯ , the vector
of complex bus voltages is V¯ , and Y is the “augmented” bus
admittance matrix, which is obtained by adding the transient
reactances of the generators and shunt admittances of the loads
to the admittance matrix of the network.
The number of buses is n and the number of generators is m.
The bus entries are sorted so that the buses where generators
are connected have the indices from n−m+ 1 to n. Hence,
Eq. (1) can be written as:
0
...
0
E¯′1/(jX
′
d,1)
...
E¯′m/(jX
′
d,m)

= Y

V¯1
...
V¯n−m
V¯n−m+1
...
V¯n

(2)
where the zero sub-vector has dimension n−m and V¯i is the
complex voltage at the i-th bus.
B. Voltage Sag Prediction using PMU Voltage Measurements
The first method to predict the depth of a voltage sag
consists in acquiring bus voltage measurements in the post-
fault configuration and computing a quadratic approximation
of each voltage evolution. To this purpose a Recursive Least
Square (RLS) estimator with exponential forgetting factor [8]
is used together with the linear regression model.
Vi = Θ
T
i xi (3)
where xi is the regressor [t2i , ti, 1]
T at a discrete time, Vi
is the observation, which is a vector of the measured bus
voltages at time ti, and Θi is the corresponding parameter
matrix determined at ti:
Θi =
 a1 . . . alb1 . . . bl
c1 . . . cl
 (4)
The first three sets of voltage magnitudes are used to compute
a first estimate of the parameter matrix, which holds all the
parameters of the quadratic approximations of all l load bus
voltages. This is achieved through linear least square ap-
proximation. Additionally, the covariance matrix is computed,
which is used in the RLS estimator and needs to be updated
at each step. The covariance matrix R is initialized as:
Ri = X
TX (5)
where X is the regression matrix holding the regression
vectors xTk , k = i − 2, i − 1, i. The parameter matrix Θ is
updated by the RLS estimator as follows:
Θi = Θi−1 + R−1i xi(Vi − xTi Θi−1) (6)
The inverse of the covariance matrix is updated as follows:
R−1i = λ
−1[R−1i−1−R−1i−1xi(λ+xTi R−1i−1xi)−1xTi R−1i−1] (7)
Consequently, only one time at the beginning the inverse of
the covariance matrix has to be determined and, thereafter, it
solely is updated using (7), which does not involve inverting
a matrix.
In [9] a typical range for the forgetting factor is stated as
λ = 0.95 . . . 0.995. λ equal to one implies that all measure-
ments are “remembered” and considered in the computation
of the parameters. Due to the strong non-linear equations
describing the dynamics of the power system, it was chosen to
use a factor at the lower limit of the common range (λ = 0.95).
The RLS estimator determines from the voltage magnitude
measurement for each load bus k a function Vk(t).
Vk(t) = akt
2 + bkt+ ck (8)
This approximated function of the voltage is then used to
predict the depth of the voltage sag through an assessment
of its extreme values.
C. Voltage Sag Prediction using the phase angle of E′
Since the voltage sag in this study originates from a
deviation of the rotor angles of a group of generators, the
second proposed method uses an RLS estimator to predict the
individual rotor angle evolution. Thus, the rotor angle of the
k-th generator is obtained as:
δk(t) = akt
2 + bkt+ ck (9)
In order to do so, the method computes from each acquired
set of synchronized bus voltage and current measurements the
matching operating point for each generator, when represented
by the classical model. The phase angle δ of the computed
e.m.f. E¯′ corresponds to the rotor angle of the machine and
its evolution may be predicted with an RLS estimator, as
introduced in the previous section. For the period, where
the rotor angle evolution is sufficiently described by the
quadratic approximation of Eq. (9) and under the assumption
of constant magnitude of the e.m.f.’s, the load bus voltages
can be computed by solving:
0
...
0
E¯′1 e
j∆δ1/(jX ′d,1)
...
E¯′m e
j∆δm/(jX ′d,m)

= Y

V¯ †1
...
V¯ †n−m
V¯ †n−m+1
...
V¯ †n

(10)
where ∆δ corresponds to changes in rotor angle from the
current state to a state some time ahead. In this work the rotor
angle prediction was performed over the next 300 ms.
D. Voltage Sag Prediction using E-SIME
1) E-SIME Method: The SIngle Machine Equivalent
(SIME) Method is a transient stability assessment method
based on the Equal-Area Criterion (EAC). A detailed descrip-
tion of the method can be found in [10]. A recent discussion
of the achievements and prospects of Emergency-SIME (E-
SIME) is available in [11]. The methodology of SIME relies
on the possibility of representing the post-fault dynamics of
a multi-machine power system by a suitable One-Machine
Infinite Bus (OMIB) equivalent. The transient stability of the
OMIB can then be assessed applying EAC.
In E-SIME real-time measurements are collected in the
post-fault configuration at regular time steps ti. These mea-
surements are used to formulate an OMIB equivalent, which
represents the dynamics between a group of “Critical” Ma-
chines (CMs) and a group of “Non-critical” Machines (NMs).
The OMIB is characterized by its rotor angle δ, speed ω,
inertia coefficient M and acceleration power Pa, which is
the difference between mechanical and electrical power. These
parameters and variables can be computed from machine
parameters and appropriate aggregation of the CMs and NMs.
Subsequently, the EAC allows to compute a transient sta-
bility margin η, which is negative for an unstable and positive
for a stable case [10]:
η = −∫ δu
δi
Padδ − 1/2Mω2i (11)
where δi and ωi correspond to δ(ti) and ω(ti) and δu is the
angle where the following instability conditions are met:
Pa(δu) = 0 and P˙a(δu) > 0 (12)
In E-SIME the angle δu is estimated through a prediction
of the Pa(δ)-curve of the OMIB. To this purpose, three
successive data sets of the OMIB, consisting of Pa and δ,
are used to compute a quadratic approximate of the curve:
Pa(δ) = aδ
2 + bδ + c (13)
of which the parameters a, b and c are computed from the
three data sets and, subsequently, are refined using a weighted
least square technique.
The implementation of E-SIME comprises the following
steps. Step 1: Collect the first three post-fault measurement
sets of the multi-machine system. Step 2: Using Taylor series
expansion, predict the rotor angles of the individual machines
some time ahead (e.g. 100 ms). Step 3: Identify the CMs by
ranking the machines according to the predicted rotor angles
and searching for the maximum angular gap between two
successive machines. The machines above the gap form the
candidate CMs and the ones below the candidate NMs. The
two groups are aggregated into two equivalent machines and,
thereafter, the “candidate” OMIB can be determined. Step 4:
The parameters of the OMIB from (at least) three successive
data sets are utilized to estimate its Pa(δ)-curve with Eq. (13).
Step 5: Then the angle δu can be computed, if Eq. (13) meets
the conditions (12). If not, a new set of data is acquired and
the procedure is repeated from Step 2. If the conditions are
met, the stability margin is computed utilizing Eq. (11). Then
a new set of data is acquired and Steps 2 to 5 are repeated
to refine the computed δu and η. The procedure is terminated
when the margin converged to a constant value or the return
angle is reached, where:
Pa(δr) < 0 and ωr = 0 (14)
2) Prediction using E-SIME: In the following, a method
is derived, which uses E-SIME to predict and early detect a
voltage sag. The idea is that E-SIME uses real-time data to
predict the rotor angle evolution in each time step of the post-
fault configuration. If the system is found stable, the method
predicts the return angle of the critical cluster. This angle
together with the up-to-date bus voltage measurements are then
used to predict the expected minimum load bus voltage.
Just after fault clearance, the admittance matrix as described
in Section II-A is computed and the assessment with E-SIME
is executed. If the computed stability margin is positive, the
return angle δr is computed by solving:
0 =
∫ δr
δi
Pa(δ)dδ − 1/2Mω2i (15)
where Pa is approximated by the quadratic function in Eq.
(13). From the current rotor angle δi of the candidate OMIB
and the predicted angle δr, the maximum angular deviation of
the CMs relative to the NMs can be estimated by
∆δr = δr − δi (16)
Since it is assumed that the voltage sag origins from the rotor
swing of the generators, it is expected that the voltage sag
minimum will be reached when the group of CMs and the
group of NMs have reached there maximum angular separation
[2], which occurs at the return angle. The operating point of
the synchronous machine represented by the classical model
is computed by utilizing the most recent bus voltage PMU
measurements and solving Eq. (2). Hence, the minimum bus
voltages are computed by assuming constant magnitude of the
e.m.f.’s, but a rotation of E¯′ of the CMs by ∆δr. Then the
bus voltages at δr can be computed by solving Eq. (2).
III. RESULTS FOR VOLTAGE SAG PREDICTION
A. Test system and test case
1) Test system: In order to validate the proposed prediction
methods and to assess their accuracy, the well-known New
England & New York system [12] is used. The system is
composed of 68 buses and 16 generators. In the time-domain
simulations the 33 loads are modelled as constant impedances.
The generators are all equipped with a simple excitation
and voltage regulation system, as well as a thermal tur-
bine/governor model. Additionally, all generators, but GEN-7
and GEN-14, are equipped with power system stabilizers. The
machines are modelled with four rotor windings.
2) Test case: In the test scenario a three-phase short-circuit
on the transmission line connecting buses 16 and 21 occurs
at time t = 1 s. This fault is very close to bus 21 and is
cleared after 150 ms through the opening of the breakers at
both ends of the faulted transmission line. This scenario was
also proposed in [12].
Due to the fault some generators accelerate relative to
the others. This leads to a large angular separation of the
rotors. The response of a selection of generators is shown
in Fig. 1. The selection consists of the five generators with
the largest increase of rotor angle (GEN-1, GEN-4, GEN-5,
GEN-6 and GEN-7), the three generators with the largest
decrease (GEN-14, GEN-15 and GEN-16) and one which is
barely affected (GEN-13). The rotor angle evolution shows
that certain generators are affected to a higher degree than
others; for instance GEN-6 and GEN-7. Yet, synchronism
is maintained, a new stable equilibrium is reached and the
scenario can be assessed to be transiently stable. The voltage
magnitudes at a selection of load buses over time are presented
in Fig. 2. This selection includes the five buses which expe-
rience the deepest voltage sag (buses 15, 16, 21, 23 and 24),
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Fig. 2. Evolution of voltage magnitudes at load buses
the three buses whose voltage magnitude are slightly increased
(buses 50, 51 and 52), and one bus barely affected by the
post-fault dynamics (bus 20). In the fault-on period voltage
magnitudes in the vicinity of the fault location experience a
dramatic drop and immediately recover after fault clearance.
However, in the subsequent evolution a voltage sag can be
observed at certain buses with voltage dropping below the
critical value of 0.7 pu, which is unacceptably low and long
lasting. An early and accurate detection of these voltage sags
is very valuable for a secure operation of the power systems.
B. Detection of critical load buses
In this section the different prediction methods are evaluated
with respect to their ability to early and consistently predict
the crossing of a critical voltage level (here taken as 0.7 pu).
Figure 3 shows on the abscissa the simulated time and on the
ordinate the loads. A data point at a certain time and for a
certain load indicates that the particular method predicted, at
that time instant, that the voltage at this load bus will drop
below the critical level during the voltage swing.
The black crosses depict the results when using directly
PMU voltage measurements and an RLS estimator (see Sec-
tion II-B), the blue circles show the results using the phase
angle of the e.m.f.’s and an RLS estimator (see Section II-C)
and the green ×’s relate to the approach using SIME (see
Section II-D). Consequently, the graph allows to assess how
early a critically low voltage at a certain load can be predicted
and how consistent this prediction is. Furthermore, the graph
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Fig. 4. Prediction of voltage minimum at bus 24 (load 14)
discloses if a method predicts critically low voltages only
at those buses, where the voltage actually drops below the
critical value. Finally, the red squares indicate the time instants
at which the voltage of a particular load drops below the
critical value in the time-domain simulation. This is the case,
in the analysed scenario, for loads 8, 9, 12, 13 and 14, which
correspond to buses 15, 16, 21, 23 and 24.
Figure 3 indicates that the method utilizing real-time voltage
measurements (black crosses) needs to acquire a large number
of measurements to correctly predict the critically low voltage
sags, which leads to some detections taking place after the
critical level has been crossed (e.g. loads 13 and 14). Further-
more, at some point the method unduly predicts low voltage
for some non-critical loads (e.g. loads 2 − 5). The second
method, which uses the phase angle of the e.m.f.’s for the
prediction (blue circles), is more consistent in the prediction
of the critical loads. It allows an early identification, while
only for a short initial period some loads are unduly flagged
as critical (e.g. loads 3 − 5). However, for some loads, the
identification of critically low voltages is interrupted before the
respective voltage falls below the critical level (e.g. loads 8,
9 and 12). The results depicted by the green ×’s and utilizing
E-SIME are very satisfactory. Generally, only the critical loads
are flagged and the identification is well before the voltage at
the particular bus falls below the critical level.
C. Earliness and Accuracy of the Prediction
In this section, the methods are assessed with respect to their
ability to early and accurately detect the actual minimum of
the voltage sag observed at a particular bus. The results are
presented for the bus experiencing the lowest voltage sag (bus
24, Fig. 4) and the bus where the voltage marginally drops
below the critical level (bus 21, Fig. 5). In both graphs the red
squares indicate the time and value of the voltage minimum
at the particular bus provided by time-domain simulation.
The prediction method which uses the bus voltages directly
(black crosses) detects late that both voltages will fall below
the critical value. Furthermore, the first predicted values are
very pessimistic, although the predicted voltage minimum,
subsequently, converges to the accurate value in both cases.
The second method, which predicts the voltage sag from the
phase angle of the e.m.f.’s (blue circles), early indicates a
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voltage below the critical value at both buses. The maximum
deviation to the actual minimum is smaller compared to the
first method. However, the prediction for bus 24 is not as
accurate as with the first method, when getting close to the
time where the actual voltage minimum occurs. Moreover,
at bus 21 the prediction is interrupted, because the voltage
is no longer identified to be critical. This occurs before the
actual voltage has reached its minimum and, thereafter, the
method fails to again detect the shortfall of the critical voltage
magnitude. The third method, which uses E-SIME for the
prediction of the depth of the voltage dip (green ×’s), detects
the crossing of the critical voltage around 200 ms later than
the second method, but still significantly earlier than the first
method. The prediction accuracy is comparable to the second
approach, but not as good as the first method. In the prediction
of the minimum voltage in the marginally critical case at bus
21, the prediction is interrupted at some point, as it is for the
other methods, but is resumed before the other methods do.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper three approaches were described to predict
critically low voltages during a transient voltage sag caused
by large rotor swings of certain generators. Voltages below
a critical level can lead to further events in the system
such as unintentional load tripping, which again can cause
deterioration of the system condition. An early and accurate
prediction of critical voltage sags is a basic requirement to
execute corrective control actions. The three approaches have
been assessed with respect to their abilities to correctly and
early predict the crossing of a critical voltage level and the
minimum of the corresponding voltage.
The results show that each of the methods can predict the
voltage sags to a certain extent. While the method utilizing the
phase angle of the e.m.f.’s and the method applying E-SIME
allow an early detection of critical buses and low voltages, the
method using voltage measurements directly allows a more
accurate prediction of the voltage minimum. All in all the
prediction method employing E-SIME seems to be promising.
It allows early and consistent identification of critical buses
and the prediction of the voltage sag minimum is sufficiently
accurate. Furthermore, the approach poses an acceptable com-
puting time and is suitable for an online application. Together
with indicators providing insight on type, size and location
for control actions, the method could be part of a closed-loop
emergency control. For such an application the time delay, due
to gathering of measurements, becomes crucial.
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Abstract—This paper presents a method that in real-time deter-
mines remedial actions, which restore stable operation with respect
to aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability (ASSRAS) when in-
secure or unstable operation has been detected. An ASSRAS as-
sessment method is used to monitor the stability boundary for each
generator in real-time. The ASSRAS boundary represents the con-
dition when a generator reaches the maximum steady state active
power injection. The proposed control method exploits analytically
derived expressions for the ASSRAS boundary and other charac-
teristic curves in the injection impedance plane to determine an ac-
tive power redispatch among selected generators to restore stable
and secure operation. Since the method is purely based on analyti-
cally derived expression, the computation of the remedial actions is
fast and well suited for real-time operation. The method was tested
on the IEEE 14-bus and the Nordic32 test systems where results
show that the method can efﬁciently determine the required active
power redispatch to avoid an imminent instability.
Index Terms—Power system control, power system generation
redispatch, power system stability, remedial action schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ODERN societies are highly dependent on a stable andsecure operation of the power system. A continuously
increasing share of power production based on renewable en-
ergy sources (RES) can be observed in numerous countries,
where, e.g., in Denmark the government's energy strategy states
that 50% of the electricity consumption is to be supplied by
wind power by 2020 [1]. The foreseen challenges associated
with these goals are great as the future power system has to be
securely operated and delivering energy at competitive prices.
The ﬂuctuating nature of RES such as wind and solar radi-
ation may cause rapid changes in future generation patterns,
leading to rapid ﬂuctuations of the power system's operating
point. Existing ofﬂine and computationally demanding ap-
proaches for assessing stability and determination of remedial
or preventive actions may become insufﬁcient. Hence, a need
for real-time approaches will arise for the future system [2].
Efforts have beenmade tomeet the real-time requirements for
the assessment of the future system. Amethod for online assess-
ment of voltage stability is presented in [3] and [4]. The method
does not rely on a dynamicmodel to predict the system response,
instead basic assumptions and simpliﬁcations are applied in the
modeling process resulting in reduced computational burden.
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Fig. 1. In [13], for this two-bus system, critical and characteristic curves were
expressed in terms of the injection impedance. (a) Two-bus system. (b) Equiv-
alent two-bus system with injection impedance.
In [5] an element wise approach is proposed for stability as-
sessment where each individual assessment method analyzes a
particular instability mechanism. [5] describes such a method
to monitor the aperiodic small signal rotor angle stability (AS-
SRAS) of the individual generators and to determine their re-
spective stability margin. This stability mechanism refers to the
ability of each individual generator to produce sufﬁcient steady
state electromechanical torque. If this torque balance is upset, an
aperiodic increase in rotor angle and a subsequent loss of syn-
chronism can be observed.
The authors of [6] emphasize that efﬁcient remedial action
schemes (RAS) are an enabler for connecting more RES based
generation. The real-world implementation of a centralized re-
medial action scheme (CRAS) system was described in [6]. The
system executes corrective actions such as load or generation re-
duction to ensure reliable and safe system operation after fault
occurrence. The automatic system-wide RAS arming system
currently used in the power grid of British Columbia was de-
scribed in [7]. The RAS arming patterns are determined peri-
odically employing a transient stability analysis tool, which en-
sures security of the system. To achieve real-time performance,
the system relies on a large case database build from extensive
off-line planning studies.
A new methodology for determining the security region for
operation of transmission systems is described in [8]. The calcu-
lation of the boundaries is done ofﬂine and can be used to iden-
tify efﬁcient controls and remedial actions. The authors of [9]
propose an adaptive damping control scheme, which uses online
measurements to adapt the controller parameters to changing
operating conditions. The initial parameters are determined of-
ﬂine using a set of nominal operating conditions. In [10] the au-
thors compare two different approaches for damping inter-area
oscillations and come to the conclusion that wide-area control
methods are more effective than local controls. The previous
two paper determine controls for periodic small signal rotor
angle stability, while the followingmethod and the one proposed
in this paper address ASSRAS.
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Fig. 2. Function blocks of the ASSRAS assessment method [5].
In [11] the authors developed a method, which determines the
necessary countermeasures to be applied to a number of loads
to restore stability and security of the system with respect to the
ASSRAS boundary. The method therefore alters the consump-
tion pattern of load buses, which were identiﬁed to be the most
effective locations for applying countermeasures.
This paper presents a new method to restore ASSRAS for
which a patent has been submitted [12]. The investigated in-
stability mechanism is a quasi steady state phenomena. Con-
sequently, the assessment method as well as the developed re-
medial action method require that the system is in quasi steady
state. Most of the prior mentioned methods rely on extensive
ofﬂine studies to determine the corrective control actions. In
contrast to that, the proposed method is derived analytically
and only requires online measurements of the current system
condition. With these information, the method can fast and ac-
curately determine the required control actions. The structure
of the paper is as follows. In Section II, the ASSRAS assess-
ment method is brieﬂy described. The data provided by the
assessment method are utilized in the developed remedial ac-
tion method to compute corrective active power redispatch so-
lutions, which is described in Section III. The method's capa-
bility to avoid an imminent collapse in voltage is presented in
Section IV, where the results from two test systems are pre-
sented. Finally, in Section V the presented method and results
are discussed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Algebraic Expressions for Critical Transmission Limits
Reference [13] describes the mapping of some characteristic
curves from a PQV-surface of a two-bus system into the injec-
tion impedance plane (see Fig. 1). For such a system the rela-
tionship of the voltage magnitudes in both ends ( and ) and
the active & reactive power ( and ) becomes
(1)
where and are the resistance and reactance of the line.
In [13] it is shown, by manipulation of (1), that the condition
for maximum deliverable power to the receiving end, under the
assumption of constant and , is represented by a circle in
the injection impedance plane, which is in polar coordinates:
(2)
Here, represents the complex injection impedance and
the impedance of the line where .
Furthermore in [13], it was shown that lines of constant voltage
magnitude and voltage angle (the angle between and )
map as circles in the injection impedance plane. For later use
the equations describing these characteristic curves are stated at
this point. The curves of constant voltage magnitude satisfy
(3)
where
From [13], the curve for constant voltage angle is given by
(4)
B. Method for Real-Time Assessment of ASSRAS
In [5] a method is presented to quickly assess the ASSRAS of
all system generators. In Fig. 2, a block diagram of the employed
method is shown to visualize the different steps carried out to
assess stability. The algebraically derived expression for max-
imum injection of active power in (2) is exploited to formulate
an algebraic assessment criterion which enables stability assess-
ment in linear time [14]. The ASSRAS boundary of a generator
is given by
(5)
where is the complex injection impedance
seen from the generator's node of constant steady state
voltage magnitude and is the complex Thévenin
network impedance seen from the same node. In [15] it was
shown that the Thévenin equivalent parameters seen from
each generator can be directly computed from the network
admittance matrix and a system snapshot. The authors of [14]
presented a test case with 7917 buses and 1325 voltage con-
trol nodes and demonstrated that all the Thévenin equivalent
parameters could be computed within 2.5 ms.
Equation (5) appears as a circle in the injection impedance
plane and the generator's ASSRAS is determined from its value
of . A value of outside the circle represents stable
operation while a value inside represents unstable operation.
An unstable operation is characterized by the condition when
a small increase of the steady state rotor angle of a given gen-
erator reduces its active power output. While during stable op-
eration, an increase in increases the generator's active power
output. The assessment method determines whether a steady
state equilibrium point exists between the mechanical power ap-
plied to a given generator and its active power output. If a dis-
turbance causes a loss of the generator's steady state equilibrium
point, the generator will begin to lose synchronism in a process
that may take tens of seconds and up to a few minutes to evolve
[5], [15] . In order to track the stability condition of a generator
in real-time, system snapshots need to be available at a sampling
rate equivalent to the repetition rate of measurements provided
by PMUs or from a fast state estimator. The sampling rate of the
snapshots should be sufﬁcient to trace the movement of the op-
erating points and a higher rate allows to choose lower security
limits.
As the cause of aperiodic small signal rotor angle instability
is the lack of existence of an equilibrium point between the me-
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Fig. 3. Function blocks of the proposed remedial action method.
chanical and electrical power of a given generator, an intuitive
choice of a counter action is to lower mechanical power applied
to the critical machine to restore an equilibrium.
1) Stability Margin: In [5] the authors showed that the dis-
tance of the operating point (OP) of a generator to the stability
boundary is a measure of the distance to instability and that it
can be expressed in terms of various variables. When repre-
senting a generator by a voltage source and the remaining
grid by a Thevenin equivalent corresponding to a voltage source
with magnitude and an impedance , then its power
injection is
(6)
Under the assumption of constant voltagemagnitudes at nodes of
power injection and freezing of all other phase angles, the power
injectionofaparticulargeneratorbecomesafunctionofsolely the
phase angle and ismaximal at the angle ,which
represents the ASSRAS boundary. Consequently, the maximum
power injection canbe expressed as
(7)
This allows to deﬁne a stability margin in percentage of themax-
imum power injection :
(8)
C. Relative Electrical Distance
In [16], the authors describe an approach to determine the rel-
ative electrical distance between load buses and generator buses.
For that purpose the authors utilize the network admittance and
the linear algebraic network equations:
(9)
where the complex current and voltage vectors at the generator
and load buses are represented by , , , and . The sub-
matrices , , , and are the corresponding
parts of the network admittance matrix.
The authors showed that the sub-matrices can be used to de-
termine the relative electrical distance of the load buses to the
generator buses in the system, which can be computed as fol-
lows:
(10)
The values in each column of the resulting matrix contain a
measure of the relative electrical distance between a load bus
and the respective generator.
Fig. 4. Injection impedance plane displaying the aperiodic small signal rotor
angle stability boundary (solid circle), the security boundary (dashed circle) and
the circle corresponding to the trigger margin (dotted circle).
III. METHOD FOR REAL-TIME DETERMINATION
OF REMEDIAL ACTIONS
This section describes a method capable of determining a
generator redispatch solution to circumvent ASSRA instability
in real-time. Fig. 3 shows the function blocks of the proposed
method.
A. Trigger and Security Margins
It is preferable that the remedial actions are executed before
the system becomes unstable. Hence, a trigger margin is intro-
duced that corresponds to a percentage of the maximum power
injection and represents the stability margin threshold below
which the remedial action method is executed. To ﬁnd a new
set point and to limit how much the remaining generators can
contribute to the remedial action, a second threshold is intro-
duced, called security margin , which deﬁnes the security
boundary. In this approach, it was assumed that the voltage at
the node of power injection remains constant during the reme-
dial action. This assumption is valid, because the node of power
injection is chosen to be at the terminal of the generator or be-
hind the synchronous reactance depending on the respective ex-
citation system of the generator. Due to the constant voltage
magnitude the power injection of the generator is solely deter-
mined by its voltage angle, see (6). Consequently, the curve cor-
responding to the trigger and the security margin are represented
by a curve of constant voltage angle in the injection impedance
plane—see (4) and Fig. 4.
The selection of appropriate margin thresholds is a trade-off
between level of system security and additional constraints
on the generator's capacity. Since the requirement of a greater
margin directly affects the maximum power that a generator
can provide to the system and, hence, may lead to an econom-
ical loss. Therefore, a balance between required margins for
secure system operation and economically efﬁcient operation
of the generators has to be found. The margins may be different
in each individual power system and it is suggested that the
system operators choose them based on their experience and
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from ofﬂine studies of a selection of aperiodic small signal
rotor angle stable and unstable contingencies.
The assessment method analyses the ASSRAS of the system
during quasi steady state conditions. However, a crossing of
the stability boundary is acceptable in dynamic transition pe-
riods from one to another steady state equilibrium point. Con-
sequently, the remedial action method should only be executed,
when the system is in quasi steady state and the generator's sta-
bility margin has fallen below the trigger margin.
B. Quasi Steady State and Error Estimation
Since the method is based on the assumption of constant
voltage magnitude at the nodes of power injection, the voltage
magnitudes at these nodes can be used to determine the steadi-
ness of the system. It is assumed that the system is in quasi
steady state, when the maximum power injection at a node of
constant voltage magnitude can be determined with satisfactory
accuracy. Therefore, at a node with assumed constant voltage
magnitude the measured voltage magnitudes provided by a
PMU are stored for a certain period. Under the assumption
that the Thevenin voltage has constant voltage magnitude, the
maximum power injection at the node can be computed as a
function of the measured voltage magnitudes using (7).
When extracting the maximum and minimum of the
voltage magnitude in the period of concern, the corresponding
maximum error of the computed maximum power injection
can be determined:
(11)
In this paper, the acceptable error was chosen to be 0.5%.
C. Operating Point
The discussed assessment method assumes either the voltage
magnitude at the terminal of the machine to be constant or
at the internal node behind the synchronous reactance .
If saliency is neglected, is equal to the reactance in the
-axis and -axis . Hence, under the assumption that the
complex voltage and the complex current at the terminal
of the machine are monitored, then the internal voltage can
be computed as follows:
(12)
For a salient machine the assumption of constant voltage behind
introduces an error, which was investigated in [15]. The re-
sults showed that the assumption leads to very small deviations
and slightly more conservative assessment results. A machine
equipped with an automatic voltage regulator (AVR) will keep
the voltage magnitude at the terminal constant, unless the exci-
tation exceeds its limit and the over excitation limiter (OEL) is
activated. The activation will cause that the ﬁeld current is kept
constant at a limit value and, hence, the voltage at the terminal
can no longer be assumed constant. However, under such con-
ditions the voltage magnitude at the internal node behind
can be assumed constant. During AVR operation with constant
voltage magnitude at the terminal, the stability of the
OP, which assumes constant voltage magnitude at the internal
node, can be monitored simultaneously with the actual OP. This
allows to provide information on the stability condition of the
system in case of activation of an OEL of a machine. Further-
TABLE I
LOCATION OF NODE OF CONSTANT VOLTAGE MAGNITUDE DURING
REMEDIAL ACTION IN DIFFERENT GENERATOR CONFIGURATION
AND OPERATION CONDITIONS
more, it allows to determine control actions guaranteeing secure
operation in case of activation of an OEL. If remedial actions are
considered for OPs, the trigger and security margins may
be chosen lower than for actual OPs, since a stability boundary
crossing of an OP only corresponds to an insecure, but
not unstable situation.
D. Assumption of Constant Voltage Magnitude
In this section it is described at which node the voltage mag-
nitude is assumed to be constant during the remedial action.
Table I shows where the voltage magnitude is assumed to be
constant depending on the generator's excitation system, the
state of the OEL and the type of the OP, whose stability margin
fell below the trigger margin or rather is imminent to experi-
encing instability.
In the simple case that the machine is manually excited, the
voltagemagnitude is assumed to be constant behind andmay
be computed with (12). In themore complex case, where thema-
chine is equipped with an AVR the location of the node of con-
stant voltage during the remedial action is dependent on the state
of the OEL. If the OEL is inactive and, hence, the AVR keeps
the voltage magnitude at the machine terminal constant, then
the voltage magnitude during the remedial action is assumed to
be constant at the terminal independent on the type of OP that
is imminent unstable/insecure. If the OEL is activated, the node
of constant voltage magnitude moves behind and, conse-
quently, this is also the node, where the voltage magnitude is
assumed to be constant throughout the control action.
E. Computation of new Stable and Secure Operating Point
1) Imminent Unstable Node is Actual Operating Point: In the
case that the margin of the actual OP of a generator fell below
the trigger margin, the power output of the generator has to be
reduced tomove theOP back into the region of secure operation.
Since the desired security margin is known as a percentage
of the maximum power injection and under the assumption that
the voltage magnitude ratio remains constant throughout
the remedial action, (8) can be used to compute the voltage angle
at the new secure OP:
(13)
Subsequently, with the new voltage angle , the new active
power injection at the secure OP can be determined utilizing
(6). Then the necessary power reduction can be determined as
the difference between power injection at the current voltage
angle and the new secure voltage angle . Fig. 5 depicts the
determination of the new secure OP in the injection impedance
plane.
The injection impedance (blue dot) of the respective
generator crossed the trigger boundary, which executed the
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Fig. 5. Graphical representation of the computation of a new secure operating
point for the case of imminent instability due to an actual operating point.
method. Following, the new angle was computed using
(13). The new injection impedance of the generator is
then found by determining the intersection of the curve of
constant voltage magnitude and the line of constant voltage
angle corresponding to .
2) Imminent Unstable Node is Operating Point: In
order to operate the system in a secure manner, it is desirable
that the OP of a machine is also in the stable and secure
operating region. The computation of the needed power reduc-
tion differs from the calculations in Section III-E1, since the
voltage magnitude at the internal node, which is used to com-
pute the OP, cannot be assumed to be constant throughout
the process. It is assumed that also in this case the AVR of the
generator keeps the voltage magnitude at the terminal constant
and, hence, the corresponding characteristic curve of constant
voltage magnitude can be utilized.
In the injection impedance plane, the distance between the in-
jection impedance of the OP and the injection impedance
of the actual OP is purely imaginary and equal to . This al-
lows to map characteristic curves of the actual to the OP
(see Fig. 6).
The new secure OP of the OP can be found as the in-
tersection of the circle representing the security boundary of the
OP with the circle corresponding to the curve of constant
voltage magnitude of the actual operating point mapped to the
OP (see Fig. 6).
The equation for curves of constant voltage magnitude as de-
scribed in (3) can be rewritten as
(14)
where is the radius of the circle, the distance from the origin
to the centre of the circle is and the angle between real axis
and a line through the origin and centre of the circle is .
This circle of constant voltage magnitude can be mapped to
the OP by subtracting :
(15)
Curves of constant voltage angle in the injection impedance
are described by (4) and this shows that all the circles of con-
stant voltage angle intercept the origin. Consequently, the term
in front of the sine corresponds to the diameter of the circle. This
allows to determine the radius of the circle as well as the angle
between real axis and the line through origin and centre of the
Fig. 6. Graphical representation of the computation of a new secure operating
point for the case of imminent instability due to an operating point.
circle. The equation can be rewritten and expressed in terms of
the Thevenin parameters as follows:
(16)
Knowing the desired stability margin and after compu-
tation of the current voltage magnitude at the internal node
of the machine, the new secure voltage angle of the
OP can be determined utilizing (13). Subsequently, the circle
corresponding to the curve of constant voltage angle can be
computed using (16). The intersection of the circle of con-
stant voltage angle described by (16) and the mapped circle
of constant voltage magnitude of the actual OP described by
(15) gives the new secure OP in terms of the injection
impedance . The corresponding new actual OP can be
computed from the new actual injection impedance ,
which can be computed by adding the synchronous reactance to
(see Fig. 6). Since the voltage magnitude in the actual
OP was assumed to be constant, the active power injection in
the new and secure OP can be computed and the necessary
active power reduction can be determined.
F. Computation of Available Power Reserves
After the required power reduction was calculated the avail-
able power resources of the remaining generators have to be
determined to eventually propose a power redispatch solution.
The available resources are calculated, while respecting the fol-
lowing constraints. The “new” power injection should not
• exceed the plus the respective security margin;
• exceed nominal power of the generator plus a sec. margin;
• move the corresponding OP into an insecure or
unstable position. Hence, also for the OP a security
margin should be maintained.
The power reserve with respect to the nominal power of the
generator can directly be computed knowing the security margin
and the machine parameter.
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Fig. 7. Determining the power reserves of the actual operating point with re-
spect to the maximum power injection of the corresponding OP.
In the following, the power reserve computation for an actual
OP and for an actual OP with respect to its OP are pre-
sented.
1) Power Reserve of an Actual Operating Point: The avail-
able power reserve of a generator with respect to its
maximum power injection can simply be computed from the dif-
ference between the current stability margin (8) and
the pre-determined security margin , since both are ex-
pressed as percentages of (7):
(17)
2) Power Reserve of an Actual Operating Point With Re-
spect to Corresponding Operating Point: In order to
compute the power reserve an approach similar to the one in
Section III-E2 was taken. For that purpose the characteristic
curves derived in [13] were exploited (see Fig. 7).
The ﬁrst step in determining the available power reserve is to
calculate the phase angle corresponding to the security margin
of the OP utilizing (13). Then the respective curve of con-
stant phase angle (blue dashed curve in Fig. 7) can be computed
with (16).
Because of the preventive action the voltage magnitude of the
OP may change, but the voltage magnitude at the actual
OP is assumed to remain constant. Consequently, the curve of
constant voltage magnitude can be used to determine the avail-
able power reserve. The curve of constant voltage magnitude
at the actual OP (red dotted curve in Fig. 7) is computed em-
ploying (15). Then this curve is transferred to the OP by
adding (blue dotted curve). The injection impedance that
respects the security margin of the OP can be found as
the intersection of the blue dotted and blue dashed circle. This
impedance is transferred back to the actual OP and the available
power reserve can be computed.
G. Determination of Redispatch Solutions
The preventive action comprises the power reduction at a
particular generator to restore its stability (see Section III-E)
and the increase of power generation of one generator or a
group to counterbalance the power reduction. Depending on
the determined power reserves of the remaining generators
(see Section III-F), a variety of redispatch solutions can be
identiﬁed employing different criteria for generator selection
and for sharing of the required power increase between several
generators. Possible generator selection criteria can be size of
the individual power reserve, power margin, electrical distance
to the generator in distress or consensus in served loads. Criteria
for computing a share size for a particular supporting generator
may be determined e.g., by the size of the generator or its
available power reserve.
In the implementation presented in this paper, the generator or
the group of generators to counter balance the power reduction
are chosen corresponding to there relative electrical distance to
the generator in distress. The idea is to redispatch the reduced
power to the electrically close generators. For that purpose in-
dices representing the relative electrical distance are computed
with an approach based on the one described in Section II-C and
[16]. The approach allows to determine the relative electrical
distance of an internal machine node behind the synchronous
reactance to an terminal of another machine. In order to utilize
the method, the extended and augmented grid admittance ma-
trix was assembled as follows:
(18)
where is the number of buses and the number of generators
in the system. The matrix is augmented by the load admittances
and the synchronous reactances of the generator. Furthermore,
it is extended to the internal nodes of the generators. The
sub-matrix is the regular grid admittance of the power
system augmented by the load admittance and the synchronous
reactances of the generators. The matrix is the sub-
matrix containing all the entries due to the additional internal
nodes, which were included due to the chosen representation
of synchronous machines. The matrix is a sub-
matrix, which is linking the internal nodes of the generators to
the system buses corresponding to the generator terminals, and
is its transpose.
After dividing the grid matrix into the sub-matrices according
to [16], the relative electrical distance of the internal nodes to
the remaining nodes in the system can be calculated as follows:
(19)
The values in each column of the resulting matrix now con-
tain a measure of the relative electrical distance between an in-
ternal node of the respective generator to its own terminal, to
the terminals of the other generators and the remaining system
nodes. Each entry has an offset due to the electrical distance
between internal node and terminal, which can be corrected by
subtracting the respective relative electrical distance between
internal node and generator terminal from all the remaining en-
tries in the particular column.
In the case that the total available power reserves are not suf-
ﬁcient to perform the required redispatch, an emergency solu-
tion is proposed, which aims at moving the OP of the critical
generator as far as possible away from the stability boundary
and towards the security boundary without jeopardizing sta-
bility and security of the remaining generators. For that purpose,
the power reserves of the non-critical generators are computed
as described in Section III-F and the total reserve
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Fig. 8. One-line diagram of the modiﬁed IEEE 14-bus test system.
as the sum of all reserves is computed, where is the set of
non-critical generators:
(20)
As stated before, in this case the total reserves are less than the
needed power reduction computed in Section III-E. However,
in order to stabilize the critical generator, its power injection is
reduced by , which can be counterbalanced by the
remaining generators without putting them at risk.
IV. RESULTS
A. Scenario 1: OP Crosses Stability Boundary
1) Test System: A modiﬁed version of the IEEE 14-bus test
system [17] was used. Modiﬁcations of the original system
were amongst others the following. The three condensers in the
system were replaced by generators to allow an active power
redispatch. Bus 8 was considered to be an inﬁnite bus and
the generator connected to it represents a strong external grid.
The synchronous machines G2-G4 are manually excited. The
generators G1 and G5 are equipped with automatic voltage
regulator (AVR), over excitation limiter (OEL) and power
system stabilizer (PSS). A one-line diagram of the test system
can be found in Fig. 8.
2) Unstable Scenario: In this scenario the system was highly
loaded and in stressed conditions. To provoke instability, a se-
quence of contingencies were applied (see Fig. 9). The results
of the time domain simulation were used to generate synthetic
PMU measurements, which were fed to the assessment method.
After the ﬁrst and second disturbance, each corresponding to
a loss of a transmission line, the system seems to reach a new
quasi steady state (see Fig. 9). However, at the new OP the ex-
citation voltage of G1 is too high and the OEL is activated after
a pre-set delay. This last disturbance led to a loss of synchro-
nism of the respective generator and, furthermore, to a collapse
in voltage in the system.
The stability assessment results, when applying the ASSRAS
method [5], are shown in Fig. 10. The ﬁgure shows a magniﬁed
detail of the normalized injection impedance plane. Here, the
actual OP of a generator is depicted by a blue circle and the
OP is indicated by a blue ﬁlled square. The color of the
large circle, which represents the stability boundary, indicates
Fig. 9. IEEE 14-bus: Instability scenario: Generator bus voltages.
Fig. 10. IEEE 14-bus: Stability assessment results: Pre-fault (1.08 s), after ﬁrst
disturbance loss of line 1–2 (25.07 s), after second disturbance loss of line 4–5
(41.16 s), after third disturbance activation of OXL of G1 (80.06 s). Arabic
numbers refer to the number of the generator, e.g., “1” refers to G1.
the stability state of the system, where green corresponds to a
stable state and red to an unstable state. The state is assessed to
be insecure if an OP has crossed the security margin or a
OP has crossed the stability boundary, but the OEL is not yet
activated.
Fig. 10 shows the stability assessment results at four time in-
stances labelled with the Roman numerals I-IV. In the pre-fault
condition (see Fig. 10 I) the system is in steady-state. The ﬁrst
disturbance leads to a considerable reduction of the stability
margin of the actual OPs of G2 and G3 and the OP of
G1, but the system remains stable and secure (see Fig. 10 II).
After the second disturbance and when a new quasi steady state
is reached, the method identiﬁes that the OP of G1 crossed
the stability boundary (see Fig. 10 III). However, as long as the
OEL of the generator is not activated the system remains stable,
but is no longer considered secure. Consequently, the third dis-
turbance, which corresponds to the activation of the OEL of G1,
leads to an unstable state and, eventually, to a collapse in voltage
(see Fig. 10 IV and Fig. 9).
The results show that the assessment method could detect an
insecure operation of the system approximately 40 s before the
actual collapse in voltage occurred.
3) Scenario With Remedial Action: In the following the same
instability scenario is discussed, but this time, when insecure
operation is detected, then the remedial action method described
in Section III is triggered and a power redispatch is determined
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TABLE II
ACTIVE POWER RESERVES AND RE-DISPATCH SOLUTION
and executed to bring the system back into a secure state. Ofﬂine
simulation of the test system showed, that for an OP, the
security and trigger margin can be chosen low with 0.5% and
0.1% of .
The stability margin of the OP of G1 had fallen below
the trigger margin and the system reached a quasi steady state
(see Section III-B) at the time instance shown in Fig. 10 III.
Consequently, the remedial action method was executed and a
redispatch as shown in Table II was determined. It should be
noted, that generator G5 was not considered for the redispatch,
since it represents the connection to a strong external grid.
The method determined that the active power of G1 needs to
be reduced by 22.4 MW to bring the system back into a secure
state. The computation of the power reserves of the remaining
generators showed that only all three generators together can
balance the needed power reduction. The contribution of each
generator was determined from the size of its power reserve with
respect to the available total power reserve. Table II shows the
complete redispatch solution and that in this case the size of the
machine rather than the maximum power injection was the lim-
iting factor. Fig. 11 shows the simulation results, when the pro-
posed redispatch of active power is applied. Fig. 11(a) shows the
voltages at the generator buses over time and Fig. 11(b) shows
the active power injection of the generators. In both graphs, the
simulation results without corrective actions are illustrated with
dashed lines and the results with the proposed redispatch with
solid lines.
It can be seen that the collapse in voltage was prevented, due
to the power redispatch, where the power output of G1 was re-
duced and the power injections of G2-G4 were increased. An
additional beneﬁt was the prevention of the third disturbance,
which was the activation of the OEL of G1.
Fig. 12 shows the stability condition of the system at the
time when insecure operation was detected (see Fig. 10 III and
Fig. 12 III) and when a new quasi steady state was reached after
the corrective redispatch (Fig. 12 V). The labels at the OPs show
the stability margin of the corresponding generator.
The stability margins of the generators G2-G4 were reduced
considerably and the stability margin of the OP of G1
was increased to a secure margin . Finally, the graph
shows that all generators are secure and stable.
B. Scenario 2: Actual OP Crosses Stability Boundary
1) Test System: The Nordic32 system [18] was chosen for
the second test case. The system topology was modiﬁed as de-
scribed in [5]. Moreover, in the presented case the initial condi-
tion from [18] were altered. The modiﬁcations are as follows:
1) Generator G22 is set out-of-service and its load is shared by
G7, G8, G20, and G21. 2) Generator G7 is manually excited.
Fig. 11. IEEE 14-bus: Results of the instable scenario, when applying the reme-
dial action method. (a) Stabilized scenario: Generator bus voltages with preven-
tive actions. (b) Stabilized scenario: Generator power injection with preventive
actions.
Fig. 12. IEEE 14-bus: Stability condition before and after preventive action,
the percentages indicate the stability margin after the preventive action. The
Arabic numbers refer to the number of the generator, e.g., “1” refers to G1.
3) One line connecting 2031 and 2032 is disconnected. 4) Load
alternations: at 41 increased by 20 MW, at 2031 increased by
10 MWand at 2032 decreased by 10 MW.
In the presented case, the system is in a very stressed condi-
tion, where the excitation voltage of various generators is close
to the respective limit.
2) Unstable Scenario: In order to provoke instability and
a collapse in voltage, the line connecting bus 4021 and 4042
was tripped at . The disturbance leads to electromechan-
ical oscillations, which damp out, but lead to activation of var-
ious OELs before a collapse in voltage can be observed (see
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Fig. 13. Voltage magnitude at a selection of buses.
Fig. 14. Nordic32: Stability assessment results: Pre-fault (2.5 s), after ﬁrst dis-
turbance loss of line 4021–4042 (18.06 s), after second disturbance activation of
OEL of G11 (21.89 s), G7 crosses stability boundary (45.89 s). Arabic numbers
refer to the number of the generator, e.g., “1” refers to G1.
Fig. 13). The OELs are activated successively beginning with
G11 at 18.28 s, G4 at 23.70 s, G13 at 33.11 s, G10 at 42.15 s,
G12 at 45.90 s, and G6 at 47.13 s.
The ASSRAS assessment results are shown at a selection of
time instances I-IV in Fig. 14. Here only the start and end OPs
(I and IV) are depicted by big markers, which indicate the type
of the OP, while the intermediate OPs at II and III are solely
represented by small blue dots.
In the pre-fault condition seen in Fig. 14 I all the generators
are stable and secure. It can be observed that the most critical
generator is the manually excited generator G7 since its actual
OP is relatively close to the stability boundary with a margin of
5.73%. The remaining displayed OPs are OPs and, conse-
quently, are less critical. However, these will become the actual
OPs, when the OEL of the respective generator is activated. The
loss of the transmission line connecting bus 4021 and 4042 re-
duced the stability margin of G7 to 3.68% (II) and its OP moved
closer to the boundary. Afterwards, the OEL of G11 was acti-
vated at 18.28 s and, hence, the prior OPG11 now became
the actual OP. This second disturbance led to a further reduction
of the stability margin of the critical machine G7 to 0.98% (III).
The subsequent activations of the OEL's of G4, G10, and G13
caused further depression of the stability margin of G7 and the
generator eventually crossed the stability boundary at 44.98 s,
as shown in Fig. 14 IV. Afterwards, the generator started to drift
TABLE III
ACTIVE POWER RE-DISPATCH SOLUTIONS
Fig. 15. Stability condition ca. 30 s after the last corrective redispatch. The
Arabic numbers refer to the number of the generator, e.g., “1” refers to G1.
away from the remaining generators, which eventually causes a
collapse of the voltages at (see Fig. 13).
The results show that the assessment method detects the im-
minent instability approximately 28 s before the collapse.
3) Scenario With Remedial Action: In this section, the same
instability scenario as prior is investigated, but this time the re-
medial action method is executed, when a generator's stability
margin falls below the trigger margin. Ofﬂine simulation of the
test system showed, that the margin thresholds for actual OPs
has to be chosen more conservative with 2% for the security
margin and 1% for the trigger margin.
In the prior described scenario, the stability margin of gener-
ator G7 fell below the trigger margin at 21.89 s (see Fig. 14 III).
The developed method determined the necessary remedial ac-
tion to bring the system back into a secure state to be an active
power reduction of G7 by 8.25 MW. Furthermore, the method
computed the available power reserves of the remaining gen-
erators. G11 was chosen to counterbalance the power reduction
with an equal increase, because of its electrical proximity and its
sufﬁcient power reserve. Due to the OEL activation of G4, the
margin of G7 again fell below the trigger threshold, which in re-
turn executed the remedial action method and caused a second
corrective power redispatch. The plurality of OEL activations
caused G7 to cross the threshold a third time. Details on the
three corrective actions can be found in Table III.
The table shows the time, when a corrective action is applied,
the critical generator, whose power injection is reduced, as well
as its stability margin and the needed power reduction. Further-
more, it shows the supporting generator, which will counterbal-
ance the power reduction, and the stability margin of the crit-
ical generator after the corrective action. During the ﬁrst two
corrective actions, the system is in a state, where ULTC trans-
formers and OELs are acting. Consequently, the assumption of
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Fig. 16. Voltage magnitude at a selection of buses with corrective redispatch.
quasi steady state conditions introduces an error and may ex-
plain, why the remedial action do not lead to a stability margin
greater or equal to the chosen security margin. The last correc-
tive redispatch succeeds to bring the system back into a secure
state. Fig. 15 depicts the system after the last redispatch and after
a new quasi steady state was reached. It can be seen that all OPs
are in the secure and stable region.
Fig. 16 displays the voltage magnitudes at a selection of buses
over time. The dashed lines are the voltages in the unstable case
and the solid lines are the voltages in the case with corrective
control actions. The graph shows that the corrective actions pre-
vented the system collapse and led to a stabilization of the volt-
ages.
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper a new patented method was presented that
determines remedial actions to prevent a blackout. A real-time
ASSRAS assessment method is used to identify insecure or
unstable system operation. The presented method utilizes these
information to compute corrective power redispatch solutions.
The method is based on algebraically derived expressions,
which makes it very well suited for real-time application. The
control actions move the OP of the critical generator back into
the secure region, while ensuring that none of the supporting
generators enters an insecure state.
The method's capability of avoiding a collapse in voltage
and an imminent blackout was demonstrated with simulation
results from two scenarios and two test systems (IEEE 14-bus
and Nordic32). In both cases, the determined corrective redis-
patches stabilized the system and restored the stability margin
of the critical machine to a secure level. This demonstrates ac-
curacy and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.
In future work, the proposed approach could be further de-
veloped, e.g., taking into account additional constraints, such as
the limits of the OELs, when determining the available active
power reserves.
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Appendix I
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I.1. New England & New York system
I.1 New England & New York system
The employed test system is the New England & New York system described in
[65]. It consists of 68 buses and 16 generators. The loads are modelled as constant
impedances in the time-domain simulation.
The rotor dynamics of the generators are represented by a sixth order model. More-
over, the generators are all equipped with a simple excitation and voltage regulation
system, as well as a thermal turbine/governor model. In addition, all generators,
but GEN-7 and GEN-14, are equipped with a power system stabilizer. Figure I.1
shows a one-line diagram of the system.
Figure I.1: One-line diagram of the New England and New York system [87].
The initial state of the system was as well adopted [65].
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I.2. Nordic32
I.2 Nordic32
The system is a simplified representation of the Swedish transmission grid and has
been used extensively to test and evaluate the efficiency of stability assessment
methods, e.g. [9] and [11]. A one-line diagram is depicted in Fig. I.2.
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Figure I.2: Oneline diagram of the Nordic32 system, figure adopted from [9]
The topology of the system was slightly modified as described in [9], where ULTC-
transformers were introduced at the buses 1041−1045 to serve the connected loads.
This resulted in the introduction of the additional buses 141 − 145. Moreover, to
further stress the system the initial condition from [84] were altered as follows:
1. Generator G22 is out-of-service and its production is shared between G7, G8,
G20 and G21.
2. Generator G7 is manually excited.
3. One line connecting 2031 and 2032 is disconnected.
4. Changes to loads: at bus 41 the load is increased by 20 MW, at bus 2031 it
is increased by 10 MW and at bus 2032 the load is decreased by 10 MW.
This resulted in very stressed system conditions were various of the generators’
excitation voltages are close to their respective limits.
159/159


www.elektro.dtu.dk
Department of Electrical Engineering
Centre for Electric Power and Energy (CEE)
Technical University of Denmark
Elektrovej building 325
DK-2800 Kgs. Lyngby
Denmark
Tel: (+45) 45 25 38 00
Fax: (+45) 45 93 16 34
Email: info@elektro.dtu.dk
